Aguirre v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 06 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 5:19-cv-565-TPB-PRL |
| Parties | JOSE MARGARITO AGUIRRE, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
JOSE MARGARITO AGUIRRE, Petitioner,
v.
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS and FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondents.
No. 5:19-cv-565-TPB-PRL
United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Ocala Division
February 6, 2023
ORDER DENYING THE AMENDED PETITION AND DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
TOM BARBER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
I. Status
Petitioner, Jose Margarito Aguirre, an inmate of the Florida penal system, initiated this action by filing a pro se Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1). He is proceeding on an Amended Petition (Doc. 12). Respondents filed a Response (Doc. 16).[1] The Court provided Petitioner with an opportunity to reply (Doc. 13), but he did not do so. This case is ripe for review.
II. Relevant Factual and Procedural History
The facts are set out in Petitioner's initial brief filed on direct appeal (Resp. Ex. C at 1-6). According to the brief's factual summary, one night, Petitioner and Fernando Castaneda drove in a black Dodge to the Rodeo Bar in Mount Dora (id. at
1-2). Petitioner's friends, Richard Herrera, Cynthia,[2] and Jesse, arrived at the Rodeo Bar at the same time in a separate vehicle. When they all arrived, Herrera had a .40 caliber firearm with him and left it in Jesse's car when they all went into the back room of the bar (id.).
Jeremiah Barriner, Kellie Adams, and Demetrius “Michi” Barriner (Jeremiah Barriner's brother) were also in the back room of the bar (id.). At closing time, Petitioner and Michi got into an altercation, resulting in Petitioner getting kicked out of the bar (id.). At trial, the bar owner testified that when Petitioner was being escorted out of the bar, he made threatening remarks to Michi and Michi's group of friends (id. at 2-3). Michi testified at trial that after Petitioner was kicked out of the bar, the bar owner suggested that Michi and his friends wait before exiting the bar because he was concerned about Petitioner's aggressive actions towards them (id. at 3). After briefly waiting, Michi, Jeremiah Barriner, and Kellie Adams began walking to their car and when they stopped to converse, the black Dodge approached them and Petitioner, who was in the passenger seat of the Dodge, pointed a gun out the window (id.). According to Michi and Kellie Adams, Petitioner then stated, “I have something for you . . .” before firing several gunshots in their direction (id.). Two of those shots struck Jeremiah Barriner, killing him.
Cynthia and Herrera testified at trial that they were also in the black Dodge when Petitioner fired the shots. According to them, when they left the bar with Petitioner, someone in Michi's group of friends shouted, “We're going to put
[Petitioner] on a T-shirt” (id.). Cynthia, Herrera, and Petitioner interpreted that statement as a threat to kill Petitioner (id.). According to Cynthia, just before Petitioner began shooting, she saw Michi, who was standing next to Jeremiah Barriner, lift his shirt as someone uttered the threatening statement again (id.). Cynthia testified that when Michi lifted his shirt, she believed he was attempting to show that he had a firearm (id.). Michi, however, testified that he was unarmed and did not make any threatening statements, nor did he lift his shirt when the black Dodge approached his group (id.).
Herrera testified that when he was leaving the bar with Petitioner, Petitioner asked for Herrera's gun and Petitioner took possession of the firearm when he got into the black Dodge (id.). According to Herrera, as they drove past Michi's group, Cynthia pointed at the group and said, “There goes the motherf**ker who . . . hit . . . choked me” (id.). Herrera stated that Petitioner then said to Michi's group, “I got something for you motherf**kers,” before firing three or four shots in the group's direction (id.).
Fernando Castaneda, who was driving the black Dodge when Petitioner shot Jeremiah Barriner, testified that after Petitioner fired the shots, he yelled, “Go . . . go . . . go,” so Castaneda drove away quickly and ended up at Cynthia's house (id. at 4-5). The next morning, Herrera took the firearm to his grandmother's house, where Petitioner's father disassembled the gun, cut it into parts, and discarded it off a roadside in Apopka (id.). Petitioner's father subsequently led police to the discarded gun parts (id.).
An autopsy of Jeremiah Barriner revealed that he suffered one gunshot wound to his back and one gunshot wound near his ankle (id. at 5). At trial, Petitioner claimed he acted in self-defense (id.). He testified that he feared for his life when Michi said he would put Petitioner on a T-shirt. According to Petitioner, when Michi lifted his shirt, Petitioner fired at the ground with no intent of shooting anyone (id. at 6). Petitioner explained that he fled to Texas after the incident because Jeremiah Barriner's friends began posting online threats against Petitioner (id.).
After the state rested its case, trial counsel moved for a judgment of acquittal:
MR. CARRANZA: Okay. Your Honor, at this point we would move for a judgment of acquittal. We don't believe the State has proven a prima facie case. Specifically, Your Honor, for the second-degree murder, we don't believe that the State has proven a prima facie case of the depraved mind. We believe that with crossexamination and with direct examination it is clear that this incident did not have any evil intent, a depraved mind
We believe the physical evidence in regard to the trajectory of the bullet and mister -- and the testimony from Cindy Aguirre stating that Mr. Aguirre stated and he physically already showing that he shot to the right and shot to the ground. We believe that the State has proven a prima facie case of manslaughter at this point, but we don't believe it rises to second-degree murder.
THE COURT: Motion is denied.
(Resp. Ex. B at 559-60). Following Petitioner's trial testimony, trial counsel renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, which the trial court again denied (id. at 644).
Following closing arguments, the jury found Petitioner guilty of second degree murder, specifically finding that Petitioner discharged a firearm causing death or great bodily harm during the commission of the offense (Resp. Ex. A at 140). The trial court adjudicated Petitioner as a Prison Releasee Reoffender and sentenced him to a life term of incarceration (id. at 183-86).
On direct appeal, Petitioner, with the benefit of counsel, filed an initial brief (Resp. Ex. C) pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), representing that no good faith argument of reversible error could be made. In the Anders brief, however, appellate counsel raised two issues for potential review: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for judgment of acquittal, and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial (Resp. Ex. C). Without requiring a response from the state, the Fifth District Court of Appeal per curiam affirmed Petitioner's judgment and conviction without a written opinion (Resp. Exs. D-E).
Petitioner later filed several pro se postconviction motions with the state courts, including a Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion raising three claims (Resp. Ex. Q). The trial court summarily denied the Rule 3.850 motion (Resp. Ex. T), and the Fifth DCA per curiam affirmed the trial court's decision without a written opinion (Resp. Ex. W). This action followed.
III. Governing Legal Principles
A. Standard of Review Under AEDPA
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) governs a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition. See Ledford v. Warden, Ga. Diagnostic & Classification Prison, 818 F.3d 600, 642 (11th Cir. 2016). “‘The purpose of AEDPA is to ensure that federal habeas relief functions as a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, and not as a means of error correction.'” Id. (quoting Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34, 38 (2011)).
The first task of the federal habeas court is to identify the last state court decision, if any, that adjudicated the petitioner's claims on the merits. See Marshall v. Sec'y Fla. Dep't of Corr., 828 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2016). The state court need not issue an opinion explaining its rationale for the state court's decision to qualify as an adjudication on the merits. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 100 (2011). When the state court's adjudication on the merits is unaccompanied by an explanation, “the federal court should ‘look through' the unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that does provide a relevant rationale” and “presume that the unexplained decision adopted the same reasoning.” Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S.Ct. 1188, 1192 (2018).
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner's claims on the merits, a federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court's adjudication of the claim was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,”
or “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding,” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). A state court's factual findings are “presumed to be correct” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
AEDPA “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state court rulings” and “demands that statecourt decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fairminded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court's decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562...
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