Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., s. 76-1483
| Decision Date | 31 October 1977 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 76-1483,76-1484,s. 76-1483 |
| Citation | 12 Ill.Dec. 292,369 N.E.2d 1306,54 Ill.App.3d 638 |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Parties | , 12 Ill.Dec. 292 Anna AHLERS, an incompetent, by Arthur Ahlers, her conservator and husband, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
Rooks, Pitts, Fullagar & Poust, Chicago (Douglas F. Stevenson, Phillip B. Allen, William N. Krucks, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellant.
Roger J. Boylan, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee.
The circuit court entered two judgments in favor of Anna Ahlers, an incompetent, suing by Arthur Ahlers, her conservator (plaintiff), and against Sears, Roebuck and Company (defendant), arising out of proceedings before the Industrial Commission of Illinois which had resulted in approval of a settlement contract. Defendant has appealed.
The factual basis of this appeal is readily stated. Plaintiff's ward was seriously injured while employed by defendant. It is agreed that the injuries resulted in permanent total disability and arose out of and in the course of employment. An application for compensation was filed with the commission. A written settlement contract between the parties was approved by the commission on June 4, 1971. Defendant agreed to pay weekly benefits and an annual pension.
The only portion of the settlement agreement at issue here pertained to care and management of the disabled person from and after July 1, 1970. The contract as approved recited that a dispute had arisen concerning the obligation of defendant to provide nursing home care. In lieu of such care, the conservator had rented larger quarters and engaged a practical nurse to live with the ward. The agreement further provided:
The agreement also provided, concerning payment of necessary medical and hospital services due to the injury, that, "(i)n the event the parties cannot agree whether any item is reimbursable, that controversy may be submitted to the Commission for resolution."
On March 14, 1974, defendant filed a petition to reopen the case before the commission. Defendant sought to terminate its responsibility for "nursing care and attention * * * " on the ground that this was "no longer required * * * " in accordance with the settlement agreement. On January 6, 1976, after due consideration of the petition, the commission denied it. Defendant took no proceedings for review before the commission.
The payments provided in the settlement agreement were made by defendant until April 1, 1975. Further payment was then terminated. On June 3, 1976, plaintiff filed suit in the circuit court seeking a judgment for monthly payments as provided in the settlement contract which had become due after April 1, 1975, and attorney's fees. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.19(g).) On June 25, 1976, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $10,150, evidencing installments of $725 per month from April 1, 1975, up to June 1, 1976. There was a subsequent judgment for attorney's fees of $2000.
On August 12, 1976, plaintiff filed a second similar suit in the circuit court. On September 1, 1976, judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff for $1450, representing payments under the settlement agreement for June and July of 1976, and attorney's fees of $290. Appeals from these two judgments have been consolidated in this court.
In this court, defendant contends that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter judgment on the settlement contract which did not form a proper legal basis for the entry of judgment under section 19(g); the alleged breach of the settlement contract by defendant did not constitute a refusal to pay compensation under the pertinent statute and plaintiff's sole remedies were contractual which were not properly before the trial court. Plaintiff asserts that the Industrial Commission had exclusive power to litigate all disputes arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act; the awards and decisions of the commission have the same finality as judgments of a court; defendant was not able to review the action of the commission in approving the award; a settlement contract approved by the commission has the legal status of an award; and the distinction must be made between the term compensation and the payment of compensation.
The role of the circuit court in workmen's compensation cases is defined and limited by the special "powers that are conferred by the statute." (Interlake Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n (1975), 60 Ill.2d 255, 262, 326 N.E.2d 744, 748; Gunnels v. Industrial Comm'n (1964), 30 Ill.2d 181, 185, 195 N.E.2d 609.) In the case before us, both complaints were filed pursuant to section 19(g) of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.19(g)) which provides:
Defendant contends that section 19(g) does not authorize judgment on a settlement contract which is neither an "award of the Arbitrator * * * " nor a "decision of the Commission * * * " under that section. This argument overlooks the most pertinent fact of commission approval of the settlement contract. The Act recognizes that the parties may enter into settlement agreements (see, e. g., Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.19(h)) and it empowers the commission to approve a compromise or settlement of an employee's right to compensation. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.23; see Taylor v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1974), 22 Ill.App.3d 164, 167, 319 N.E.2d 303.) The settlement contract before us was an approved compromise of defendant's statutory duty to "pay for such maintenance or institutional care as shall be required" if the employee cannot be self-sufficient "as a result of the injury * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).) It cannot be disputed that an act of the commission within its statutory powers is a "decision of the Commission * * * " under section 19(g).
A settlement contract approved by the commission "is, in legal effect, an award" for purposes of determining a deduction for a previous injury from an award for a later injury (Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1950), 404 Ill. 557, 565, 90 N.E.2d 220, 224); in fixing the jurisdiction of the commission to review the settlement (Michelson v. Industrial Comm'n (1941), 375 Ill. 462, 468, 31 N.E.2d 940); in denying the availability of collateral attack on the agreement when no direct review had been sought (Dyer v. Industrial Comm'n (1936), 364 Ill. 161, 163, 4 N.E.2d 82) and in deciding whether a right to compensation was extinguished by an employee's death (Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1926), 320 Ill. 544, 151 N.E. 495). In our opinion, this general rule that a settlement agreement approved by the commission is in legal effect an award applies in the case before us. Defendant relies upon the factual differences in the foregoing decisions. These factual variations do not alter our conclusion.
Further, to construe section 19(g) as excluding settlement contracts approved by the commission would be contrary to the policy that settlement agreements "are fostered and encouraged by the courts * * *." Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 320 Ill. 544, 546, 151 N.E. 495, 496; see generally Blaylock v. Toledo, Peoria & Western R. R. Co. (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 35, 37, 1 Ill.Dec. 451, 356 N.E.2d 639.
Defendant asserts more specifically that the plaintiff's rights are contractual rather than being rights under section 19(g). Defendant depends upon two contingencies expressed in the settlement contract which could extinguish defendant's liability for nursing care: (1) either party could unilaterally determine the payments were no longer necessary and then could discontinue payment or acceptance of payment and (2) either party could petition the commission to change "the mode of such benefits * * *." We cannot agree.
Section 19(g) unambiguously vests in the circuit court the "power at any time upon application to make any such judgment conform to any modification required by any subsequent decision of the Supreme Court upon appeal, or as the result of any subsequent proceedings for review, as provided in this Act." (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.19(g).) Therefore, the fact that an award or decision is subject to later modification by these methods does not alter the availability of judgment under section 19(g).
We note also that awards for compensation in cases of complete disability under section 8(f) of the Act are not excepted from the coverage of section 19(g) even though section 8(f) provides: "If...
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