Ahmad v. Beck, CV–15–33

Decision Date04 February 2016
Docket NumberNo. CV–15–33,CV–15–33
Citation480 S.W.3d 166
Parties Mahmood Ahmad, M.D., Appellant v. Joseph M. Beck, M.D., Chairman, Arkansas State Medical Board ; and Arkansas State Medical Board, Appellees
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Samuel A. Perroni, Little Rock, and Tim Dudley, for appellant.

Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Colin R. Jorgensen, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.

HOWARD W. BRILL, Chief Justice

AppellantMahmood Ahmad, M.D., appeals an order of the Pulaski County Circuit Court dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and his motion for temporary restraining order.For reversal, Dr. Ahmad contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his complaint and that the circuit court erred in denying, on jurisdictional grounds, his request for a temporary restraining order.We affirm the circuit court's order.

Dr. Ahmad is a physician licensed under the Arkansas Medical Practices Act, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 17–95–201 to –412 (Repl. 2010 & Supp. 2015)(the "Act").A board certified anesthesiologist, he has practiced medicine in Pulaski County for over fifteen years, specializing in pain management.As part of his practice, Dr. Ahmad regularly writes prescriptions for controlled substances.

The Arkansas State Medical Board(the "Board"), which consists of fourteen members appointed by the Governor, has the authority to promulgate and put into effect rules and regulations as are necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.Ark. Code Ann. § 17–95–303(2).In addition, pursuant to the Act, the Board may revoke an existing license or impose penalties when a physician has committed any of the acts or offenses defined as "unprofessional conduct."Id.§ 17–95–409(a).

To understand the issues on appeal in this case, it is necessary to briefly review the procedural history in two separate actions arising from the same set of facts.In November 2012, the Board charged Dr. Ahmad with alleged violations of the Act related to his prescribing controlled substances to patients, his record keeping, and his patient monitoring.After two administrative hearings, in an order entered June 22, 2013, the Board found Dr. Ahmad in violation of the Act and Board regulations 2.4 and 2.6 and ordered him to take certain continuing education courses, undergo a record keeping audit, reimburse the Board for the cost of its investigation, and pay a fine of $500 per count for his violation.1On July 5, 2013, Dr. Ahmad filed in the circuit court an administrative appeal of the Board's order.SeeAhmad v. State Medical Board, PulaskiCty. Cir. Ct., No. 60CV–13–2691.

On December 3, 2013, while his administrative appeal was pending in the circuit court, Dr. Ahmad filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the Board and the Board's chairman, Joseph M. Beck, M.D.(collectively referred to as the "Board").SeeAhmad v. Beck, PulaskiCty. Cir. Ct., No. 60CV–13–4704.In his complaint, Dr. Ahmad requested that the circuit court(1) declare that Arkansas Code Annotated section 17–95–704(b)(3)(A) of the Chronic Intractable Pain Treatment Act, Arkansas Code Annotated sections 17–95–701 to –707 ("CIPTA"), and Board regulations 2.4, 2.6, and 192 are unconstitutional and therefore null and void; (2) declare that the Board engages in conduct that exceeds its statutory authority in applying regulations 2.4, 2.6, and 19 to disciplinary actions against physicians practicing pain medicine; and (3) enjoin the Board from applying regulations 2.4, 2.6, and 19 to disciplinary hearings.

On January 3, 2014, the Board filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, contending that, because Dr. Ahmad's exclusive remedy was an administrative appeal of the Board's June 22, 2013 order, his complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was barred as a matter of law.The Board asserted that Dr. Ahmad had the opportunity in the June 2013 administrative hearings to raise his constitutional arguments and to obtain rulings on those arguments.The Board added that Dr. Ahmad had the opportunity to obtain judicial review of all rulings contained in the Board's June 22 order.Dr. Ahmad responded and argued that his complaint complied with the requirements of Arkansas Code Annotated section 25–15–207(Repl. 2004) of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act.He also argued that, because he had no genuine opportunity for relief, the circuit court had jurisdiction over his complaint pursuant to the declaratory-judgment statute, Arkansas Code Annotated section 16–111–104(Repl. 2006).Finally, he argued that it would be futile to raise his constitutional issues in his administrative appeal to the circuit court because he did not raise those issues in the administrative hearings before the Board.

On September 4, 2014, Ahmad filed a motion for temporary restraining order in which he asked the circuit court to issue an order prohibiting the Board from pursuing any administrative action against him in separate cases pending against him until both his administrative appeal and his declaratory and injunctive action were concluded.On September 30, 2014, after a hearing on the complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and the motion for temporary restraining order, the circuit court entered an order granting the Board's motion to dismiss, denying Dr. Ahmad's motion for a restraining order, and dismissing the complaint with prejudice.3The circuit court noted in its order that Dr. Ahmad's complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief was filed on December 10, 2013, which was after the June 2013 administrative hearings; that in addition to filing the complaint, Dr. Ahmad had also filed an administrative appeal of the Board's disciplinary action against him; and that the administrative appeal remained pending.The circuit court ruled that Dr. Ahmad was barred from seeking declaratory relief on the constitutionality of Board regulations 2.4, 2.6, and 19 and that he was required to exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking declaratory relief from the court.Dr. Ahmad now appeals the order dismissing with prejudice his complaint for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief and his motion for temporary restraining order.

To dispose of this appeal, we must answer the following question: Under the facts of this case, was Dr. Ahmad permitted to file a separate declaratory action to raise claims that he could have raised in the proceedings before the Board?The circuit court answered that question in the negative.We consider questions of law de novo.SeeTucker v. Sullivant,2010 Ark. 170, 370 S.W.3d 812.

Dr. Ahmad contends that, even though his administrative appeal was pending, he was entitled to bring a separate action for declaratory judgment pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 25–15–207 of the Arkansas Administrative Procedure Act and Arkansas's declaratory-judgment statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 16–111–104.Section 25–15–207 states, in relevant part,

(a) The validity or applicability of a rule may be determined in an action for declaratory judgment if it is alleged that the rule, or its threatened application, injures or threatens to injure the plaintiff in his or her person, business, or property.
....
(d) A declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the plaintiff has requested the agency to pass upon the validity or applicability of the rule in question.

Section 16–111–104 states,

Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder.

The Board responds that the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine applies; therefore, Dr. Ahmad was not entitled to bring a separate declaratory action.The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies provides that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.Hotels.com, LP v. Pine Bluff Advertising & Promotion Comm'n,2013 Ark. 392, 430 S.W.3d 56;see alsoMcGhee v. Ark. State Bd. of Collection Agencies,368 Ark. 60, 243 S.W.3d 278(2006)(stating that a basic rule of administrative procedure requires that an agency be given the opportunity to address a question before a complainant resorts to the courts).The failure to exhaust administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal.McGhee,368 Ark. 60, 243 S.W.3d 278.

Declaratory-judgment actions are intended to supplement, rather than replace, ordinary actions.Rehab Hosp. Servs. Corp. v. Delta–Hills Health Sys. Agency, Inc.,285 Ark. 397, 687 S.W.2d 840(1985).Accordingly, litigants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking a declaratory judgment.Hankins v. McElroy,313 Ark. 394, 855 S.W.2d 310(1993);see alsoRehab Hosp. Servs. v. Delta–Hills,285 Ark. at 399, 687 S.W.2d at 841–42("It seems to be now a recognized doctrine that requires administrative relief to be sought before resorting to declaratory procedure, wherever administrative relief is afforded and this requirement is not one merely requiring the initiation of administrative procedure, but the administrative procedure must be pursued to its final conclusion before resort may be had to the court for declaratory relief. ")(quotingW. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments, § 204, at 433(1951)).

In the instant case, Dr. Ahmad did not pursue the administrative procedure to its final conclusion.Rather, he filed a separate complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief while administrative proceedings were pending.

Still, there are exceptions to the exhaustion-of-administrative-remedies doctrine.Hotels.com,LP...

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4 cases
  • Brown v. Towell
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • March 18, 2021
    ...10, 14. Finally, "we consider questions of law de novo. See Tucker v. Sullivant , 2010 Ark. 170, 370 S.W.3d 812." Ahmad v. Beck , 2016 Ark. 30, at 5, 480 S.W.3d 166, 169. II. Points on AppealWe first consider Brown's fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth arguments on appeal that the circ......
  • Mun. Health Benefit Fund v. Hendrix
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 11, 2020
    ...111.3 Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849, 204 L.Ed.2d 116 (2019) (cleaned up).4 See Ahmad v. Beck , 2016 Ark. 30, 480 S.W.3d 166 (disposing of case on substantive exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine as opposed to considering exhaustion as jurisdictional barrie......
  • Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 9, 2017
    ...the court. Generally, declaratory-judgment actions are intended to supplement, rather than replace, ordinary actions. Ahmad v. Beck, 2016 Ark. 30, 480 S.W.3d 166 (2016). Accordingly, litigants must exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking a declaratory judgment. Id., 480 S.W.3d ......
  • Harmon v. Jackson, CV–17–888
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 31, 2018
    ...In Arkansas, exhaustion is generally required when a party is seeking a declaratory judgment or injunctive relief. See Ahmad v. Beck , 2016 Ark. 30, 480 S.W.3d 166 (declaratory-judgment actions are intended to supplement, rather than replace, ordinary actions and litigants must therefore ex......

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