Ahmad v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp.
| Decision Date | 29 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 5:10-cv-310 |
| Court | United States District Courts. 2nd Circuit. District of Vermont |
| Parties | Nizam Ahmad, Plaintiff, v. International Business Machines Corporation, Defendant. |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND
III OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO STRIKE, AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO AMEND
THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
(Docs. 43, 75 and 83)
Plaintiff Nizam Ahmad brings this action claiming that Defendant International Business Machines Corporation ("IBM") wrongfully terminated his employment on the basis of his age, religion, national origin, race and/or ethnicity. Now before the court is IBM's motion to dismiss three of the six Counts asserted in Mr. Ahmad's Second Amended Complaint.1 Specifically, IBM moves to dismiss Mr. Ahmad's claims under the Older Workers Benefits Protection Act ("OWBPA") (Count I), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1974 ("ADEA") (Count II), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III). The court held a hearing on IBM's motion to dismiss on March 8, 2012. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court dismissed Count I on the record. Counts II and III remain pending.
Also before the court is IBM's motion to strike Mr. Ahmad's second memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 75.) Finally, Mr. Ahmad hasmoved to amend his Second Amended Complaint "[i]f the Honorable Court feels that Plaintiff did not file his Complaint properly." (Doc. 83 at 15.) IBM is represented by Patricia M. Sabalis, Esq. Mr. Ahmad is representing himself.
The following facts are derived from the Second Amended Complaint and the attachments thereto. Mr. Ahmad was initially employed by IBM in Vermont between 1994 and 2002. On September 23, 2001, shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, he reportedly had a letter published in the "It's My Turn" section of the Burlington Free Press. The letter stated, among other things, that "the idea of assassination of innocent people is totally against the teaching of Islam," and that "Islam is against those who are fanatics." Mr. Ahmad's photograph was published in the same newspaper the following day under the heading "Muslim spread[s| message of peace." (Doc. 73 at 3.)
On November 3, 2001, IBM allegedly declared Mr. Ahmad as "surplus." Id. at 4. On or around December 1, 2001, IBM notified him that he would be terminated effective January 31, 2002. Mr. Ahmad claims that prior to his termination, his performance reviews at IBM had been satisfactory or better. He is Muslim, originally from Pakistan, and was forty-seven years old at the time of his termination.
In October 2003, a group of former IBM employees, including Mr. Ahmad and others in a putative class of similarly situated persons, brought a lawsuit against IBM in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that their respective terminations violated the ADEA and OWBPA. See Syverson v. Int'l Bus. Mack Corp., Case No. 03-cv-04529-RMW. In or around January 2009, a group of Syverson plaintiffs accepted a settlement from IBM, and the case was dismissed with prejudice. Mr. Ahmad did not accept the settlement offer.
In April 2004, IBM re-hired Mr. Ahmad as a senior project manager. In June 2004, he traveled to Rochester, Minnesota to meet his manager and attend a department meeting. He claims that until this time, his job performance had been "satisfactory or better." This "favorable-feedback pattern" allegedly changed, however, after Mr. Ahmadrevealed during a social gathering his "practice of the dietary restrictions, including restrictions on drinking alcohol, that are associated with Plaintiff's religious (Muslim) belief." (Doc. 73 at 5.)
In October 2004, Mr. Ahmad's manager allegedly offered him a severance package. Mr. Ahmad declined, and instead asked for an internal investigation. The Second Amended Complaint alleges, without elaboration, that the investigation "had discrepancies." Mr. Ahmad claims that he was "abruptly" fired by IBM on December 21, 2004. Id.
The Second Amended Complaint sets forth six claims for relief. The first claim is that a Release and Covenant not to Sue ("Release") signed by Mr. Ahmad at the time of his first termination in 2002 violated the OWBPA, and thus "does not prohibit Plaintiff from maintaining his action for age discrimination under the ADEA." Id. at 6. As noted above, Count I was dismissed by the court at oral argument on the ground that the OWBPA does not authorize an affirmative claim for damages. Count II alleges that Mr. Ahmad was terminated because of his age, in violation of the ADEA. Count III asserts that Mr. Ahmad's religious preference, national origin and ethnicity were "material" and "substantial" factors in his 2002 termination, and that IBM therefore violated his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Counts IV, V, and VI set forth state law claims of breach of implied contract, unlawful employment discrimination under 21 V.S.A. § 495, and defamation, respectively.
IBM now moves to dismiss Counts II and III, arguing (1) that Mr. Ahmad failed to file an administrative charge prior to bringing his ADEA claim, and did not file the claim within the statutory limitations period, and (2) that Mr. Ahmad's cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 is untimely. The motion to dismiss pertains only to Mr. Ahmad's 2002 termination, and not to his subsequent re-employment at IBM in 2004.
IBM brings its motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), all factual allegations in the complaint areaccepted as true, and all inferences are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. See Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1174 (2d Cir. 1993). "'The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Villager Pond, Inc. v. Town of Darien, 56 F.3d 375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995) (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
To survive a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly. 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausability when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
In reviewing a complaint for legal sufficiency under Rule 12(b)(6), a court is limited to the facts "contained within the four corners of the complaint." Goldberg v. Danaher, 599 F.3d 181, 183-84 (2d Cir. 2010). However, a court may also review attachments to the complaint, documents that are incorporated by reference, and documents that are heavily relied upon in, and thus integral to, the complaint. See Yung v. Lee, 432 F.3d 142, 146 (2d Cir. 2005). A court may also dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of an affirmative defense if that defense "appears on the face of the complaint." Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., 547 F.3d 406, 426 (2d Cir. 2008). Although the court must accept the factual allegations of a complaint as true, it is "'not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Finally, pleadings by pro se litigants must be construed liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 2010).
IBM contends that Mr. Ahmad's ADEA claim set forth in Count II should be dismissed because he failed to file a discrimination charge with either the EqualEmployment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or the Vermont Attorney General's Office prior to filing suit. IBM also contends that, even if Mr. Ahmad did not have to file a discrimination charge, his ADEA claim is untimely.2
Filing an administrative charge is a prerequisite to filing suit under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Mr. Ahmad contends that "it would have been useless" to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC because other Syverson plaintiffs had already done so, and the EEOC would have simply rendered "the same determination." (Doc. 73 at 2.) The parties also agreed at oral argument that any such filing with the EEOC would have been untimely. IBM thus acknowledges that the court should not require Mr. Ahmad to now file a claim with the EEOC. It nonetheless argues that, even if relieved of this requirement, Mr. Ahmad's lawsuit is untimely.
Mr. Ahmad contends that, under the "single filing rule." he was allowed to "piggyback" onto the administrative charges filed by other Syverson plaintiffs. In Tolliver v. Xerox Corp., 918 F.2d 1052 (2d Cir. 1990), the Second Circuit concluded that a plaintiff asserting a claim under the ADEA may assert the single-filing rule, and "piggyback" on previous discrimination charges brought by others similarly situated when bringing a separate lawsuit. Tolliver, 918 F.2d at 1057. In reaching this conclusion, the Tolliver court reasoned that "[t]he purpose of the charge filing requirement is fully served by an administrative claim that alerts the EEOC to the nature and scope of the grievance, regardless of whether those with a similar grievance elect to join a preexisting suit or initiate their own." Id. The court also required that, "where the grievances are alleged to arise throughout a large group .. . there must be some indication that the grievance affects a group of individuals defined broadly enough to include those who seek to piggyback on the claim." Id. at 1058.
The Second...
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