Ahmadi v. United Cont'l Holdings, Inc.
| Decision Date | 10 August 2015 |
| Docket Number | 1:14-cv-00264 LJO JLT |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | SARA AHMADI, Plaintiff, v. UNITED CONTINENTAL HOLDINGS, Inc., dba UNITED AIRLINE, and DOES 1-50, Defendants. |
Plaintiff Sara Ahmadi alleges that, while removing baggage from an overhead bin, a fellow passenger on a United Airlines ("United") flight dropped luggage on her head, causing her physical and emotional injuries.
On December 25, 2011, Plaintiff was a passenger on United flights travelling between Bakersfield, CA and Boston, MA, which involved a change of planes in Denver, CO. Joint Statement of Stipulated Facts ("JSSF"), Doc. 41, No. 1. In Denver, Plaintiff boarded Flight 861 to Boston. Id. After Plaintiff was seated, she alleges that a passenger attempted to place a piece of luggage into an overhead bin above her head. Id. During the attempt, the luggage fell on Plaintiff's head, causing her injury. Id. Plaintiff states that that she lost consciousness. JSSF No. 2. Plaintiff did not see this happen, but feltsomething heavy land on her head. JSSF No. 6. Plaintiff's husband was travelling with her and stated that he saw the event. JSSF No. 8. Plaintiff's husband describes that the passenger "was trying to put his luggage where it had to go, and it just fell down from his hand on top of my wife's head." JSSF No. 9. Neither the Plaintiff nor her husband know the identity of this passenger and he currently is not a party to this action. JSSF Nos. 12 & 15. Plaintiff alleges that a flight attendant was near her when this happened and that this attendant failed to assist the passenger. JSSF No. 2.
On December 12, 2013, Ahmadi filed a complaint against United in Kern County Superior Court alleging five causes of action: 1) negligence; 2) res ipsa loquitur negligence; 3) violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 2100, et seq./negligence per se; 4) breach of contract; and 5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Doc. 1. On February 26, 2014, United removed the action to this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Id. On March 5, 2014, United filed a motion to dismiss Ahmadi's fourth and fifth causes of action for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Doc. 5. The Court granted the motion with leave to amend. Doc. 8. On April 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a first amended complaint ("FAC"), Doc. 9. Defendants again moved to dismiss the breach of contract and implied covenant claims. Doc. 10. The Court granted Defendant's request without leave to amend, leaving only the tort claims. Doc. 15.
On May 5, 2015, Defendant moved for summary judgment on the remaining tort claims, on the basis that they are preempted by the Federal Aviation Act ("FAA"). United Airlines, Inc.'s Notice of Mot. for Summ. J. ("MSJ"), Doc. 38. On July 20, 2015, Plaintiff filed an opposition. Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. ("Opposition"), Doc. 57. After receiving Defendant's Reply, Doc. 61, the Court vacated the hearing set for the motion pursuant to Local Rule 230(g).
Summary judgment is proper if the movant shows "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving partybears the initial burden of "informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). A fact is material if it could affect the outcome of the suit under the governing substantive law; "irrelevant" or "unnecessary" factual disputes will not be counted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
If the moving party would bear the burden of proof on an issue at trial, that party must "affirmatively demonstrate that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than for the moving party." Soremekun v. Thrifty Payless, Inc., 509 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2007). In contrast, if the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on an issue, the moving party can prevail by "merely pointing out that there is an absence of evidence" to support the non-moving party's case. Id. When the moving party meets its burden, the non-moving party must demonstrate that there are genuine disputes as to material facts by either:
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court does not make credibility determinations or weigh evidence. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. Rather, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. Only admissible evidence may be considered in deciding a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). "Conclusory, speculative testimony in affidavits and moving papers is insufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and defeat summary judgment." Soremekun, 509 F.3d at 984.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant is negligent as follows:
Defendants and each of them, negligently, employed, entrusted, confirmed, ratified, delegated, hired, supervised, and trained their employees, and defendants, and each of them, negligently and carelessly failed to assist passengers in loading their carry-on luggage in overhead bins, they failed to allow passengers to safely store their carry-on bags in overhead bins, and they failed to provide a safe storage location for carry-on bags. Defendants further negligently and carelessly maintained, managed, planned, controlled, allowed, promoted, operated, installed, built, designed, hired contractors, and serviced their airplane in such a manner that luggage fell on top of the plaintiff's head and caused injuries. Defendants, and each of them, are a common carrier and they knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of the dangerous condition and the unreasonable risk of harm of which the plaintiff was at all times herein mentioned was unaware. Defendants, and each of them, negligently failed to take steps to either make the condition safe or warn the plaintiff of the dangerous condition, all of which caused plaintiff injuries.
The Court reads this as alleging that Defendant: 1) failed to train or supervise their employees, 2) failed to assist passengers in loading their carry-on luggage in overhead bins, 3) failed to provide a safe storage space for carry-on bags, and 4) failed to warn Plaintiffs about a dangerous condition. Id. Defendant argues that federal regulation pre-empts state-law based standards of care for each of these complaints and that Plaintiff does not provide evidence that shows that it did not meet federal standards. MSJ at 9. Plaintiff contends that her state law claims are not preempted and that genuine issues exist regarding Defendant's liability for her claims. Opposition at 7-14.
The Supremacy Clause gives Congress the power to preempt state law. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. It may do so in three ways. First, "Congress may withdraw specified powers from the States by enacting a statute containing an express preemption provision." Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2500-01 (2012). Second, "[s]tates are precluded from regulating conduct in a field that Congress, actingwithin its proper authority, has determined must be regulated by its exclusive governance." Id. at 2501. Finally, "state laws are preempted when they conflict with federal law." Id. Nothing in the FAA expressly preempts state regulation of air safety. Montalvo v. Spirit Airlines, 508 F.3d 464, 470 (9th Cir. 2007).2 Thus, only conflict and field pre-emption are implicated in this case.
Conflict preemption exists "if there is an actual conflict between federal and state law, or where compliance with both is impossible." Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Grays Harbor Cnty. Wash. v. IDACORP Inc., 379 F.3d 641, 649-50 (9th Cir. 2004). It also exists "where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (Internal quotations omitted).
In areas of law involving aviation safety and commerce, field preemption exists where there are pervasive federal regulations. Gilstrap v. United Air Lines Inc., 709 F.3d 995, 1006 (9th Cir. 2013). In Gilstrap, a plaintiff with disabilities alleged that an airline did not provide the assistance that she requested for moving through an airport. Id. at 998. The Ninth Circuit examined FAA regulations and found that they were pervasive as to "when and where air carriers must provide such assistance." Id. at 1007. However, it also found that the FAA regulations said nothing about "how airlines should interact with passengers." Id. at 1007-08. Therefore, as to assistance in moving through the airport, the FAA regulations established the standard of care and preempted any different or higher standard of care that existed under state tort law. Id. However, as to the alleged hostility from the agents, the standard of care required for the plaintiff to state a claim was based on state tort law. Id. While Gilstrap specifically dealt with services to disabled persons, its...
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