Ahmed v. Tokio Marine Am. Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 April 2021
• Docket Number: 352418
• Citation: 337 Mich.App. 1,972 N.W.2d 860
• Parties: Mohamed AHMED, Plaintiff-Appellee, and Northland Radiology, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff, v. TOKIO MARINE AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant, and Ali Ahmed, Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

337 Mich.App. 1

972 N.W.2d 860

Mohamed AHMED, Plaintiff-Appellee,andNorthland Radiology, Inc., Intervening Plaintiff,

v. TOKIO MARINE AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant,andAli Ahmed, Defendant.

No. 352418

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted March 3, 2021, at Detroit.

Decided April 22, 2021, 9:00 a.m.

Elia & Ponto, PLLC (by Alexander V. Brown and Adam P. Ponto, Southfield) for Mohamed Ahmed.

The Berkal Law Firm, PLLC (by David J. Berkal, Southfield) for Tokio Marine America Insurance Company.

Before: Tukel, P.J., and Jansen and Cameron, JJ.

Tukel, P.J.

In this no-fault action, defendant¹ appeals by leave granted² the trial court's order denying its motion for summary disposition. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by concluding that there was a dispute of material fact regarding whether plaintiff, who had no valid driver's license, was barred by MCL 500.3113(a) from eligibility for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the applicable insurance policy. MCL 500.3113(a) bars such eligibility if the motor vehicle is "taken unlawfully" and the person "knew or should have known" of the unlawful nature of the taking. The "knew or should have known" language was added by 2014 PA 489 and has not been addressed by our Supreme Court or this Court in a published opinion. We agree that because plaintiff was not a licensed driver, defendant has satisfied the standard for summary disposition. The rental agreement in this case provided that only a licensed driver was authorized to use, operate, or drive the motor vehicle. As a result, plaintiff's taking of the vehicle was in violation of MCL 750.414 and thus was unlawful; additionally, plaintiff should have known of the unlawful nature of the taking. We reverse the order of the trial court denying defendant's motion for summary disposition and remand with instructions that the trial court enter an order of summary disposition in favor of defendant.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

This case arises from a car accident in which plaintiff was driving a rental car owned by Meade Lexus of Lakeside. Plaintiff's wife, Ala Hagran, had rented the vehicle shortly before the accident. When Hagran rented the vehicle, the terms of the rental agreement were explained to her, including that only "Authorized Drivers" could operate the rental vehicle and that in order to be an "Authorized Driver," an individual needed to be a validly licensed driver. Plaintiff accompanied Hagran when she rented the vehicle, but he was not a party to the rental agreement; indeed, plaintiff testified at his deposition that he never read the rental agreement. Plaintiff did not have a driver's license at the time the accident occurred because his license had been revoked in 2015, almost four years before the accident at issue here. Plaintiff testified at his deposition, however, that he had believed his license was merely restricted and that he was driving within the terms of the restrictions at the time of the accident.

Paragraph 1 of the rental agreement, entitled "Authorized Drivers," provided that the vehicle was to be "used, operated or driven only by an Authorized Driver." The agreement defined the term "Authorized Driver" as: "(a) the Customer; (b) any person listed by us on Page 1 as an additional driver; (c) the Customer's spouse;" and two other circumstances that could have no applicability here. Following the five categories of Authorized Drivers, ¶1 concluded, "PROVIDED THAT each such person is a licensed driver and is at least age 18."

Plaintiff filed a complaint after defendant denied his claim for PIP benefits. Defendant eventually moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that MCL 500.3113(a) disqualified plaintiff from receiving PIP benefits because he unlawfully took the vehicle by driving it without a driver's license. Defendant responded and disagreed, arguing that defendant could not demonstrate that plaintiff knew he was an unlicensed driver when the accident occurred or that he was expressly prohibited from taking the vehicle. The trial court denied defendant's motion for summary disposition because it concluded that a dispute of material fact existed regarding whether plaintiff knew that he did not qualify as an authorized driver and that his license had been revoked. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint and is reviewed de novo. Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200, 205-206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."

Patrick v. Turkelson , 322 Mich. App. 595, 605, 913 N.W.2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "The trial court is not permitted to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes, and if material evidence conflicts, it is not appropriate to grant a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10)." Barnes v. 21st Century Premier Ins. Co. , 334 Mich. App. 531, 540, 965 N.W.2d 121 (2020) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary disposition "is appropriate .... if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Patrick , 322 Mich. App. at 605, 913 N.W.2d 369 (quotation marks and citation omitted). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., L.L.P. , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "Only the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered may be considered." 1300 Lafayette East Coop., Inc. v. Savoy , 284 Mich. App. 522, 525, 773 N.W.2d 57 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact, but mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient." McNeill-Marks v. MidMichigan Med. Ctr.-Gratiot , 316 Mich. App. 1, 16, 891 N.W.2d 528 (2016). Finally, "[w]e review de novo questions of statutory interpretation." Hayford v. Hayford , 279 Mich. App. 324, 325, 760 N.W.2d 503 (2008).

III. ANALYSIS

A. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

This Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have described the rules of statutory construction as follows:

"The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute's language. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." [ PNC Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 285 Mich. App. 504, 506, 778 N.W.2d 282 (2009), quoting Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare Sys. , 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001).]

"A provision of a statute is ambiguous only if it irreconcilably conflicts with another provision or is equally susceptible to more than a single meaning." In re AGD , 327 Mich. App. 332, 343, 933 N.W.2d 751 (2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). "Unless defined in the statute, every word or phrase of a statute should be accorded its plain and ordinary meaning, taking into account the context in which the words are used." In re Smith Estate , 252 Mich. App. 120, 124, 651 N.W.2d 153 (2002). Nonetheless, "technical words and phrases, and such as may have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in the law, shall be construed and understood according to such peculiar and appropriate meaning." MCL 8.3a.

Finally, statutes that address similar subject matters should be read together as one law:

Statutes that relate to the same subject or that share a common purpose are in pari materia and must be read together as one law, even if they contain no reference to one another and were enacted on different dates. The object of the in pari materia rule is to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in harmonious statutes. If statutes lend themselves to a construction that avoids conflict, that construction should control. [ In re AGD , 327 Mich. App. at 344, 933 N.W.2d 751 (quotation marks and citations omitted).]

Furthermore,

When two statutes are in pari materia but conflict with one another on a particular issue, the more specific statute must control over the more general statute. The rules of statutory construction also provide that a more recently enacted law has precedence over the older statute. This rule is particularly persuasive when one statute is both the more specific and the more recent. [ Parise v. Detroit Entertainment, LLC , 295 Mich. App. 25, 27-28, 811 N.W.2d 98 (2011) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted).]

B. MCL 500.3113(a)

"The no-fault act permits an insurer to avoid coverage of PIP benefits under certain enumerated circumstances," such as those listed in MCL 500.3113. Meemic Ins. Co. v. Fortson , 506 Mich. 287, 303, 954 N.W.2d 115 (2020). MCL 500.3113(a) provides that:

A person is not entitled to be paid personal protection insurance benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

(a) The person was willingly operating or willingly using a motor vehicle or motorcycle that was taken unlawfully, and the person knew or should have known that the motor vehicle or motorcycle was taken unlawfully.

The current version of MCL 500.3113(a) dates from 2014.³ The previous version provided:

"A person is not entitled to be paid [PIP] benefits for accidental bodily injury if at the time of the accident any of the following circumstances existed:

(a) The person was using a motor vehicle or motorcycle which he or she had taken

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