Ahrens v. Perot Sys. Corp., 99-10255

• Decision Date: 03 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-10255,99-10255
• Parties: (5th Cir. 2000) WENDY J. AHRENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEROT SYSTEMS CORP., Defendant-Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 831

205 F.3d 831 (5th Cir. 2000)

WENDY J. AHRENS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PEROT SYSTEMS CORP., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99-10255

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

March 3, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Summary judgment having been awarded Perot Systems Corp., primarily at issue is whether judicial estoppel precludes Wendy J. Ahrens' claim of discriminatory discharge by Perot Systems, in the light of her claim, in an earlier action, of discharge because of tortious interference with that employment. We AFFIRM.

I.

Perot Systems hired Ahrens in 1992. She took a medical leave of absence in November 1994, and was released to return to work the following February.

That November, her supervisor, Howard, told her that, because of the 1996 budget, it was possible that Ahrens' role would change, and suggested that she look for other positions. On 1 December, Howard discharged Ahrens.

That same day, Ahrens filed an action in state court against Image Sciences, Inc. (a former employer), Andereck (its president), Morton (apparently its employee), International Business Machines Corporation (Image Sciences' co-defendant in an action in which Ahrens was deposed), Cravath, Swain & Moore (law firm which represented IBM), and Chesler (Cravath attorney who allegedly contacted Perot Systems in January 1995 and requested Ahrens' termination). She claimed, inter alia, that IBM, Chesler, and Cravath had tortiously interfered with her employment with Perot Systems.

In April 1996, Ahrens filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, in which she swore that Perot Systems discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by discharging her in December 1995. In early May, she received a notice of right to sue letter for that charge. That July, she filed this action in federal court against Perot Systems, claiming gender discrimination discharge, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq.

Shortly before filing this action, Ahrens filed a second EEOC charge, in which she swore that Perot Systems discharged her because it regarded her as disabled. That August, she received a notice of right to sue letter for that charge. That November, she amended her complaint to add that her discharge was also motivated by disability discrimination, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. (ADA).

Perot Systems moved for summary judgment, asserting, inter alia, that Ahrens was judicially estopped from pursuing her discrimination claims because of sworn statements made during the earlier-filed tortious interference action; and, alternatively, that she could not prove that her discharge was motivated by either gender or disability discrimination.

Summary judgment was granted Perot Systems in February 1999, on the judicial estoppel basis, the court concluding that Ahrens' claim in this discrimination action was inconsistent with that asserted previously in the interference action, and that the district court in the latter had relied on her inconsistent position there in granting her motion to remand that action to state court. Alternatively, such judgment was awarded Perot Systems because Ahrens had not created a material fact issue for her discrimination claims.

II.

Ahrens challenges both bases for the summary judgment. Because we agree with the district court on judicial estoppel, we do not reach its alternate ruling.

A summary judgment is reviewed de novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court. E.g., Horton v. City of Houston, Tex., 179 F.3d 188, 191 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 530 (1999). Such judgment is proper if the summary judgment record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, establishes that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Horton, 179 F.3d at 191.

The district court's invocation of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. In re Coastal Plains, Inc., 179 F.3d 197, 205 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 936 (2000). "Judicial estoppel applies to protect the integrity of the courts-preventing a litigant from contradicting its previous, inconsistent position when a court has adopted and relied on it." Afram Carriers, Inc. v. Moeykens, 145 F.3d 298, 303 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1141 (1999). It "is a common law doctrine by which a party who has assumed one position in his pleadings may be estopped from assuming an inconsistent position". Coastal Plains, 179 F.3d at 205 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Most courts have identified at least two limitations on the application of the doctrine: (1) it may be applied only where the position of the party to be estopped is clearly inconsistent with its previous one; and (2) that party must have convinced the court to accept that previous position." Id. at 206.

A.

Ahrens maintains that neither of the two bases for judicial estoppel is satisfied.

1.

Ahrens contends that her position in this action - discharged because of discrimination - is not inconsistent with her position in her first action - discharged because Chesler, Cravath, and IBM (the IBM defendants) tortiously interfered with her employment with Perot Systems.

The complaint in the interference action, filed 1 December 1995, the day of termination, claimed:

[T]he contact of Perot Systems ... by [the IBM defendants] constituted interference with the employment relationship. [The IBM defendants'] interference altered Perot Systems' good relationship with ... Ahrens. She became suspect and has not been provided the same status and pay she would have attained absent the interference. Because of the interference, ... Ahrens' employment has become more burdensome and difficult.

On 2 January 1996, claiming fraudulent joinder, the IBM defendants removed the action to federal court. Ahrens submitted a sworn declaration late that month, in support of her response to the IBM defendants' motion to dismiss. The declaration, which employed language almost identical to that in her complaint, quoted above, stated:

The contact of Perot Systems, by [the IBM defendants] constituted interference with my employment relationship. [The IBM defendants'] interference altered Perot Systems' good relationship with me. I became suspect and was not provided the same status and pay I would have attained absent the interference. Because of the interference, my employment with Perot Systems became more burdensome and difficult, and I was ultimately terminated.

Early that February, Ahrens moved to remand her interference action to state court. In support, she submitted a sworn declaration, in which she adopted and incorporated by reference her statements in the above-quoted January declaration, and stated that "[t]he IBM defendants disparaged [me] to Perot Systems and requested that Perot Systems terminate [me]". The district court granted the remand motion.

In state court in late August 1996, following remand, Ahrens filed a sworn application for an injunction, seeking to prohibit defendants from interfering with her employment, and a supporting affidavit, in which she stated that "Perot Systems terminated [her] employment as a direct result of the interference by the IBM Defendants...." (Emphasis added.) This "direct result" claim was made less than two months after her gender discrimination claim was filed in federal court.

In her deposition in the interference action in late October 1996, approximately three months after she filed her original complaint in this action, claiming gender discrimination, and just weeks before she amended it to add a claim for perceived disability discrimination, Ahrens testified as follows:

Q. Well, why were you terminated from Perot Systems?

A. I was terminated because ... Chesler tort[i]ously interfered with my employment contract.

(Emphasis added.)

On 19 November 1996, four days after she filed her amended complaint in this action, claiming gender and perceived disability discrimination, Ahrens filed a "Response to Special Appearance" in the state court interference action, in which she stated:

The contact of Perot Systems, by [the IBM defendants] constituted interference with my employment relationship. [The IBM defen-dants'] interference altered Perot Systems' good relationship with me. [I] became suspect and was not provided the same status and pay [I] would have attained absent the interference. Because of the interference, my employment with Perot Systems became more burdensome and difficult, and I was ultimately terminated. [The IBM defendants] knew about [my] employment relationship and intended to induce a breach or termination of the relationship proximately causing damages to [me].

In contrast, in her deposition on 18 July 1998 in this action, Ahrens testified that she was discharged because of her gender and perceived disability:

Q.... Why were you terminated from Perot Systems?

AI was terminated from Perot Systems because of my sex: Female; that women weren't given the opportunity to be successful at Perot Systems that men would be; and that - because of the fact that I was considered damaged goods or handicapped and unable to provide value to the company.

In opposing Perot Systems' summary judgment motion on her discrimination claims, and...