Ahrens v. Rojas, 18955.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
• Writing for the Court: TUTTLE, , RIVES, Circuit , and DE VANE
• Citation: 292 F.2d 406
• Parties: Edward P. AHRENS, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida, Appellant, v. Rolando Masferrer ROJAS, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 18955.,18955.
• Decision Date: 30 June 1961

292 F.2d 406 (1961)

Edward P. AHRENS, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida, Appellant, v. Rolando Masferrer ROJAS, Appellee.

No. 18955.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

June 30, 1961.

Paul E. Gifford, Asst. U. S. Atty., Miami, Fla., Douglas P. Lillis, Regional Counsel, I. & N. Service, Richmond, Va., for appellant.

Monroe Gelb, Miami, Fla., for appellee.

Before TUTTLE, Chief Judge, RIVES, Circuit Judge, and DE VANE, District Judge.

RIVES, Circuit Judge.

In an action brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, and Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 1009, the district court entered a final judgment that the plaintiff-appellee be released from custody by the defendant and "that the defendant, Edward P. Ahrens, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida, his agents or employees, be, and they are hereby permanently restrained and enjoined after May 1, 1961 from molesting the plaintiff, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, or from taking him into custody, or in any wise interfering with the plaintiff, except that the foregoing shall not apply to the actual deportation of the plaintiff to a country outside the United States of America." This appeal is from that judgment.

No witnesses were examined on the hearing before the district court. The undisputed facts appear to be in accord with an affidavit filed by the defendant Ahrens:

"That the plaintiff is an alien, native and citizen of Cuba, age 43, who was prominent in Cuba politics during the Batista regime;

"That after the Castro revolution, to-wit, January 1, 1959, the plaintiff fled from Cuba and applied for admission to the United States at Key West, Florida, on January 1, 1959;

"That the plaintiff was then paroled into the United States under the authority of Section 212(d) (5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. 1182(d) (5);

"That on March 30, 1959, the plaintiff was accorded an exclusion hearing before a Special Inquiry Officer and was by him excluded on June 11, 1959, under Section 212(a) (20) of the Immigration and Nationality Act 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) (20) as an alien not in possession of a valid visa or passport; that the plaintiff appealed the decision of the Special Inquiry Officer to the Board of Immigration Appeals which on October 20, 1959, affirmed the said exclusion order;

"That the plaintiff was continued on parole until January 8, 1960, when he was ordered by defendant to surrender into defendant\'s custody on January 18, 1960, for removal from Florida and the coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico for residence in Washington, D. C. or Baltimore, Maryland, or any other area not proximate to Florida and the coastal areas of the Gulf of Mexico;

"That plaintiff by Civil Action No. 9697 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, Miami Division, sought to resist defendant\'s above order requiring his surrender. The Honerable Judge Emett C. Choate by order of February 29, 1960, denied plaintiff\'s request for a temporary restraining order and gave him forty-eight hours within which to comply with defendant\'s above surrender order;

"That because of plaintiff\'s physical condition, the defendant allowed plaintiff to remain in Miami, Florida and did not require compliance with Judge Choate\'s above order;

"That on April 7, 1961, The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, wrote The Honorable Robert F. Kennedy, The Attorney General, which original letter is attached requesting the Department of Justice and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to take action within the law to revoke the plaintiff\'s parole, to deport him or to restrict his presence at large for the reason that such action would advance our foreign policy objectives; that The Attorney General, exercising the authority accorded him by law, directed the defendant to take the plaintiff into custody;

"That defendant, thereupon, assumed custody of the plaintiff who is now detained in detention facilities at the Border Patrol Headquarters, Miami, Florida;

"That on April 10, 1961, the plaintiff was indicted in the United States, District Court at Miami, Florida for conspiracy to violate the neutrality laws, to-wit, to take part in a military expedition against the Republic of Cuba;

"That in a press conference on April 13, 1961, the Honorable John F. Kennedy, President of the United States, made reference to the above indictment of the plaintiff and stated that our Government does not approve of the purpose of the plaintiff to establish a Batista-like regime in Cuba;

"That plaintiff is not as alleged in his complaint being held incommunicado but has been given every opportunity to and has conferred with his counsel and immediate family on several occasions;

"That the allegation of the complaint that plaintiff was not given notice of the revocation of his parole is incorrect; that notice was given pursuant to Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 212.5; that a copy of said notice is attached hereto."

The district court concluded that the only issue was one of law and held that the defendant, a delegate of the Attorney General, could not hold an excluded alien in custody where deportation was not imminent.

That view seems directly contrary to the holding of the Supreme Court in Shaughnessy v. U. S. ex rel. Mezei, 1953, 345 U.S. 206, 215, 216, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956. Mezei presented a far stronger case for his release than does this plaintiff. Mezei had resided in the United States for twenty-five years before he departed and visited in Hungary for nineteen months. Upon his return, he was excluded by the Attorney General on the ground that his entry would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States. Mezei was then detained on Ellis Island for two years. He made numerous attempts to gain admission to other countries. The plaintiff here had no prior residence in the United States. He conceded that it was impossible to deport him to Cuba.¹ He had made no attempt to depart from the United States, and had rejected restrictions on his parole which would have excluded him from the State of Florida or any other area within 150 miles of the Gulf of Mexico.

In view of the plaintiff's status as an excluded alien, and the determination by the Attorney General that his further enlargement on parole would be prejudicial to the public interest, the Attorney General when unable to immediately deport him could legally hold him in custody. That much was settled in Shaughnessy v. U. S. ex rel. Mezei, supra.

The plaintiff further insists that his parole could not be revoked without according him a hearing, and for that insistence relies mainly on United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 2 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 610. The majority opinion in that case by Judge Medina, concurred in by Judge Waterman, is opposed by an able and vigorous dissent of Judge Moore and is contrary to the thoroughly considered opinion of District Judge Kaufman reported in Application of Paktorovics, 156 F.Supp. 816. The majority opinion itself recognizes that case as sui generis,² and distinguishes that case from the controlling precedents as follows:

"* * * What makes this case different from other exclusion cases, such as United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 70 S. Ct. 309, 94 L.Ed. 317; Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956; Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185, 78 S.Ct. 1072, 2 L.Ed.2d 1246, and Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193, 78 S.Ct. 1076, 2 L.Ed.2d 1252, is that Paktorovics was invited here pursuant to the announced foreign policy of the United States as formulated by the President in his directive of December 1, 1956, referred to in his Message to the Congress, of January 31, 1957, from which we have already quoted. Furthermore, the Congress has recently enacted legislation endorsing the extraordinary action of the President with respect to these Hungarian refugees. See Public Law 85-559, 72 Stat. 419 (approved July 25, 1958).

"True it is that the President has no power to change the law by inviting Paktorovics and the other Hungarian refugees to come here, but this is not to say that the tender of such an invitation and its acceptance by him did not effect a change in the status of Paktorovics sufficient to entitle him to the protection of our Constitution." United States ex rel. Paktorovics v. Murff, 2 Cir., 1958, 260 F.2d 610, 614.

There are no similar distinctions in the present case. The statute under which the plaintiff was paroled into the United States is couched in clear and unmistakable terms:

"(5) The Attorney General may in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States." Title 8 U.S.C.A. § 1182(d) (5).

That statute is further implemented by Title 8, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 212.5, which reads as follows:

"Section 212.5. Parole of aliens into the United States. The district director in charge of a port of entry may, prior to examination by an immigration officer, or subsequent to such examination and pending a final determination of admissibility in accordance with Sections 235 and 236 of the act and this chapter, or after a finding of inadmissibility has been made, parole into the United States temporarily in accordance with Section 212(d) (5) of the act any alien applicant for

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