Ahuruonye v. U.S. Dep't of Interior

• Decision Date: 01 May 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 16–1767 (RBW)
• Parties: Barry AHURUONYE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

312 F.Supp.3d 1

Barry AHURUONYE, Plaintiff,

v.UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 16–1767 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 1, 2018

Barry Ahuruonye, Hyattsville, MD, pro se.

Patricia K. McBride, U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

Barry Ahuruonye, the pro se plaintiff, brings this civil action against the defendants, the United States Department of Interior ("Department of Interior"), the Merit Systems Protection Board ("MSPB"), the United States Department of Justice, and multiple employees of the Department of Interior, asserting violations of various employment and criminal laws, the Privacy Act, the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the Declaratory Judgment Act, the All Writs Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (the "APA"). See generally Consolidated Complaints: Case No. 16–cv–1767; Case No. 16–cv–2028; Case No. 17–cv–284 ("Compl."), ECF No. 30. Currently pending before the Court are the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Complaint for Lack of Subject[–]Matter Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim ("Defs.' Mot."), ECF No. 36, the plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction Relief ("Pl.'s Mot."), ECF No. 35, the Plaintiff['s] Motion for Sanctions Under Federal Rule 11 for Patricia K. McBride['] Fraud ("Pl.'s Sanctions Mot."), ECF No. 44, and the Plaintiff[']s Response Motion for Sanctions and Striking Out a Fraudulent ECF [Nos.] 36 & 41 ("Pl.'s Sanctions Reply"), ECF No. 49. Upon consideration of the parties' submissions,¹ the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant in part and deny in part the defendants' motion to dismiss and deny the plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief, motion for sanctions, and motion to strike.

I. BACKGROUND²

In December 2011, the plaintiff "was appointed to a GS–12 Grants Management Specialist position" with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, an agency within the Department of Interior. Defs.' Mot., Exhibit ("Ex.") 1 (Initial Decision (Feb. 5, 2016) ) at 2. "In November[ ] 2012, the [plaintiff] filed a complaint with the Department of Interior Office of Inspector General [ ], alleging that his supervisor, Penny Bartnicki[,] engaged in illegal grant awards ...." Id."Shortly after the [plaintiff] filed [that] complaint, [ ] Bartnicki proposed the [plaintiff's] termination as a probationary employee." Id. On April 15, 2013, the plaintiff and the Department of Interior "settled the [plaintiff's] appeal of [his] removal [ ], and the [plaintiff] was reinstated." Id. After his reinstatement, the plaintiff "raised numerous claims against the [Department of Interior] and [ ] Bartnicki, alleging whistleblowing retaliation and discrimination." Id.; see also id. at 3–4 (listing various adverse employment actions that the plaintiff appealed to the MSPB, including the issuance of a letter of reprimand, poor performance reviews, and wage-increase denials). On March 26, 2015, the plaintiff was issued a notice of proposed removal, see id. at 4, and his employment was terminated thereafter.

Prior to and in conjunction with the filing of his cases in this district, the plaintiff has filed various actions with the MSPB, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and the Federal Circuit seeking review of allegedly adverse employment actions. See Defs.' Mot. at 4–12. The plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the MSPB's decisions on his adverse employment action appeals, along with asserting additional claims for alleged constitutional and statutory violations. See generally Compl.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(1)

"Federal [district] courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994), and "[a] motion for dismissal under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) ‘presents a threshold challenge to the court's jurisdiction ...,’ " Morrow v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (quoting Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ). Thus, a district court is obligated to dismiss a claim if it "lack[s] ... subject-matter jurisdiction[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because "it is ... presumed that a cause lies outside [a federal court's] limited jurisdiction," Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a district court has subject-matter jurisdiction, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

In deciding a motion to dismiss based upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, a district "court need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint." Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, "a court may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case." Scolaro v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000) ; see also Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Additionally, a district court must "assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting [the] plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’ " Am. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ). However, "the [p]laintiff's factual allegations in the complaint ... will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim." Grand Lodge, 185 F.Supp.2d at 13–14 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

B. Motion for Preliminary Injunction

A preliminary injunction "is an extraordinary remedy that should be granted only when the party seeking the relief, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion." Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, "[t]he power to issue a preliminary injunction, especially a mandatory one, should be sparingly exercised." Dorfmann v. Boozer, 414 F.2d 1168, 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (internal quotation marks omitted). "A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish [1] that he is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, [3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that an injunction is in the public interest." Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20, 129 S.Ct. 365, 172 L.Ed.2d 249 (2008) ).

C. Motion for Sanctions

" [Federal Civil Procedure] Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed where a party files a pleading, motion[,] or other paper with the court for an improper purpose, that is unwarranted by existing law, [ ] that is lacking evidentiary support," Henok v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 926 F.Supp.2d 100, 104 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1)–(3) ), or that is not "reasonably based on belief or a lack of information," Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4). " Rule 11 sanctions are an extreme punishment for filing pleadings that frustrate judicial proceedings." Brown v. FBI, 873 F.Supp.2d 388, 408 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Wasserman v. Rodacker, No. 06-cv-1005 (RWR), 2007 WL 2071649, at *7 (D.D.C. July 18, 2007) ). Although " ‘the district court is accorded wide discretion’ in determining whether sanctions are appropriate," Gomez v. Aragon, 705 F.Supp.2d 21, 23 n.2 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 770 F.2d 1168, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ), the test "under Rule 11 is an objective one: that is, whether a reasonable inquiry would have revealed that there was no basis in law or fact for the asserted claim," Sharp v. Rosa Mexicano, D.C., LLC, 496 F.Supp.2d 93, 100 (D.D.C. 2007) (quoting Reynolds v. U.S. Capitol Police Bd., 357 F.Supp.2d 19, 23 (D.D.C. 2004) ).

D. Motion to Strike

"Motions to strike are ‘drastic remed[ies] that courts disfavor,’ and the ‘decision to grant or deny a motion to strike is vested in the trial judge's sound discretion.’ " Riddick v. Holland, 134 F.Supp.3d 281, 285 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting U.S. ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Corp., 308 F.R.D. 1 (D.D.C. 2015) ). A court, either on its own volition or by a moving party, "may strike from a pleading an[y] insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(f). Rule 12(f) itself does not require the striking of prejudicial matters, and although courts disfavor motions to strike, courts have granted such motions, but only upon a showing that parts of a pleading "are prejudicial or scandalous." Nwachukwu v. Rooney, 362 F.Supp.2d 183, 190 (D.D.C. 2005). However, "absent a ‘strong reason for so doing,’ courts will generally ‘not tamper with pleadings.’ " Id. (quoting Lipsky v. Commonwealth United Corp., 551 F.2d 887, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) ).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The Plaintiff's Motion to Strike

In his reply in support of his motion for sanctions, the plaintiff requests that this Court strike from the record both the defendants' motion to dismiss his Consolidated Complaint and their opposition to his motion for preliminary injunctive relief. See Pl.'s Sanctions Reply at 1, 3. The plaintiff argues that such relief is warranted because the defendants' motion to dismiss is "grounded and anchored on fraud," see id. at 1, and because the defendants purportedly refused to serve him with a copy of their opposition to his motion for preliminary injunctive relief, see id. at 3. For the following reasons, the Court de...