Aiello v. Woods, Civil No. 2:10-CV-14330

• Decision Date: 29 October 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2:10-CV-14330
• Parties: DONALD JAMES AIELLO, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

DONALD JAMES AIELLO, Petitioner, v. JEFFREY WOODS, Respondent.

Civil No. 2:10-CV-14330

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

October 29, 2015

HONORABLE NANCY G. EDMUNDS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Donald James Aiello, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. In his pro se application, petitioner challenges his convictions for carjacking, M.C.L.A. § 750.529a; armed robbery, M.C.L.A. § 750.529; receiving and concealing a stolen firearm, M.C.L.A. § 750.535b; two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm), M.C.L.A. § 750.227b; carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, M.C.L.A. § 750.226; assault with intent to do great bodily harm, M.C.L.A. § 750.84; two counts of discharge of a firearm at a dwelling, M.C.L.A. § 750.234b; and discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle, M.C.L.A. § 750.234a. For the reasons that follow, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner was convicted of the above offenses following a jury trial in the St. Clair County Circuit Court. This Court recites verbatim the relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). See Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009):

In this case, defendant was hospitalized for about four days for recurring depression after he attempted to commit suicide by taking approximately 80 aspirin pills. This occurred about six weeks before his crimes took place. Defendant was prescribed two anti-depressant medications as a result of his attempted suicide, but his prognosis was guarded because the treating psychiatrist did not believe defendant would handle his depression well.

*************************************************************************************

Defendant was previously upset with Brianna Frantz and her family. Defendant was previously upset with Brianna Frantz and her family. Defendant threatened to kill Frantz and her family after she refused to work things out in their relationship. Defendant obtained a gun, stole a taxicab, and then shot at Frantz's house. He then discarded the gun and cab and went to a friend's house. Shortly thereafter, defendant then fled the state.

People v. Aiello, No. 283241; 2009 WL 1441468, *2 (Mich.Ct.App. May 21, 2009).

Petitioner's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id.; lv. den. 485 Mich. 928, 773 N.W.2d 684 (2009); reconsideration denied, 485 Mich. 1073, 777 N.W.2d 184 (2010).

Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was held in abeyance while petitioner returned to the state courts to exhaust additional claims. See Aiello v. Curtin, No. 2:10-14330; 2011 WL 4962982 (E.D. Mich. October 19, 2011).

Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment, which was denied. People v. Aiello, No. L-07-000818-FC (St. Clair County Circuit Court, January 24, 2012). The Michigan appellate courts denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Aiello, No. 311457 (Mich.Ct.App. September 3, 2013); lv. den. 495 Mich. 851, 835 N.W.2d 590 (2013).

On June 12, 2014, the Court reopened the case to the Court's active docket and permitted petitioner to file an amended habeas petition, in which petitioner seeks relief on the following grounds:

I. Defendant was denied effective assistance of trial counsel where counsel failed to present a defense of insanity and instead presented a defense of voluntary intoxication claiming that a side effect from defendants [sic] prescribed psychotropic medication had caused him to commit the crimes for which he was charged and convicted.

II. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to verdict [sic] form when counsel had stated that he would object if the form did not include the lesser offense of UDAA.

III. The trial court abused it's [sic] discretion when it improperly admitted People's exhibit #49 (a cd), thus denying defendant due process of law and a fair trial.

IV. Defendant was denied his right of effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to reasonably investigate, prepare, and present a substantial defense of involuntary intoxication and trial counsels [sic] failure to investigate, prepare, and call witnesses whose testimony would have provided defendant with a substantial defense.

V. Defendant was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel when appellate counsel failed to raise in a proper post trial motion or on direct appeal of trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to conduct reasonable investigations, and for appellate counsel's failure to investigate known witnesses whose testimony were outcome determinative on appeal.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) ((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002)(per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011) (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. at 102 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; andthen it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id. Habeas relief is not appropriate unless each ground which supported the state court's decision is examined and found to be unreasonable under the AEDPA. See Wetzel v. Lambert, 132 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (2012).

"[I]f this standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. Although 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, does not completely bar federal courts from relitigating claims that have previously been rejected in the state courts, it preserves the authority for a federal court to grant habeas relief only "in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with" the Supreme Court's precedents. Id. Indeed, "Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a 'guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,' not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal." Id. at 102-03 (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n. 5 (1979)(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)). Thus, a "readiness to attribute error [to a state court] is inconsistent with the presumption that state courts know and follow the law." Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24. In order to obtain habeas relief in federal court, a state prisoner is required to show that the state court's rejection of his claim "was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103. In reviewing petitioner's claims, this Court must remember that under the federal constitution, petitioner was "entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one." Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1953).

III. Discussion

A. Claim # 3. The procedurally defaulted claim.

Petitioner's third claim contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it improperly admitted People's exhibit #49 (a CD), thereby denying petitioner due process and his right to a fair trial. Respondent contends that the claim is defaulted because petitio...