Aiken v. Dir. of Fed. Bureau of Prisons
| Decision Date | 15 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 20-cv-2091 (BAH) |
| Parties | SHAWNTA AIKEN, Plaintiff v. DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Shawnta Aiken, who was formerly incarcerated at Federal Prison Camp, Alderson ("FPC Alderson") in Alderson, West Virginia, brings the instant lawsuit against the Director of the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP"); the Warden of FPC Alderson, David Wilson; and Jerrod Grimes, at the time a Captain at FPC Alderson. She alleges that Grimes sexually harassed her for approximately nine months, from January 2017 to September 2017, and attempted to rape her in September 2017, Compl. ¶¶ 14-28, ECF No. 1, and claims that Grimes, Wilson, and BOP have violated common law, the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671 et seq. See generally Compl.; see also infra Part I.B. Defendants Wilson and BOP (together the federal defendants) have filed the pending Motion to Transfer ( ), ECF No. 15, arguing that plaintiff's lawsuit should be transferred to the Southern District of West Virginia ("S.D.W.V."), the federal judicial district in which FPC Alderson is located, because that district is the locus of the facts, evidence, and witnesses relevant to the instant case, and because adjudication of plaintiff's FTCA claims will require application of West Virginia state law. For the following reasons, defendant's Motion to Transfer is denied.
A brief overview of plaintiff's disturbing factual allegations is followed by discussion of the procedural history of the instant case.
In 2017, plaintiff, a resident of the District of Columbia, Compl. ¶ 8, was incarcerated at FPC Alderson in Alderson, West Virginia, id. ¶¶ 1-2. In January 2017, Grimes, a BOP Captain at FPC Alderson, began verbally sexually harassing plaintiff on a daily basis, id. ¶¶ 2, 15. Such harassment took the form of sexually explicit comments, such as "If I could get you alone . . ." and "If you give me a chance . . . ," id. ¶ 16, as well as near-daily comments about plaintiff's appearance and body, id. ¶ 17. This alleged conduct continued for at least nine months. See id. ¶¶ 18-19.
Grimes's alleged harassment of plaintiff escalated to sexual assault. One evening in late September 2017, at approximately 8:00 PM, Grimes called plaintiff into his office—a command that, as an inmate, plaintiff had no choice but to obey. Id. ¶ 18. The guard normally stationed at a booth in the hallway outside Grimes's office was absent, and when plaintiff arrived alone at Grimes's office, the lights in the office were dimmed, the blinds were closed, and Grimes was the only other person there. Id. ¶ 21. As plaintiff entered, he told her, "You know why I called you down here," and showed her a write-up she had received regarding an altercation with another incarcerated person earlier that day. Id. ¶ 22. Grimes then told plaintiff, "If you want some dick, you should've just told me," and then unbuttoned his pants, exposing himself to plaintiff, and began kissing and groping her, id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff tried to escape Grimes's office, but he grabbed her by the shoulders, threw her face-down onto a table in his office, and partially removed her pants, while plaintiff screamed for him to stop. Id. ¶¶ 24-25. A guard heardplaintiff's shouts and knocked on the door to Grimes's office, which gave plaintiff an opportunity to escape. Id. ¶ 27.
Plaintiff further alleges that she "was not the only female inmate subjected to sexual abuse and harassment" by Grimes, id. ¶ 29, and Grimes has acknowledged as much. In the course of subsequently pleading guilty to a thirteen-count federal indictment, including ten charges of sexual abuse of a ward and three charges of abusive sexual contact involving a ward, Grimes admitted that he engaged in sexual intercourse with multiple female inmates on several occasions between April 2017 and December 2017, including at least once at the Warden's house at FPC Alderson. Id. ¶¶ 29-32; see also Indictment, ECF No. 7, United States v. Grimes, No. 5:18-cr-00069 (S.D.W. Va.).1 Plaintiff also claims that, in addition to Grimes, "many other correctional officers also sexually abused, harassed, and/or engaged in sexual contact with the female inmates" at FPC Alderson. Id. ¶ 33. She alleges that "[t]his abusive culture of sexual abuse, harassment, and/or sexual contact between officers and inmates was widespread and well known to FPC Alderson inmates and FPC Alderson employees." Id. ¶ 34. Despite being aware of these abuses, Wilson, the Warden at FPC Alderson, "failed to take the necessary actions to protect the inmates within [their] care and custody" from the prison guards themselves, including failing to report and investigate allegations of sexual assault and failing to discipline prison guards found to have sexually assaulted inmates. Id. ¶ 35.
Finally, according to plaintiff, BOP itself was aware of the criminal misconduct being perpetrated by FPC Alderson prison guards on female inmates, because it received formal complaints from some of those inmates who were, like plaintiff, Grimes's victims. Id. ¶ 36. Forinstance, C.L., an inmate at FPC Alderson, was raped by Grimes in April 2017 and filed a formal administrative grievance shortly thereafter. Id. ¶ 37.2 In April 2017, V.J., another FPC Alderson inmate, filed a formal complaint that described an instance of sexual harassment or assault and also explained that victims of Grimes were "scared of retaliation" and warned not to pursue their complaints because Grimes "had just had 'a bad day.'" Id. ¶ 38.3 Despite thus being on notice of a systemic sexual-assault problem at FPC Alderson, plaintiff alleges that BOP failed to ensure that FPC Alderson leadership and guards were complying with BOP's strict sexual-assault-prevention regulations, promulgated pursuant to the Prison Rape Elimination Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 30301 et seq. See Compl. ¶¶ 42-59.
Plaintiff filed the instant lawsuit on July 31, 2020. She alleges that her sexual assault by Grimes constituted assault and battery , intentional infliction of emotional distress ), negligent infliction of emotional distress ), all common law violations, as well as cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution ). She further alleges that in failing to protect her from sexual assault and failing to enforce BOP's sexual-harassment and -assault policies and to train FPC Alderson employees concerning those policies, Wilson and BOP violated the Eighth Amendment ), and committed six distinct violations of the FTCA, namely negligence ), negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision ),assault ), battery ), intentional infliction of emotional distress ), and negligent infliction of emotional distress ). Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in compensatory damages, plus punitive damages, costs, and attorney's fees. See id. at 33.
On February 26, 2021, before filing an answer, the federal defendants filed a motion to transfer plaintiff's lawsuit to S.D.W.V. See Federal Defs.' Mot. That motion has been thoroughly briefed, see Federal Defs.' Mem. Supp. Mot. Transfer ( ), ECF No. 15-1; Pl.'s Opp'n Federal Defs.' Mot. Transfer ("Pl.'s Opp'n"), ECF No. 17; Federal Defs.' Reply Supp. Mot. Transfer ( ), ECF No. 18; Pl.'s Surreply Opp'n Federal Defs.' Mot. Transfer ("Pl.'s Surreply"), ECF No. 21, and is now ripe for resolution.
A case may be transferred to any district where venue is also proper "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); Atl. Marine Constr. Co. v. United States Dist. Court, 571 U.S. 49, 59 (2013) (). The Supreme Court has explained that "Section 1404(a) is intended to place discretion in the district court to adjudicate motions for transfer according to an 'individualized, case-by-case consideration of convenience and fairness.'" Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988) (quoting Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 622 (1964)). "The decision whether a transfer or a dismissal is in the interest of justice . . . rests within the sound discretion of the district court," Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983), which discretion "is broad" but "notuntrammeled." Fine v. McGuire, 433 F.2d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also In re Scott, 709 F.2d 717, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ().
"[T]ransfer in derogation of properly laid venue" in the District of Columbia "must . . . be justified by particular circumstances that render the transferor forum inappropriate by reference to the considerations specified in that statute." Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1974). "Section 1404(a) provides for transfer to a more convenient forum, not to a forum likely to prove equally convenient or inconvenient," Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 645-46, and the movant bears the burden of persuasion that transfer of an action is proper, see SEC v. Savoy Indus., Inc., 587 F.2d 1149, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (citing Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690, 698 (5th Cir. 1966)); see also...
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