Ainsworth v. Fillmore County, 34372

Decision Date06 June 1958
Docket NumberNo. 34372,34372
Citation90 N.W.2d 360,166 Neb. 779
PartiesRay AINSWORTH et al., Appellees, v. COUNTY OF FILLMORE, Nebraska, and Bert A. Lynn, County Treasurer of said County, Appellants.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

1. A general demurrer admits all allegations of fact in the pleading to which it is addressed, which are issuable, relevant, material, and well pleaded; but does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law or fact.

2. The levy, assessment, and collection of taxes which are demonstrably void for want of jurisdiction or authority to impose the same may be enjoined.

3. The domicile of the owner is the taxable situs assigned to tangibles where an actual situs has not been acquired elsewhere.

4. The state which is the domicile of the owner of tangibles is the situs of tangible personal property temporarily in another state but not permanently located there.

5. A fact necessary to entitle the plaintiffs to injunction against the assessment which was made was permanent absence of the wheat from the State of Nebraska.

6. The absence of an allegation of this essential fact rendered the petition of plaintiffs vulnerable to an attack by general demurrer.

7. A defendant has the right to insist that all of the facts essential to the existence of a cause of action against him and in favor of the plaintiff be stated in the petition.

8. Ordinarily the valuation of a county assessor for tax purposes will be presumed to be correct, and when attacked the burden rests upon the taxpayer to overcome the presumption.

John C. Gewacke, Geneva, Clarence S. Beck, Atty. Gen., H. G. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellants.

Keenan & Corbitt, Geneva, for appellees.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE, and BOSLAUGH, JJ.

YEAGER, Justice.

This is an action in equity wherein Ray Ainsworth [166 Neb. 780] and 67 others, all of whom are residents and taxpayers, as plaintiffs, appellees here, by petition instituted this action in the district court for Fillmore County, Nebraska, against the County of Fillmore and Bert A. Lynn, treasurer of that county, defendants, appellants here, to enjoin the collection of a tax levied on wheat added to their tax schedules respectively which was grown by the plaintiffs in 1956 but which it was alleged was outside the State of Nebraska on March 1, 1957, and on account thereof the tax levied thereon was void and uncollectible. The paragraphs of the petition containing the allegations as to ownership, production, and situs of the wheat are the following:

'That the Defendant, the County of Fillmore, through its Board of Equalization and its Assessor, has added to each of the tax schedules of the Plaintiffs for the year 1957, certain wheat which was grown in 1956 but which wheat was outside the State of Nebraska on March 1, 1957.'

'That said wheat being outside the State of Nebraska on March 1, 1957 is not taxable within the State of Nebraska or the County of Fillmore and the tax sought to be levied upon the same by the Defendants is void and uncollectable.'

To the petition the defendants filed a general demurrer. The demurrer was overruled and the defendants elected to stand thereon and refused to plead further. A decree was thereupon rendered granting the injunctive relief prayed by the plaintiffs. From the decree the defendants have appealed.

The theory of the demurrer and also of the appeal is that the petition failed to state facts sufficient upon which to base a decree for the relief prayed by the plaintiffs; or in other words, the petition did not state a cause of action.

The general rule, about which there is no longer room for dispute, with regard to the office of a general demurrer is the following: 'A general demurrer admits all allegations of fact in the pleading to which it is addressed, which are issuable, relevant, material, and well pleaded; but does not admit the pleader's conclusions of law or fact.' In re Estate of Halstead, 154 Neb. 31, 46 N.W.2d 779, 781. See, also, Freeman v. Elder, 158 Neb. 364, 63 N.W.2d 327; Johnson v. Ruhl, 162 Neb. 330, 75 N.W.2d 717; Boettcher v. County of Holt, 163 Neb. 231, 79 N.W.2d 183.

The defendants urge that within the meaning of this rule the petition fails for two reasons to state a cause of action. One of these is, as we interpret, that, assuming the impropriety of the alleged addition of the wheat to the assessment rolls, injunction is not available for the reason that the plaintiffs had available to them a statutory remedy for the correction of the assessments.

If it be assumed that the tax assessed against the added grain was void, an action to enjoin its collection was available to the plaintiffs, notwithstanding an available statutory remedy, if there was one, which could have been employed for protection. In Offutt Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382, 383, affirmed 351 U.S. 253, 76 S.Ct. 814, 100 L.Ed. 1151, it was said: 'The levy, assessment, and collection of taxes which are demonstrably void for want of jurisdiction or authority to impose the same may be enjoined.' See, also, Earl v. Duras, 13 Neb. 234, 13 N.W. 206; Burlington & M. R. R. Co. v. Cass County, 16 Neb. 136, 19 N.W. 700; Touzalin v. City of Omaha, 25 Neb. 817, 41 N.W. 796; Bellevue Improvement Co. v. Village of Bellevue, 39 Neb. 876, 58 N.W. 446.

Accordingly if the plaintiffs have otherwise sufficiently pleaded that this added wheat was nontaxable in Fillmore County, Nebraska, this first proposition advanced by the defendants must be rejected.

The second reason why the defendants assert that the petition is vulnerable to general demurrer is that the facts stated, if proved to be true, would not under law render this wheat nontaxable in Fillmore County, Nebraska. At this point it should be said that in 1957 the date for the taxation of wheat was March 1. Section 77-1201, R.R.S.1943, as amended by Laws 1955, c. 288, section 10, p. 906.

As is observable from the petition it is not alleged that the plaintiffs were not residents of the State of Nebraska on March 1, 1957. It is not alleged that the wheat had acquired a permanent situs in some other state on March 1, 1957. It is not alleged that the ownership was not the same on March 1, 1957, as when produced in 1956, or that it was not owned on March 1, 1957, by the plaintiffs respectively. The implication of which the petition and the brief of plaintiffs is capable is that the wheat was on March 1, 1957, the property of the plaintiffs and that on that date the plaintiffs were residents of Fillmore County, Nebraska.

In order to have rendered this wheat nontaxable in Nebraska on March 1, 1957, it must not only have been on that date without the jurisdiction but also the situs must have had the character of permanency.

The rule is stated as follows in 51 Am.Jur., Taxation, section 457, p. 470, as follows: 'The domicil of the owner is the taxable situs assigned to tangibles where an actual situs has not been acquired elsewhere. That state is the situs for the purposes of taxation of tangible personal property temporarily in another state, but not permanently located there.'

This rule is discussed at length with approval in Brock & Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 8 Cal.2d 286, 65 P.2d 791, 110 A.L.R. 700. Other cases which hold to the same effect are the following: Sangamon & Morgan R. R. Co. v. County of Morgan, 14 Ill. 163, 56 Am.Dec. 497; Commonwealth v. R. G. Dun & Co., 126 Ky. 108, 102 S.W. 859, 10 L.R.A.,N.S., 920; Reeves v. Island Creek Fuel & Trans. Co., 313 Ky. 400, 230 S.W.2d 924; Johnson Oil Refining Co. v. State ex rel. Templeton, 172 Okl. 552, 46 P.2d 546; Commonwealth v. American Dredging Co., 122...

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5 cases
  • Cain v. Custer County Board of Equalization
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • August 28, 2015
    ...rests upon the taxpayer to rebut this presumption and “ ‘to prove that an assessment is excessive.’ ” See Ainsworth v. County of Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 784, 90 N.W.2d 360, 364 (1958). Our case law indicates that the standard generally applicable in proceedings before county boards, includi......
  • In re Cain, S-14-764.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • August 28, 2015
    ...rests upon the taxpayer to rebut this presumption and "'to prove that an assessment is excessive.'" See Ainsworth v. County of Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 784, 90 N.W.2d 360, 364 (1958). Our case law indicates that the standard generally applicable in proceedings before county boards, including......
  • Douglas County v. OEA Senior Citizens, Inc.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • November 17, 1961
    ...Housing Co. v. County of Sarpy, 160 Neb. 320, 70 N.W.2d 382, affirmed 351 U.S. 253, 76 S.Ct. 814, 100 L.Ed. 1151; Ainsworth v. County of Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 90 N.W.2d 360. The type of independent action to which the language of these cited cases was directed was injunction and it is of ......
  • Ace Const. Co. v. Board of Equalization of Douglas County
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Nebraska
    • October 9, 1959
    ...165 Neb. 315, 85 N.W.2d 638; K-K Appliance Co. v. Board of Tax Equalization, 165 Neb. 547, 86 N.W.2d 381; Ainsworth v. County of Fillmore, 166 Neb. 779, 90 N.W.2d 360, 361. Tangible personal property, in the absence of statute and anything to show that it has acquired an actual situs elsewh......
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