Air Evac Ems, Inc. v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 07 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 3:06-0239.,3:06-0239.
• Citation: 486 F.Supp.2d 713
• Parties: AIR EVAC EMS, INC., d/b/a Air Evac Lifeteam, Plaintiffs, v. Kenneth D. ROBINSON, M.D., Commissioner of Health and Tennessee Board of Emergency Medical Services, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee

486 F.Supp.2d 713

AIR EVAC EMS, INC., d/b/a Air Evac Lifeteam, Plaintiffs, v. Kenneth D. ROBINSON, M.D., Commissioner of Health and Tennessee Board of Emergency Medical Services, Defendants.

No. 3:06-0239.

United States District Court, M.D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.

May 7, 2007.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Charles K. Grant, William Henry West, Yanika C. Smith, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Nashville, TN, for Plaintiffs.

Sue A. Sheldon, Tennessee Attorney General's Office, Nashville, TN, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

TRAUGER, District Judge.

Pending before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 30), to which the plaintiff has responded (Docket No. 47). Also pending is the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 34), to which the defendants have responded (Docket No. 44), and the plaintiff has replied (Docket No. 49). The United States has filed a Statement of Interest (Docket No. 41). For the reasons discussed herein, the defendants' motion will be denied and the plaintiff's motion will be granted.

FACTS and PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff provides air ambulance services from bases located throughout Tennessee. (See Docket No. 1 ¶ 6.) On March 17, 2005, the Tennessee Board of Emergency Medical Services ("Board") notified the plaintiff that certain of its helicopters had been deemed by Board staff to be in violation of Tennessee Emergency Medical Services rules 1200-12-1-.05(2)(c)(2), (3), and (4), which require helicopters licensed in' this state to have on board certain equipment. (See id. ¶ 8.)

The plaintiff, which operates pursuant to an air carrier operating certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA"), challenged the rules before the Board, which determined, at the conclusion of a hearing held on November 30, 2005, that the rules were valid and not preempted by federal law. (See id. ¶¶ 13, 16.) On March 28, 2006, the plaintiff filed a Complaint in this court seeking both "a declaration that the [Board] has no power to issue rules concerning aircraft safety" and "the enjoining of the enforcement against the Plaintiff of certain aircraft equipment rules promulgated by the State of Tennessee." (See id. ¶ 1.) Two days later, on March 30, 2006, the Board filed its final order with the Administrative Procedures Division of the Office of the Tennessee Secretary of State. (See Docket No. 45 ¶ 19.)

On August 1, 2006, the plaintiff sought leave to amend its Complaint in a number of ways. (See Docket No. 12.) The court granted this motion in part but denied the plaintiff's attempt to expand its preemption challenge to include a claim that federal law preempts the defendants'"aircraft crew safety and training" regulations. (See Docket No. 15 at 3.) On October 23, 2006, the court denied the plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration of this denial. (See Docket No. 27 at 1.)

The plaintiff alleges that federal law preempts the Board's rules at issue here. (See Docket No. 35 at 1.) The defendants disagree. (See Docket No. 44 at 2.) Both parties have now moved for summary' judgment on these preemption claims. (See Docket No. 30; Docket No. 34.) In addition, the defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiff's claims based on the abstention principles set forth in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 40-41, 91 S.Ct. 746 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The court first will address the defendants' abstention arguments.

I. Because abstention is not warranted in this case, the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims on abstention grounds will be denied.

The defendants maintain that, because the plaintiff filed suit in this court two days before the Board officially entered its decision denying the plaintiff's petition for a declaratory order, this court should abstain from judgment on the plaintiff's claims under the principles set forth in Younger v. Harris and should dismiss the plaintiffs' case altogether. (See Docket No. 31 at 5); Younger, 401 U.S. at 40-41, 91 S.Ct. 746. The plaintiff maintains that abstention is not proper in this case for two reasons: (1) because "the issues in this case present a facially conclusive claim of preemption"; and (2) because "considerations of comity prevent the invocation of abstention in this matter."¹ (See Docket No. 47 at 1, 5.)

Although this case does not present facially conclusive claims of preemption, Younger abstention is not appropriate here.

A. This case does not present facially conclusive claims of preemption.

The Sixth Circuit has recognized the power of federal courts to rule on cases in which abstention may otherwise be proper when those cases present facially conclusive claims of preemption. See GTE Mobilnet of Ohio v. Johnson, 111 F.3d 469, 475 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that abstention is not required where "the naked question, uncomplicated by ambiguous language, is whether the state law on its face is preempted"). A facially conclusive claim of this sort exists where a court can resolve a preemption dispute without interpreting state law or making factual findings. See Bunning v. Kentucky, 42 F 3d 1008, 1011 (6th Cir.1994); see also Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Pub. Mils. Comm'n of Ohio, 926 F2d 567, 573 (6th Cir.1991) (internal quotation omitted). As the Sixth Circuit explained in GTE, a court tasked with making this kind of determination about a federal statute should look to the "provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy" and decide whether the statute, on its face, presents a "facially conclusive" claim that the federal law preempts state action. See GTE, 111 F.3d at 479-80.

Here, the plaintiff maintains that it has demonstrated a facially conclusive claim of preemption because (1) no factual issues exist as to whether the plaintiff has violated the. Board's rules (it has); and (2) the court need not engage in a detailed analysis of state law in order to decide the preemption issues presented here. (See Docket No. 47 at 3.) While the plaintiff correctly attempts to fit its arguments about facially conclusive claims within the Bunning framework, these arguments lack an important element. The plaintiff never explains how the federal statute and regulations at issue here — specifically, the Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2000) ("Act") and the regulations promulgated thereunder — on their face present facially conclusive claims of preemption. In every relevant case cited by the plaintiff, as well as all of those discovered during the court's research, courts found facially conclusive claims of preemption only where the statute itself limited state interference.

For instance, in GTE, the Sixth Circuit found no facially conclusive claims of preemption in a case where cellular telephone providers sought injunctive relief from administrative action because the plain language of the federal statutory section in question did not reflect "Congress's clear intent to preempt the states' authority" to regulate commercial cellular telephone rates. See GTE, 111 F.3d at 480. The court specifically contrasted that case with two other Sixth Circuit cases that involved statutes that, on their face, expressly preempted state action. See id. at 476 (citing Bunning, 42 F.3d at 1009-12 (involving an "express preemption clause which states that the provisions of [the federal statute] supersede and preempt any provision of state law ..."); and Norfolk, 926 F.2d at 569-70 ("The Act includes a broad preemption provision excluding the states from legislating in any area already `covered' by the regulations adopted by the secretary.")); see also Cmty. Treatment Ctrs., Inc. v. City of Westland, 970 F.Supp. 1197, 1224 (E.D.Mich.1997) (finding no facially conclusive claims of preemption where a federal statute and its accompanying regulations "on their face [were] silent" about whether they preempted local action).

The plaintiff points to no statutory provision or regulation that, on its face, preempts state action. Without facially conclusive statutory language, the court cannot determine whether the federal enactments in this case preempt the state ones unless it engages in a deeper analysis of legal and factual issues, which the Sixth Circuit cautioned against in Bunning. See Bunning, 42 F.3d at 1011 (noting that facially conclusive claims of preemption exist "where resolution of the dispute does not require the court to interpret state law or make factual findings"). Accordingly, like in GTE and Community Treatment Centers, facially conclusive claims of preemption do not exist here.

This finding does not end the court's abstention analysis. Rather, the court now must determine whether abstention is appropriate under the principles set forth in Younger v. Harris. See GTE, 111 F.3d at 480. (indicating that a court may consider whether Younger abstention is appropriate after it has determined that facially conclusive claims of preemption do not render abstention improper).

B. Younger abstention is not appropriate in this case.

The "virtually unflagging obligation of the federal forum to exercise its jurisdictional powers may be abdicated out of deference to parallel litigation in the state forum in only the most exceptional circumstances." See United States v. Anderson County, Tenn., 705 F.2d 184, 186 (6th Cir. 1983). Such circumstances exist when the abstention requirements laid out in Younger v. Harris are met. See New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) ("NOPSI").

The Sixth Circuit has held that abstention pursuant to Younger is appropriate only when a court can answer the following three questions in the affirmative: (1) do the relevant state proceedings "constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding"; (2) do the proceedings "implicate important state interests"; and (3) is there "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Norfolk, 926 F.2d...