Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. Fed. Express Corp.

• Decision Date: 28 September 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00944-RDM
• Citation: 139 F.Supp.3d 320
• Parties: Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l, Petitioner, v. Federal Express Corporation, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

139 F.Supp.3d 320

Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l, Petitioner,

v.Federal Express Corporation, Respondent.

Civil Action No. 1:14-cv-00944-RDM

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 28, 2015

Granville Clayton Warner, Marta Wagner, Air Line Pilots Association, International, Herndon, VA, Jonathan Asher Cohen, Air Line Pilots Association, International, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

David R. Broderdorf, II, Thomas Edward Reinert, Jr., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, DC, David Knox, Federal Express Corporation, Memphis, TN, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ROYCE C. LAMBERTH, United States District Judge

In this case, plaintiff, Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l ("ALPA"), brings an action against Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") seeking to compel FedEx's compliance with an arbitration award issued by a System Board of Adjustment ("System Board" or "Board"). Compl. 1. FedEx responds with a counterclaim against ALPA, seeking a declaratory judgment that its current dispute with ALPA qualifies as a "minor dispute" under the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., which the System Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve under Section 204 of the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 184. This matter Is before the Court on plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, or for summary judgment in the alternative, and on defendant's motion for summary judgment.

For the following reasons and after consideration of the parties' briefing and relevant legal standards, ALPA's motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment will be DENIED, and FedEx's motion for summary judgment will be GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

Defendant FedEx is a corporation engaged in the business of worldwide package delivery and is considered a "common carrier by air" engaged in the business of providing air services in interstate commerce under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. § 181. Compl. 1–2; Answer 5.

Plaintiff ALPA is an unincorporated labor organization and is the exclusive bargaining representative of pilots employed by FedEx. Compl. 1; Answer 5. ALPA and FedEx are parties to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), effective 2011, which establishes the wages, benefits, and working conditions of FedEx pilots. Compl. 3; Answer 2. The CBA specifically governs the assignment of flying duties to all active pilots at FedEx. Def.'s SOMF 1, ¶ 2.

In furtherance of Section 204 of the RLA, Section 21 of the CBA establishes an arbitration panel—the System Board—to issue final and binding decisions regarding disputes "growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions." Pl.'s SOMF 2, ¶ 6.

FedEx hired Captain Patricia Ahneman as a pilot in 1990 and terminated her employment in June 2013 for (1) "operating FedEx aircraft without being in possession of a valid medical certificate during 2008 and 2009" in a manner " ‘without justification, inexcusable and constituted intentional or reckless disregard’ of FAA regulations, FedEx rules and the CBA," and (2) providing "dishonest testimony" in the internal hearing prior to her termination. Def.'s SOMF 2, ¶ 7.

Ahneman challenged her termination, and the System Board heard the dispute in September 2013. Compl. 4, ¶ 14; Answer 8, ¶ 14. The Board issued a final Decision and Award ("Award") in November 2013 and sustained Ahneman's grievance. Compl. 4, ¶ 15; Answer 6, ¶ 7. It held that "[t]he grievant shall forthwith, no later than 10 days from the date of this decision, be reinstated to her former position and made whole." Id.

Within the 10–day period, FedEx presented Ahneman with a baseline payment and reinstated her to her former position: an active pilot in not operationally qualified ("NOQ") status, under which pilots are paid but not assigned flying duties. Def.'s SOMF 3–4. Ahneman had entered NOQ paid status in December 2012 after failing a line check and remained in this position until her termination in June 2013. Id.

Since the Board's Award, FedEx has also allowed Ahneman to bid for and be awarded "pay only" schedules that provide around $20,000 in wage-based compensation each month. Id. at 5, ¶ 2. In sum, as of the initiation of this litigation, Ahneman has received over $100,000 in backpay and over $250,000 in ongoing compensation. She has also received all benefits to which active pilots are entitled. Id. at 6, ¶ 23.

Around two months after the Board issued the Award, an ALPA representative asked FedEx when Ahneman could enter a training program and exit paid NOQ status. Id. at 6, ¶ 27. FedEx promptly responded that the issue was "still under review" (Tice Supp. Dec. ¶ 10) and later informed ALPA that FedEx was discussing whether it would be willing to assign Ahneman flight duties due to safety concerns. Id. ¶ 11.

In late February 2014, FedEx made the decision not to retrain Ahneman or assign her flight duties for the remainder of her career because of safety and operational concerns. Id. ¶ 15; see also id. ¶ 20 (noting that Ahneman will turn sixty-five in October 2016 and thus will become legally ineligible to pilot the aircraft used in FedEx's operations). FedEx asserts that these concerns were based on Ahneman's "employment and training record" and were "distinct from the basis of her June 2013 termination and the System Board Award." Def.'s SOMF 7, ¶ 33.

The current dispute between ALPA and FedEx arose from this decision by FedEx to not assign Ahneman flying duties and to leave Ahneman in her former position of paid NOQ status. ALPA contends that Ahneman has not been fully reinstated because she has not been permitted to fly. In later memoranda before this Court, ALPA also argues that Ahneman has not been "made whole" because FedEx's refusal to assign her flights duties has supposedly caused a diminution of her potential earnings. See Pl.'s Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. 6 ("As a FedEx pilot flying its aircraft, Captain Ahneman could have earned additional compensation under various provisions of the CBA.").

After FedEx informed ALPA of its decision to not assign Ahneman flying duties, the parties engaged in a settlement discussion in attempt to resolve all claims and issues. Tice Supp. Dec. ¶ 19. No agreement was reached, however, and ALPA initiated this litigation in June 2014.

II. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed ... a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings should only be granted "where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Schuchart v. La Taberna Del Alabardero, Inc., 365 F.3d 33, 35 (D.C.Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted); see also Konah v. District of Columbia, 915 F.Supp.2d 7, 18 (D.D.C.2013) ("A motion for judgment on the pleadings will be granted if the movant shows, at the close of the pleadings, that no issue of material fact remains to be resolved, and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").

Similar to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, see Robinson–Reeder v. Am. Council on Educ., 532 F.Supp.2d 6, 12 (D.D.C.2008), aff'd, 417 Fed.Appx. 4 (D.C.Cir.2011) ("The appropriate standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that applied to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."), this Court will dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(c) if the complaint does not contain sufficient factual allegations to "state a claim that relief is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). A complaint is considered "plausible on its face" if it "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (internal quotations omitted). The facts alleged "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

In evaluating a party's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(c), a court must accept all factual allegations contained in the complaint as true. Id. The court may not rely on facts outside of the pleadings and must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Barr v. Clinton, 370 F.3d 1196, 1199 (D.C.Cir.2004) ; Peters v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 966 F.2d 1483, 1485 (D.C.Cir.1992). "The court is limited to considering facts alleged in the complaint, any documents attached to or incorporated in the complaint, matters of which the court may take judicial notice, and matters of public record." Robinson v. District of Columbia, 403 F.Supp.2d 39, 47 (D.D.C.2005) (citing EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997) ).

Accepting all facts pleaded as true, and viewing all inferences in a light most favorable to FedEx as the non-moving party, the Court finds that FedEx's counterclaim presents sufficient factual allegations to raise the right to relief above the speculative level. Thus, ALPA's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to FedEx's counterclaim will be DENIED.

Also, the Court finds that ALPA's complaint does not demonstrate that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ALPA's motion for judgment on the pleadings with respect to its claims against FedEx will be DENIED.

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Legal Standard

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court shall grant a motion for summary judgment when "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

In determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists, the court must view all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co....