Aitken v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 11 May 1939
• Docket Number: No. 410.,410.
• Citation: 6 A.2d 133,122 N.J.L. 436
• Parties: AITKEN v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

6 A.2d 133

122 N.J.L. 436

AITKEN

v. JOHN HANCOCK MUT. LIFE INS. CO.

No. 410.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

May 11, 1939.

Syllabus by the Court.

1. Where trial at law is had before the court and without a jury, a motion to "direct a verdict" while inept and technically inappropriate, may be considered on appeal as tantamount to a motion that the court rule as a matter of law that on all the evidence the opposing party is not entitled to judgment in his favor.

2. By express statutory provision (R.S. 26:6-7) a certificate of birth or death, filed and recorded as required by law, or a certified copy thereof, is prima facie evidence in court of facts stated therein in compliance with the law.

3. The Supreme Court on appeal from a District Court under statutes R.S. 2:32-202 and 2:32-204, is without power to reverse the judgment of a District Court on a matter of fact where there was evidence before the lower court to support its finding of fact.

Appeal from District Court, Second Judicial District, Hudson County; Leo S. Carney, Judge.

Suit on two life policies having a clause of extra indemnity for death by accident, by James Aitken against John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company. From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, the defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.

Argued January term, 1939, before TRENCHARD, PARKER, and PERSKIE,

JJ.

Drewen & Nugent, of Jersey City (John Drewen, of Jersey City, of counsel), for appellant.

Charles A. Rooney, of Jersey City (Gustave A. Peduto, of Jersey City, of counsel), for respondent.

PARKER, Justice.

This is a suit on two life insurance policies issued by the defendant appellant, and based on a clause of extra indemnity for death by accident. The relevant language of the policies is as follows: "Upon receipt of due proof that the insured * * * has sustained bodily injury, solely through external, violent, and accidental means * * * and resulting directly and independently of all other causes, in the death of the insured. * * * No accidental death benefit will be paid * * * if death is caused or contributed to, directly or indirectly, or wholly, or partially, by disease, or by bodily or mental infirmity * * *"

The case was tried without jury, and the judge as the trier of facts as well as law, found for the plaintiff beneficiary named in the policies for the amount of "accidental death benefit", the ordinary death claim having been paid. This necessarily involved a finding of fact by the trial judge that the death of the deceased had occurred under circumstances satisfying the language of the policy above quoted; and the sole point raised on this appeal is that there was no such evidence. There are four specifications of causes for reversal which read as follows:

"1. The trial court erred in denying defendant's motion for a direction of verdict at the conclusion of the entire case.

"2. The trial court erroneously, and without any evidence whatsoever in the case to support it, found that the insured had sustained bodily injuries solely through external, violent and accidental means, which resulted directly and independently of all other causes in the death of the insured.

"3. The trial court erroneously, and without any evidence whatsoever in the case to support it, found that the insured met her death through external, violent and accidental means, directly and independently of all other causes."

"4. The trial court erroneously, and without any evidence whatsoever in the case to support it, entered judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant."

The first specification is technically inappropriate to a case in which there was no jury, although accurate as regards the motion that was in fact made at the conclusion of the evidence in the District Court. The phrase "direction of verdict" has recently been criticised by this court as inept as regards the disposition of a case tried without jury. River Park Homes Corporation v. Hammond, 120 N.J.L. 519, at page 521, 1 A.2d 16. But as in that case, we are content to treat the motion at the trial and the specification here as referring to the refusal of the trial court to render judgment for the defendant on one or both of the grounds set up in specifications 2 and 3.

Specification 4, as appears, challenges the positive action of the court in rendering a judgment for the plaintiff.

The meritorious question, therefore, to be determined on this appeal is whether there was adduced at the trial any evidence which would support the finding by the trial judge that death occurred under circumstances satisfying the quoted condition of the policy, as this court on appeal from the District Court has no power to review findings of fact. R.S. 2:32-202: Burr v. Adams Express Co., 71 N.J.L. 263, 58 A. 609; Baldwin v. Golden Star Fraternity, 47 N.J.L. 111 (for the statute referred to in that case see Revision 1877, p. 1330, § 171): Ellis Co. v. Eyth, 69 N.J.L. 579, 55 A. 54; Phelps v. Seymour, 70 N.J.L. 626, 57 A. 129; Buckley v. Ellsworth Camp &c., 93 N.J.L. 450, 108 A. 221. The evidence at the trial to support the case for the plaintiff, it should be stated, was meagre and unsatisfactory; and if we were reviewing a verdict on the ground that it was against the weight of evidence we should doubtless feel impelled to set aside that verdict. But the case before us does not involve the weight of evidence. As already noted, it involves simply the question whether there was legal evidence to support the finding; and in this respect closely resembles the case of McNamara v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 117 N.J.L. 323, 187 A. 919, in which case, as here, the trial judge sat without jury and the same motion for "direction of verdict" was made. The case for the plaintiff rested in large measure upon the language of an official death certificate, a certified copy of which was received in evidence expressly without objection.

The statute (R.S. 2:98-14) provides in part that "any transcript of return of death, marriage or birth, made by any person according to law, to any officer or board empowered by law to receive the same or of the record of such return, such transcript being a copy of the return as originally made or a copy of the record thereof as recorded according to law, when such transcript shall be signed by the officer required by law to return or record the same as the case may be and, by him certified to be a true copy of said return or record, shall be...