Aizpitarte v. Minear
| Decision Date | 03 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 48773 |
| Citation | 508 P.3d 1260 |
| Parties | Miguel AIZPITARTE and Janice Aizpitarte, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Michael MINEAR and Laura Minear, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Eberle, Berlin, Kading, Turnbow & McKlveen, Chartered, Boise, attorneys for Appellants. Eric Taylor argued.
Fisher, Hudson, Shallat, Boise, attorney for Respondents. Christopher Brown argued.
This appeal stems from a dispute between neighbors about whether an easement has been established by prior existing use for an access driveway. Miguel and Janice Aizpitarte sued Michael and Laura Minear to quiet title and sought a declaratory judgment to recognize their right to an implied easement by prior use.1 They also sought injunctive relief enjoining the Minears from blocking access to the driveway. The Aizpitartes moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. The district court concluded the Aizpitartes had an implied easement by prior use of the driveway crossing the Minear property to the Aizpitarte property. The Minears timely appealed. They argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment against them because there were genuine issues of material fact in the record. They also argue the scope of the easement recognized by the district court was too broad. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the district court's decisions.
In 1990, Miguel and Janice Aizpitarte bought 17.67 acres of land in Emmett, Idaho. They partitioned the 17.67-acre parcel into four separate parcels in 1998. When they partitioned the land, they retained ownership of all four parcels. At that time, the Aizpitartes had Tri-County Surveying survey the land, which showed that Parcels 1, 2, and 3 were each five acres, and Parcel 4, which the Aizpitartes lived on, was 2.67 acres.
Two years later, in 2000, the Aizpitartes built and moved into a house on Parcel 2, where they now reside. The Aizpitartes built their house on the west side of the property abutting Lower Bluff Road. The Aizpitartes also constructed two gravel driveways from Lower Bluff Road when they built the house. They called these the "North Driveway" and the "South Driveway." The South Driveway is at issue here. The Aizpitartes used both driveways to access their property, which was otherwise surrounded by active farmland.
From 2000 to 2005, the Aizpitartes continued to use the South Driveway. Then, in 2005, they executed a warranty deed conveying Parcel 3 to Brian and Heather Gregory.2 According to the 1998 partition and land survey, the South Driveway was situated upon and included within Parcel 3 when the Aizpitartes conveyed Parcel 3 to the Gregorys. Even so, the Aizpitartes were unaware of this when they sold Parcel 3. After learning the South Driveway was located on Parcel 3, the Aizpitartes and the Gregorys made an oral agreement reserving the Aizpitartes right to use the South Driveway. This arrangement remained in place for the approximately thirteen years that the Gregorys owned the property. The agreement was never put into writing or recorded.
In July 2018, the Gregorys sold Parcel 3 to Dr. Trent and Angela Giles. The Aizpitartes continued to use the South Driveway while the Gileses owned the property, but the Gileses never gave the Aizpitartes express permission to do so. Even so, Dr. Giles testified that he and Mrs. Giles allowed the Aizpitartes to use the property because they "thought it was neighborly to allow the Aizpitartes use of the driveway." In August 2019, the Gileses sold Parcel 3 to Michael and Laura Minear.
According to the Aizpitartes, when the Minears purchased Parcel 3, they had actual "or" constructive notice of the Aizpitartes’ access easement to the South Driveway. Mrs. Minear disputes this, noting that at the time of purchase, neither she nor her husband were informed by the Gileses that the Aizpitartes claimed an easement and during her inspection she "did not see any activity along the [South D]riveway." When the Gileses and Minears signed the purchase and sales agreement, the Gileses signed an RE-25 Seller's Property Condition Disclosure Form. That form included the question: "[a]re there any conditions that may affect your ability to clear title such as encroachments, easements, zoning violations, lot line disputes, restrictive covenants, etc.?" The Gileses checked the box, answering "no." The disclosure form also asked: "[i]s there a private road to this property?" The Gileses again answered "no."
From August 2019 to November 2019, the Minears did not prohibit, question, or otherwise interfere with the Aizpitartes’ access to the South Driveway. Then, in late November, the Minears obstructed the South Driveway by laying plastic piping along an irrigation ditch that ran the boundary length between the Aizpitarte and Minear properties. Despite the Aizpitartes’ requests to access the South Driveway, the Minears refused. The Minears also planted a tree in a location obstructing the Aizpitartes’ access to the South Driveway.
In March 2020, the Aizpitartes sent a formal demand letter to the Minears to restore access to the South Driveway. The Minears, through counsel, denied that the Aizpitartes had an easement and declined to recognize the easement over the South Driveway. Later, the Aizpitartes filed a complaint to quiet title to their claimed easement over the South Driveway and to enjoin the Minears from restricting their access. The Aizpitartes claimed an implied easement by prior use. The Minears answered and filed a third-party complaint against the Gileses. The Minears alleged in the third-party complaint that the Gileses were aware of the claimed easement and the Aizpitartes’ use of the South Driveway, but willfully failed or neglected to inform the Minears.
Later, the Aizpitartes moved for summary judgment, asserting they had proved all three elements needed for an implied easement by prior use. The Minears objected and alleged the Aizpitartes did not satisfy any elements because they did not build the driveway until after they separated the parcels in 1998. The district court granted summary judgment to the Aizpitartes and ordered a permanent injunction against the Minears. The district court also entered an order setting the scope of the easement as "unlimited reasonable use." The Minears later requested that the district court restrict the scope of the easement, which the court did twice—issuing two amended judgment—ultimately limiting the scope to "any reasonable and lawful use." The Minears timely appealed.
This Court employs the same standard as the district court when reviewing rulings on summary judgment motions. Owen v. Smith , 168 Idaho 633, 640–41, 485 P.3d 129, 136-37 (2021) (citing Trumble v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho , 166 Idaho 132, 140–41, 456 P.3d 201, 209-10 (2019) ). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(a). A moving party must support its assertion by citing particular materials in the record or by showing the I.R.C.P. 56(c)(1)(B). "Summary judgment is improper ‘if reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented.’ " Owen , 168 Idaho at 641, 485 P.3d at 137 (quoting Trumble , 166 Idaho at 141, 456 P.3d at 210 ). "Even so, a ‘mere scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt as to the facts is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact for the purposes of summary judgment.’ " Id .
This Court freely reviews the record to determine whether the facts found, or stipulated to, are enough to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement or a prescriptive easement. Walker v. Hollinger , 132 Idaho 172, 176, 968 P.2d 661, 665 (1998).
The Minears challenge the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the Aizpitartes arguing that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment and that the district court erred as a matter of law. The Minears also challenge the scope of the easement granted by the district court. For the reasons below, we affirm the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the Aizpitartes and its second judgment defining the scope of the easement.
An easement may be express or implied. See Shultz v. Atkins , 97 Idaho 770, 773, 554 P.2d 948, 951 (1976). This case involves an implied easement. To establish an implied easement by prior use, a party must prove three elements:
(1) unity of title or ownership and a subsequent separation by grant of the dominant estate; (2) apparent continuous use long enough before separation of the dominant estate to show that the use was intended to be permanent; and (3) the easement must be reasonably necessary to the proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.
Spectra Site Commc'ns, Inc. v. Lawrence , 160 Idaho 570, 574, 377 P.3d 75, 79 (2016) (citing Bird v. Bidwell , 147 Idaho 350, 352, 209 P.3d 647, 649 (2009) ). The owner of the dominant estate has the burden of proof "to show the existence of facts necessary to create by implication an easement" pertinent to their estate. Davis v. Gowen , 83 Idaho 204, 212, 360 P.2d 403, 408 (1961). This doctrine presumes that if an access was in use at the time of severance, such use was meant to continue. Capstar Radio Operating Co. v. Lawrence , 160 Idaho 452, 459, 375 P.3d 282, 289 (2016). The district court properly held that there was no genuine dispute of material fact regarding the three elements for an implied easement by prior use.
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