Akerley v. Hartford Ins. Group
Decision Date | 25 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 91-164,91-164 |
Citation | 136 N.H. 433,616 A.2d 511 |
Parties | Joseph C. AKERLEY and Another v. The HARTFORD INSURANCE GROUP and Another. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Donald M. Redden, Derry, on the brief and orally, for plaintiffs.
Wadleigh, Starr, Peters, Dunn & Chiesa, Manchester (Robert E. Murphy, Jr., on the defendants' joint brief, and Peter R. Chiesa, orally and on the defendants' joint brief), for defendant The Hartford Ins. Group.
Backus, Meyer & Solomon, Manchester (H. Jon Meyer, on the defendants' joint brief and orally), for defendant Metropolitan Ins. Co.
Hamblett & Kerrigan, P.A., Nashua (Paul W. Chant, on the brief), for Ronald Dowling, as amicus curiae.
In this declaratory judgment proceeding, the insureds, Joseph C. Akerley and Paula S. Akerley, appeal a Superior Court (Hampsey, J.) order denying coverage under two uninsured motorist policies for an injury Joseph Akerley sustained while arresting a suspect. The defendants cross-appeal. We affirm.
In April 1986, Officer Joseph Akerley was on duty as a deputy sheriff when he was informed that an individual was shooting a weapon from his car toward people on Hampton Beach. Officer Akerley and another officer responded to the report and, eventually, cornered a suspect in his car in a parking lot. The suspect resisted arrest, and the officers were forced to physically remove him from his car. The suspect continued to struggle outside the car, whereupon all three individuals fell to the ground. Officer Akerley claims that he suffered a back injury from this incident.
Joseph and Paula Akerley entered claims for uninsured motorist benefits with the defendants, The Hartford Insurance Group (Hartford) and Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan). Hartford insured Officer Akerley's employer under a business auto policy, and Metropolitan insured the plaintiffs under their personal auto policy. After the defendants denied coverage, the plaintiffs brought a petition for declaratory judgment seeking to establish coverage under the policies. All parties moved for summary judgment. The Superior Court (Pappagianis, J.) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The trial court determined that although the requisite causal connection existed between Officer Akerley's injury and the use of the uninsured vehicle, the fireman's rule precluded the plaintiffs from recovering because Officer Akerley's injury arose out of the same conduct that required his presence.
After the trial court entered its order, we decided Migdal v. Stamp, 132 N.H. 171, 176, 564 A.2d 826, 829 (1989), recognizing exceptions to the fireman's rule for wanton or reckless conduct and for positive acts of misconduct. In light of our decision in Migdal, the plaintiffs moved to amend their petition for declaratory judgment and asked the trial court to reconsider the denial of their motion. The plaintiffs were permitted to amend their petition to allege the following
After granting the plaintiffs' motion to amend, the Superior Court (Pappagianis, J.) vacated its earlier order granting summary judgment to the defendants. The defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment a second time, contending that their policies only covered injuries arising out of "accidents" and that the new allegations of reckless, wanton, or willful misconduct did not fall within their policy definitions of an accident. The Superior Court (Hampsey, J.) denied the defendants' motion, finding that the question of whether the injury was caused by an accident was a question of fact. The defendants brought a motion for reconsideration which the Superior Court (Hampsey, J.) granted. In granting the motion, the trial court found that the question of whether Officer Akerley's injury arose out of an accident was not one of material fact. The trial court ruled that if the injury arose out of an accident, then the plaintiffs' uninsured motorist claims were barred by the fireman's rule; if the injury was not the result of an accident, then the policies did not provide coverage. In this ruling, the trial court did not reach the issue of whether the alleged injury arose out of or resulted from ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured vehicle.
On appeal, the plaintiffs contend that the fireman's rule should be abrogated in New Hampshire or, in the alternative, that it does not apply to the facts of this case. The plaintiffs further contend that whether Officer Akerley's injury falls within both policies' definition of "accident" is a question of fact. On cross-appeal, the defendants argue that regardless of whether Officer Akerley's injury arose from an accident, the plaintiffs cannot recover as a matter of law. The defendants argue that Officer Akerley's injury was not causally connected to "ownership, maintenance or use" of the uninsured motor vehicle.
The fireman's rule precludes "a police officer or fireman, both of whom are paid to confront crises and allay dangers created by an uncircumspect citizenry, from complaining of negligence in the creation of the very occasion for their engagement." England v. Tasker, 129 N.H. 467, 471-72, 529 A.2d 938, 941 (1987). In England, we left open the question whether the rule also applied to willful or wanton conduct. Id. at 472, 529 A.2d at 941. We settled this issue in Migdal by holding that the fireman's rule applies only "to acts of ordinary negligence," Migdal, 132 N.H. at 176, 564 A.2d at 828, and explicitly exempting reckless, wanton, or positive (willful) acts of misconduct from the scope of the rule. Id. at 175-76, 564 A.2d at 828.
In England, we enunciated the relevant public policy considerations that compel the application of the fireman's rule. The rule supports the principle that societal responsibility is a better, surer, and fairer recourse for a public officer or fireman injured in the line of duty than the possibility of a tort recovery. England, 129 N.H. at 470, 529 A.2d at 940. Police officers and firemen are " 'paid to confront crises and allay dangers created by an uncircumspect citizenry'...." Id. (quoting Berko v. Freda, 93 N.J. 81, 86, 459 A.2d 663, 666 (1983)). As such, "it is fundamentally unfair to ask the citizen to compensate ... public safety officer[s], already engaged at taxpayer expense, a second time for injuries sustained while performing the very service which [they are] paid to undertake for the citizen's benefit." Id. 129 N.H. at 471, 529 A.2d at 940. A contrary rule might discourage members of the public from requesting assistance from public safety officers for fear of liability. Id. at 471, 529 A.2d at 941. We see no reason to set aside these considerations and thus reject the plaintiffs' argument that the rule should be abrogated.
We read the plaintiffs' amended petition as alleging that Officer Akerley's injury was proximately caused by three types of conduct: (1) negligent conduct; (2) reckless and wanton conduct, see W. Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984) ( ); and (3) positive (intentional) acts of misconduct. Because of the fireman's rule, we find that the trial court correctly barred the plaintiffs' recovery for an injury that was caused by ordinary negligence. See Migdal, 132 N.H. at 176, 564 A.2d at 828. The fireman's rule, however, does not bar the plaintiffs from bringing their other claims. Thus, we must turn to the applicable uninsured motorist coverage provisions and determine which policy, if any, affords coverage on the facts alleged.
Generally, uninsured motorist coverage is "designed to provide protection for the motoring public from injuries caused by uninsured ... motorists and hit-and-run motorists." R. McNamara, 9 New Hampshire Practice, Personal Injury § 572, at 123 (1988). Hartford's uninsured motorist policy contains the following provision:
(Emphasis added.) Similarly, the uninsured motorist provision of Metropolitan's policy covers the insured's injuries that were "caused by an accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of an uninsured ... vehicle...." (Emphasis added.) Such coverage is not intended to serve as a substitute for comprehensive personal liability insurance. See 8C Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice § 5092.55, at 396-97 (1991).
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