Akers v. Com.

• Decision Date: 13 June 1975
• Docket Number: No. 741039,741039
• Citation: 216 S.E.2d 28,216 Va. 40
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Charles Rufus AKERS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record

Page 28

216 S.E.2d 28

216 Va. 40

Charles Rufus AKERS v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 741039.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

June 13, 1975.

E. Ralph Coon, Jr., R. O. Kellam, Coon & Kellam, Manassas, for appellant.

Andrew P. Miller, James E. Kulp, Richmond, for appellee.

Before I'ANSON, C.J., and CARRICO, HARRISON, COCHRAN, HARMAN, POFF and COMPTON, JJ.

I'ANSON, Chief Justice.

Charles Rufus Akers, defendant, was indicted for the murder of a fourteen-year-old girl. Defendant pleaded not guilty, waived trial by jury, was found guilty of murder in the first degree, and was sentenced to life imprisonment in the State penitentiary.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in:

(1) Admitting into evidence his alleged confessions without first hearing evidence on the issue of voluntariness;

(2) Admitting the confession made to Officers Deane and Morgan after he had indicated to them that he did not want to answer any more questions;

(3) Permitting the Commonwealth's Attorney, on cross-examination, to exceed the scope of direct examination;

(4) Holding that his confessions were voluntary;

(5) Not requiring the Commonwealth to elect on which theory it was seeking a first degree murder conviction; and

(6) Holding that he was guilty of murder in the first degree.

The evidence shows that on October 20, 1973, the deceased and her family were in Prince William County to attend a wedding. At approximately 2:30 p.m. the deceased left her family to go to a nearby shopping center.

At 3:08 p.m. the County police received a telephone call from a person who identified himself as Akers. He gave his address, and stated that he had just killed someone.

Two officers were immediately dispatched to the scene, and upon their arrival were approached by the defendant who said, 'I killed her. She is upstairs.' Defendant was placed under arrest and advised of his Miranda rights, which he said he understood. One of the officers went upstairs in defendant's apartment but could not find the body. He returned and asked the defendant where she was. Defendant responded, 'In the closet.' The officer went back upstairs and found some blankets and clothing piled up in the closet, and upon moving them he saw the deceased. Her slacks were down to her knees. Defendant was again advised of his Miranda rights and he said that he understood them.

Investigator Deane, of the police department, arrived on the scene at approximately 3:15 p.m. Upon entering defendant's bedroom, he observed the girl's body in the closet. He found one knife with blood on it and another knife and a wet towel on the closet shelf. Spots of blood were on the rug and the wall of the room.

Shortly thereafter, Deane advised defendant of his Miranda rights and defendant made a statement which was reduced to writing by the officer and signed by defendant. The essence of the statement, marked exhibit 18, which was introduced into evidence over the objection of defendant, was that he saw the girl at the 7--11 store; that she asked to see his apartment, and he followed her up to his bedroom; that she sat on the bed and began unbuckling her pants; that he started to help her and she said, 'What do you think I am, a whore?' and began screaming 'rape' and 'help'; and that he 'stabbed her in the chest at least once, maybe more.'

Prior to the introduction of the above statement into evidence, defendant requested a hearing on the issue of voluntariness, but the trial court ruled that defendant would be allowed an opportunity later to put on such evidence for the court to determine if it should consider the statement.

Approximately four hours after this statement was signed, Deane again advised defendant of his Miranda rights. After each right was read to the defendant, Deane asked him if he understood and defendant replied each time that he did. Defendant also signed the waiver of rights statement. He was questioned by Officers Deane and Morgan, and the interrogation was recorded on tape and later transcribed. Statements found in the first portion of the recorded interrogation were substantially the same as those made by defendant to Deane earlier in the day. When defendant was asked how he got the girl to walk with him to his apartment, the following exchange occurred:

'Akers: Do I have to talk about it now?

'Deane: Well, we would just like to get it all straightened out now.

'Morgan: Tell it all right now. It'll do you good to get it all out.

'Deane: We know you are upset.

'Morgan: Don't you think you'd sleep better at night?

'Akers: No. I can sleep good anyhow.

Deane: You will feel better when you tell the truth about it, Charles.

'Morgan: Tell us exactly what happened here at the 7--11.'

Following this exchange, defendant continued to answer the officers' questions and did not indicate that he wanted to stop the interrogation. His answers indicated that he had threatened the girl with a knife and held her by the arm or around the waist as they proceeded to his apartment.

The transcribed statement, marked exhibit 22, was also introduced into evidence over the objection of defendant.

A medical examiner viewed the body while it was still in the closet. He stated that the girl's slacks were pulled down to the mid-buttock level and her underpants had been pulled down to expose pubic hair. The autopsy revealed that the girl had seven stab wounds in her chest and abdomen and that there were wounds on the palm of her left hand, and bruises on her nose, lip and neck. Vaginal smears were negative, indicating no evidence of rape.

Defendant's father testified that when he saw his son in jail on October 21, 1973, defendant appeared to be very nervous and upset.

Robert Caton, a deputy sheriff of the County and a friend of defendant's family, testified that he saw defendant, at defendant's request, on or about October 23, 1973. Caton said that at that time the defendant appeared to be relaxed and able to understand what was said to him, but when he took him to the Medical Health Center on October 31, 1973, pursuant to a court order, the defendant looked tense.

Defendant was examined by Dr. N. M. Alp, a psychiatrist, on October 31, 1973. At that time Dr. Alp found the defendant to be extremely depressed and confused. He diagnosed defendant's condition as schizophrenic, simple type, and prescribed certain medication. In February 1974, defendant was adjudged competent to stand trial. Dr. Alp testified that after he examined defendant on May 7, 1974, he was able to verify that defendant had a perfectly clear mind at the time the crime was committed, and in his report he concluded that defendant was not suffering from any kind of mental disorder at that time.

Defendant took the stand solely for the purpose of testifying concerning the voluntariness of his alleged confessions, exhibits 18 and 22. He admitted that he had been advised of his constitutional rights but said that he did not understand them. It was only after he had talked with an inmate in the jail that he fully understood his rights. Defendant was 21 years of age and had 'gone up' to the eleventh grade in school.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence exhibits 18 and 22 before hearing evidence on the issue of voluntariness of the confessions.

Defendant relies on the rule in Virginia that in determining the admissibility of a confession, the trial judge must hear all evidence relating to the question of its voluntariness out of the presence of the Jury and rule upon whether it was freely and voluntarily made. The credibility and weight of a confession are questions for determination by the Jury. Washington v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 737, 738--39, 204 S.E.2d 266, 267 (1974); Reid v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 464, 467, 144 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1965).

Defendant also relies on Jackson v. Dennon, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). There the Supreme Court held that the New York procedure for determining the voluntariness of confessions in criminal cases tried before a Judge and jury violated the Fourteenth Amendment because it did not afford a defendant an opportunity 'to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination on the issues of voluntariness, a determination uninfluenced by the truth of falsity of the confession.' 378 U.S. at 377, 84 S.Ct. at 1781. The Court was concerned with a jury's inability to decide both the voluntariness of a confession and the guilt or innocence of an accused without allowing the consideration of one issue to influence the other.

Defendant argues that the Virginia rule and the holding in Jackson v. Denno, supra, relating to the issue of the voluntariness of a confession, are applicable in a nonjury trial of a criminal case. However, in all the cases relied upon there was a jury trial. Here the defendant was tried by the judge without a jury.

In People v. Brown, 24 N.Y.2d 168, 172, 299 N.Y.S.2d 190, 193, 247 N.E.2d 153, 155 (1969), the court held that 'a Judge--unlike a jury--by reasons of his learning, experience and judicial discipline, is uniquely capable of distinguishing the issues and of making an objective determination as to voluntariness, regardless of whether he has heard evidence on other issues in the case,' and that the rule laid down in Jackson v. Denno, requiring a separate hearing on the issue of voluntariness, has no applicability in a nonjury case. For a contrary view, See United States ex rel. Spears v. Rundle, 268 F.Supp. 691 (E.D.Pa.1967), and United States ex rel. Owens v. Cavell, 254 F.Supp. 154 (M.D.Pa.1966).

In the case at bar, the defendant's spontaneous statements that he had killed the girl and that her body was in the closet had already been admitted in evidence without objection when the trial judge was requested to hear evidence on the voluntariness of exhibits 18 and 22. Thus we cannot say that it was reversible error for the court trying the case without a jury to delay passing on the issue of...