Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc.
| Citation | 142 Idaho 293,127 P.3d 196 |
| Decision Date | 30 December 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 30845.,No. 30795.,30795.,30845. |
| Parties | Dennis Lyle AKERS and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. D.L. WHITE CONSTRUCTION, INC., David L. White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants, and Vernon J. Mortensen and Martie Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants. Dennis Lyle Akers and Sherrie L. Akers, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. D.L. White Construction, Inc., David White and Michelle V. White, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants, and Vernon J. Mortensen and Martie Mortensen, husband and wife, Defendants. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Idaho |
Jones, Gledhill, Hess, Andrews, Fuhrman, Bradbury & Eiden, Boise, for appellants in case number 30795. Terri R. Yost argued.
Robert E. Covington, III, Hayden, argued for appellants in case number 30845.
Owens, James, Vernon & Weeks, Coeur d'Alene, for respondents. Leander L. James argued.
This action arose from alleged trespass and other torts by the Appellants on land owned by the Respondents. The Appellants hold an easement for ingress and egress over portions of the Respondents' property, but following a bench trial the Appellants were found to have trespassed by exceeding their rights under the easement and by altering a roadway outside of the easement's boundaries. The district court also determined the Appellants had committed various torts against the Respondents and quieted title to disputed portions of the Respondents' land. The Respondents were awarded compensatory damages for the trespass, which were tripled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202, as well as damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, and costs and attorney fees. We vacate the district court's award of damages, costs and attorney fees, and remand for reconsideration of damages, trespass, and the easement rights held by the Appellants.
The Respondents, Dennis and Sherrie Akers, (the Akers; used herein as a plural) are owners of real property adjacent to land owned by appellants David and Michelle White (the Whites). The Whites operate D.L. White Construction Company. In turn, the Whites' real property borders on property held by appellants Vernon and Martie Mortensen. (The Whites, the Mortensens, and D.L. White Construction are hereinafter referred to collectively as "the Appellants.")
All the property at issue now owned by the parties was once held by W.L. and Patricia Millsaps (the Millsaps; used herein as a plural). This included all of a parcel known as "Government Lot 2," as well as what for the purposes of this action are referred to as "Parcel A" and "Parcel B." There is a fourth parcel of interest, referred to here as the "Reynolds Property," that is not owned by the parties and was never owned by the Millsaps. The four parcels are rectangular and meet together at a four-way corner. Parcel A is to the southwest. Parcel B is to the northwest. Government Lot 2 is to the northeast, and the Reynolds Parcel is to the southeast. Government Lot 2 is bisected roughly north to south by a county road, Millsap Loop Road. Because the properties meet at a four-way corner, Parcel A and Government Lot 2 do not actually share a border. It is therefore physically impossible to access Parcel A from the county road in Government Lot 2 without also passing through some other property.
In 1966, the Millsaps sold the northern portion of their property, Government Lot 2 and Parcel B, to Vernon and Kathryn Baker (the Bakers). When doing so, the Millsaps reserved in the deed an easement for themselves across the southern part of Government Lot 2. This easement was to allow the Millsaps to access Millsap Loop Road from that portion of their land they retained and continued to farm, Parcel A. By 1966, and possibly much earlier, an access road (the access road) matching the easement ran from Millsap Loop Road, westward across the southern part of Government Lot 2. It then went beyond the western boundary of Government Lot 2 into Parcel B, before turning south into Parcel A. The Millsaps used the access road several times a year for farming and logging access.
In 1967, the Millsaps sold Parcel A to Floyd and Stella Peplinski (the Peplinskis). The deed from the Millsaps to the Peplinskis expressly conveyed along with Parcel A its easement across Government Lot 2. After taking ownership of Parcel A, the Peplinskis used the access road in the same manner as the Millsaps had used it.
In 1979, the Bakers conveyed the southeastern corner of Parcel B and the southwestern corner of Government Lot 2 lying west of Millsap Loop Road — which includes the land through which the access road passes — to Roger and Linda Wilhelm, (the Wilhelms) and Gregory and Barbara Turk (the Turks). In the following year, 1980, the Akers purchased that property from the Wilhelms and Marvin and Betty Wigen, (the Wigens) the Turks' successors in interest. The deed from the Wilhelms and Wigens to the Akers provides that the Akers took their land subject to "easements of record or in view."
After the Akers moved onto their property, they altered the route of the access road at its eastern end where it connects to Millsap Loop Road. Rather than meeting Millsap Loop Road after a sharp turn to the north as before, (the original approach) the altered approach (the curved approach) starts to turn earlier and curves more gently to the north before meeting the county road. Both the original and curved approaches to the access road are on a triangle of land (the triangle) the ownership of which has been disputed. The Akers' deed to their property, according to the metes and bounds description, does not include the triangle. The triangle, however, is west of Millsap Loop Road, and references in the deed to that road suggest the triangle of land could belong to the Akers.
The Akers eventually quarreled with the Peplinskis over the Peplinskis' use of the access road, leading to the Peplinskis filing a lawsuit. The Peplinski/Akers suit ended in 1994 when the Peplinskis sold their property, Parcel A, to the Mortensens. The Mortensens later sold much of Parcel A, including the portion adjacent to Parcel B, to the Whites.
According to later findings by the district court, the Whites and the Mortensens entered into a business relationship in which they planned to split their land in Parcel A into smaller lots to create a housing development. The court found that in order to accommodate their projected housing development, the Appellants also planned to widen the access road that crossed the Akers' property and connected the Appellants' land to Millsap Loop Road.
In January 2002 or before, the Akers blocked the Appellants' use of the curved approach to the access road and also forbid the Appellants to travel on the western end of the access road, where it passes through Parcel B before connecting to the Appellants' property in Parcel A. The Appellants then brought in heavy equipment, including a bulldozer, to carve a route around the Akers' gate and to otherwise alter the access road. This led to a series of confrontations between the Akers and the Appellants, as well as alleged damage to the Akers' property and alleged malicious behavior by the Appellants.
In response, the Akers filed the instant action for trespass, quiet title, and negligence. Following a bench trial, the district court quieted title in favor of the Akers to the disputed triangle and confirmed to the Appellants an easement 12.2 feet in width across the Akers' property in Government Lot 2, including an easement across the disputed triangle through the original approach, but not the curved approach, to Millsap Loop Road. Although the district court confirmed the Appellants' easement across part of the Akers' land, the court determined the easement ended at the western boundary of Government Lot 2, and did not cross into the Akers' property in Parcel B. As a result, the easement was ruled to run from Millsap Loop Road to a point very close to, but not actually reaching, the Appellants' property.
The district court also awarded the Akers compensatory damages arising from the Appellants' trespass in the amount of $17,002.85, which was trebled pursuant to I.C. § 6-202 to a total of $51,008.55, to be paid by the Appellants jointly and severally. Sherrie Akers was awarded $10,000 in compensatory damages for emotional distress, also to be paid jointly and severally by the Appellants. Additionally, the Akers were awarded punitive damages in the amount of $150,000 to be paid by the Mortensens, and $30,000 to be paid by the Whites. Finally, the Appellants were determined to be jointly and severally liable to the Akers for costs and attorney fees totaling $105,534.06.
The Appellants filed a timely appeal from that judgment that is now before this Court.
This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691, 696, 8 P.3d 1234, 1239 (2000). We will not disturb findings of fact that are supported by substantial and competent evidence, even if there is conflicting evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proven. Miller v. Callear, 140 Idaho 213, 216, 91 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2004). "However, this Court freely reviews the question of whether the facts found, or stipulated to, are sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements for the existence of an implied easement or a prescriptive easement." Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362, 365 (1999).
This appeal raises issues concerning easements and ownership of real property, as well as regarding damages arising from trespass and other torts. Because the Appellants argue they are not liable for trespass because they...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Easterling v. Hal Pac. Props., L.P.
...the property by the owner.’ " Backman v. Lawrence , 147 Idaho 390, 394, 210 P.3d 75, 79 (2009) (quoting Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 298, 127 P.3d 196, 201 (2005) ). An easement by necessity arises and is implied at the conveyance of a tract of land that is landlocked a......
-
Cobb v. Daugherty, 35015.
... ... Hillary Corp. v. U.S. Cold Storage, Inc., 250 Neb. 397, 550 N.W.2d 889, 897 (1996) ... See so, ... Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 302, 127 P.3d ... ...
-
Halvorson v. N. Latah Cnty. Highway Dist.
...or constructive, that it is burdened with an existing easement, takes the land subject to the easement." Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005) (quoting Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Idaho 715, 721, 152 P.2d 585, 587 (1944) ). Because the Highway District......
-
Nampa Highway Dist. No. 1, v. Knight
...264, 273, 127 P.3d 167, 176 (2005) ). "An express easement may be by way of reservation or by exception." Akers v. D.L. White Const., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 301, 127 P.3d 196, 204 (2005). "An express easement by reservation reserves to the grantor some new right in the property being conveyed......