Akers v. Singer

• Decision Date: 05 March 1969
• Citation: 255 A.2d 858,158 Conn. 29
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Lawrence M. AKERS et al. v. Ethel SINGER, Administratrix (ESTATE of Bernard J. SINGER (two cases).) Ethel SINGER, Administratrix v. Lawrence M. AKERS et al.

Page 858

255 A.2d 858

158 Conn. 29

Lawrence M. AKERS et al. v. Ethel SINGER, Administratrix (ESTATE of Bernard J. SINGER

(two cases).)

Ethel SINGER, Administratrix v. Lawrence M. AKERS et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

March 5, 1969.

John J. Hunt, Bridgeport, with whom were Samuel Engelman, Bridgeport, and, on the brief, Melvin Fennell, Bridgeport, for appellant (defendant) in the first case.

Samuel Engelman, Bridgeport, with whom were John J. Hunt, Bridgeport, and, on the brief, Melvin Fennell, Bridgeport, for appellant (plaintiff) in the second case.

Richard P. Gilardi, Bridgeport, with whom was Richard F. Oburchay, Bridgeport, for appellees (plaintiffs in the first case and defendants in the second case).

Before KING, C.J., and ALCORN, HOUSE, THIM and RYAN, JJ.

THIM, Associate Justice.

The administratrix of the estate of Bernard J. Singer has taken appeals from the judgments in two cases, and they have been combined in a single record. Both cases arose as a result of an accident which occurred on the Connecticut Turnpike at Bridgeport, and they were consolidated and tried together.

In the first case, Lawrence M. Akers and his employer, the Pressed Steel Tank Company, brought an action for negligence against the Singer estate to recover damages for personal injuries and property damage. The administratrix of the estate pleaded contributory negligence as a special defense. Shortly thereafter, the administratrix initiated an action on behalf of the estate against Akers and the Pressed Steel Tank Company to recover damages for the decedent's death alleged to have been caused by the negligence of Akers while he was acting as the agent for his employer. Akers and his employer pleaded the special defense of contributory negligence. In both cases, the jury found the issues in favor of Akers and the Pressed Steel Tank Company.

I

The administratrix of the Singer estate seeks to correct paragraphs of the finding. We shall not, however, consider the errors assigned to the finding because they have not been pursued in the brief and are thus treated as abandoned. Sherman-Colonial Realty Corporation v. Goldsmith, 155 Conn. 175, 183, 230 A.2d 568; State v. 155 Conn. 175, 183, 230 A.2d 568; State v. Adamsen v. Adamsen, 151 Conn. 172, 173, 195 A.2d 418.

II

The administratrix claims that the trial court committed error in denying her motion to set aside the verdicts. The question thus presented is whether the trial court abused its legal discretion in denying the motion to set aside the verdicts. Brooks v. Singer, 147 Conn. 719, 158 A.2d 745; Desmarais v. Pinto, 147 Conn. 109, 110, 157 A.2d 596. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, we decide only whether the jury could reasonably and logically have reached the conclusion which they did; Cayer v. Salvatore, 150 Conn. 361, 364, 189 A.2d 505; Conti v. Brown, 149 Conn. 465, 467, 181 A.2d 591; Desmarais v. Pinto, supra; Loomis v. Perkins, 70 Conn. 444, 446, 39 A. 797; see Badela v. Karpowich, 152 Conn. 360, 363, 206 A.2d 838; and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdicts. Terminal Taxi Co. v. Flynn, 156 Conn. 313, 314, 240 A.2d 881; Blados v. Blados, 151 Conn. 391, 393, 198 A.2d 213.

The jury could have reasonably found the following facts: On February 8, 1965, at about 6:15 p.m., Bernard J. Singer was driving his automobile in an easterly direction on the Connecticut Turnpike. At the same time, Lawrence M. Akers was driving a tractor-trailer owned by the Pressed Steel Tank Company in the center lane and was also traveling in an easterly direction. Akers was traveling about fifty miles per hour, the posted speed, when the Singer vehicle passed him in the left lane and shortly thereafter turned into the center lane. When Singer's vehicle was about forty yards ahead of Akers' truck, the car began to skid sideways, the brake lights went on, and it turned broadside to the truck. After the elapse of a few seconds, the truck collided with the right rear portion of Singer's vehicle. The truck mounted the car and pinned it underneath. In this position, the two vehicles careened to a stop at the median divider of the highway about 400 feet from the point of impact. Before the vehicles came to a complete stop, a fire started at the rear of the truck, and within a short time flames engulfed both of the vehicles. Singer died before he could be removed from the wreckage.

The two verdicts in favor of Akers and his employer import a jury finding that Singer's negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and that Akers was not negligent or, if he was, his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident. At the trial, there was considerable testimony describing the manner in which the Singer vehicle was driven up until the moment of the collision. Witnesses testified that the Singer car passed Akers' truck, which was traveling at the posted speed limit, and that the car then cut in ahead of the truck just prior to the collision. We do not believe that the jury strained the limits of reasonable probability by concluding that Singer's speed and change of lanes constituted negligence which was the sole proximate cause of the accident. It was reasonable for the jury to draw the inference that it was more probable than not that Singer was the responsible agent for the loss of the control of his vehicle. Badela v. Karpowich, supra; Blados v. Blados, supra, 394, 198 A.2d 213; Danzell v. Smith, 150 Conn. 35, 41,42, 184 A.2d 53.

At the trial, Akers admitted that he did not apply his brakes to avoid a collision because of the danger of jackknifing his truck; he did, however, direct his truck toward the left lane in an attempt to avoid hitting the Singer vehicle. We do not believe that Akers' failure to apply his brakes was negligence as a matter of law. Akers was faced with a sudden emergency, and, considering the speed and momentum of the truck, the jury could reasonably conclude that his failure to apply the brakes was not negligence. Danehy v. Metz, 140 Conn. 376, 380, 100 A.2d 843.

III

The administratrix claims that, even if the estate is liable for the injuries sustained by Akers, the damages which the jury awarded him were excessive. The jury awarded Akers a verdict of $9500 to compensate him for his personal injuries, and the court ordered a remittitur of $3700, which was subsequently filed.

Akers testified that after the...