Akers v. State
| Decision Date | 03 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2562-2019,1717-2019 |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
| Parties | MARTHA ANN AKERS v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
MARTHA ANN AKERS
v.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Nos. 1717-2019, 2562-2019
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
March 3, 2022
Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 134629C
Berger, Wells, Sharer, J. Frederick (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
OPINION [*]
Wells, J.
The State charged the appellant, Martha Ann Akers, with first-degree and second-degree assault in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. Akers discharged her assigned public defender. The trial court ruled that Akers had waived her right to counsel by inaction, and Akers represented herself at trial before a jury. That jury deadlocked, and the court declared a mistrial.
The State decided to retry the case. Between the mistrial and retrial, Akers obtained the assistance of two different public defenders, and, later, Akers discharged them. Before the retrial, the court held a hearing and denied Akers' motions to dismiss and to suppress evidence. Akers then filed a notice of appeal. This Court docketed that appeal as Case Number 1717 of the September 2019 Term.
Before the retrial, the court ruled that Akers had waived her right to counsel by inaction once again. During the retrial, Akers represented herself, and that jury found Akers guilty of second-degree assault, but acquitted her of first-degree assault. The court sentenced Akers to three years of incarceration, with all but six months suspended, and two years of supervised probation. Akers filed a notice of appeal from that final judgment, and this Court docketed that appeal as Case Number 2562 of the September 2019 Term.
In April 2020, the circuit court modified Akers' sentence because of the COVID-19 emergency. The court resentenced Akers to three years of incarceration, with all but time served (116 days) suspended, and two years of supervised probation. Akers, on her own
behalf, filed a brief[1] and an amended brief[2] in Case Number 1717. The Office of the Public Defender ("OPD") appointed Akers' appellate counsel to represent Akers in this Court.
Counsel for Akers filed a brief in Case Number 2562. Akers' counsel moved to consolidate both cases on appeal because Akers had filed the appeal in Case Number 1717 prematurely.[3] This Court granted that motion to consolidate. Akers' counsel asks this Court to consider the issues that Akers raised in Case Number 1717.
For clarity, we have rephrased and reformatted the issues that Akers presents in Case Number 1717 as follows:
1. Does Akers' ineffective assistance claim entitle Akers to relief?
2. Did the trial court err when it denied Akers' motion to dismiss the case on speedy trial grounds?
3. If preserved, were the State's remarks during closing argument permissible?
4. Did the trial court err when it declined to impose a discovery sanction?
5. Do Akers' remaining claims entitle Akers to relief?
Akers' counsel also filed a brief in Case Number 2562. That brief presents these two questions for our review:
6. Did the lower court err in finding that Ms. Akers had waived her right to counsel by inaction and in failing to conduct an inquiry into whether she was entitled to court-appointed counsel?
7. Did the trial court err in propounding voir dire questions that left the determination of fairness to individual jurors?
The State moves to dismiss the appeal in Case Number 1717 because Akers' brief in that case lacked references to the transcripts in the record. On her own behalf, Akers filed a motion in this Court entitled "Claim for Privilege and Protection and Request for Injunction[.]" For the reasons to be discussed, we shall deny the parties' motions and affirm the circuit court's judgment.
BACKGROUND
On the morning of August 23, 2018, Getnet Anley was working at a 7-Eleven in Silver Spring when Akers entered the store. Akers paid for ten dollars of gas and asked if
she could have some water for tea. Anley agreed that Akers could take some hot water. Anley noticed that Akers also used some sugar and asked Akers to pay for the cost of the refill ($1.48). Akers refused to pay, and Anley threatened to deduct the cost of the refill from the ten dollars that Akers had given him for gas. As Akers held a cup of hot water, Akers threatened, "if you do that, I would pour the hot water on you."
Akers then went behind the checkout counter and threw hot water on Anley that burned part of Anley's neck. As Anley tried to block the water, Akers grabbed him by the neck. Anley slipped on the wet floor and injured his arm. [Around that time, Akers bit and choked Anley.
Store manager, Lingereh Belay, and another 7-Eleven employee separated Akers and Anley. Belay called the police, and Akers left the 7-Eleven. Belay and Anley followed Akers outside, and Anley photographed Akers' vehicle. Anley went to the hospital, where he was treated for his injuries.
Officer Christopher Stuckey of the Montgomery County Police Department responded to the 7-Eleven and received a description of the vehicle that Akers was driving. Officer Stuckey found Akers' vehicle less than a mile away and initiated a stop. Akers did not stop the vehicle until after she had crossed into the District of Columbia. At that time, Akers got out of the car and told Officer Stuckey, "you can't do anything to me because I'm in D.C."
During the stop, Akers refused to provide the officer with her identification. Akers' license plate number was the same as the one in the photograph taken by Anley. Officer
Stuckey confirmed Akers' identity based on a photograph in the Motor Vehicle Administration database.
Around that time, Officer Hassan Custis reviewed the surveillance footage from the 7-Eleven. Officer Stuckey watched the surveillance video and recorded a portion of it using his body camera. Belay's boss tried to save the surveillance footage to a disc, but it did not record. When police returned to the 7-Eleven to obtain another copy of the footage, it was no longer saved in the surveillance system. We supply additional facts as necessary below.
CASE NUMBER 1717
I. We Decline to Grant the State's Motion to Dismiss.
The State argues that we should dismiss the appeal in Case Number 1717 because Akers' brief, which she filed on her own behalf, did not include references to the transcripts. Md. Rule 8-503(b) provides as follows: "If the case falls within an exception listed in Rule 8-501(b), references to the transcript of testimony contained in the record shall be indicated as (T .......)[.]" Because this is a criminal case, this case falls within an exception listed in Md. Rule 8-501(b). The State argues that "this Court will have to delve through the 22 different transcripts Akers filed . . . and try to pinpoint the portions of the record to which Akers refers in her brief." After the State had filed its brief, which contains the motion to dismiss on this basis, Akers filed an amended brief. In that amended brief, it appears that Akers made some attempt to cite the transcripts. Under Md. Rule 8-602(c)(6), this Court has discretion to dismiss an appeal if the contents of the brief fail to
comply with Md. Rule 8-503. We shall exercise our discretion and deny the State's motion to dismiss.
II. Akers' Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Is Not Properly Before This Court.
A. Parties' Contentions
Akers argues that she is entitled to relief because her assigned public defenders provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Akers alleges that her counsel below failed to gather supporting evidence and failed to move to dismiss the case. [The State first responds by noting that this Court does not ordinarily entertain ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal. The State also notes that Akers proceeded pro se after she had discharged her assigned public defenders, and thus her ineffective assistance of counsel claims should fail.
B. Analysis
The Court of Appeals has repeatedly explained that a post-conviction proceeding is generally the most appropriate mechanism for raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Bailey v. State, 464 Md. 685, 703-05 (2019). This is because "the trial record rarely reveals why counsel acted or omitted to act, and such proceedings allow for fact-finding and the introduction of testimony and evidence directly related to allegations of the counsel's ineffectiveness." Mosley v. State, 378 Md. 548, 560 (2003). To consider
a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, "the trial record clearly must illuminate why counsel's actions were ineffective[.]" Id. at 561.
Akers claims that her assigned public defenders failed to gather supporting evidence. She also argues that her assigned public defenders ignored her request to move to dismiss the case based on an alleged discovery violation. But the trial record does not illuminate Akers' allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. As a result, we decline to review Akers' ineffective assistance of counsel claims in this appeal.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Err When It Denied Akers' Motion to Dismiss for Prosecutorial Delay.
A. Parties' Contentions.
At a hearing in September 2019, the trial court denied Akers' motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Akers challenges that ruling here and claims that the length of the delay warrants dismissal. The State contends that Akers' argument misses the mark because Akers measures the length of the delay from the date of the indictment, rather than the date that the court declared a mistrial.
B. Analysis
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial[.]" U.S. Const., amend. VI, cl. 1. That guarantee applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 221-23 (1967). Article 21 of the Maryland...
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