Akey v. Placer Cnty.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:14-cv-2402 KJM DB,2:14-cv-2402 KJM DB |
| Parties | RACHAEL AKEY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PLACER COUNTY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
This civil rights action is before the court on plaintiffs' four opposed motions. First, plaintiffs move to continue the discovery cut-off.1 Second, plaintiffs move to amend their Monell claims2 against defendant Placer County.3 Third, plaintiffs move to amend their negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims.4 Finally, plaintiffs move for reconsideration of two of the magistrate judge's rulings.5The court held a hearing regarding all four motions on November 4, 2016. Patrick Dwyer appeared for plaintiffs; Clayton Cook appeared for defendants. ECF No. 91. For the following reasons, the court GRANTS the motion to continue, GRANTS the motion for leave to amend the Monell claims, DENIES the motion for leave to amend the NIED/IIED claims, and DENIES the motion for reconsideration.
This case involves the custody of plaintiff N.D., a minor who was three years old at the time period relevant to the operative complaint. TAC ¶ 1. N.D.'s mother is plaintiff Rachael Akey6 and N.D.'s father is Cameron Dupree, who is not a party to this case. Id. ¶¶ 2-4. Akey and Dupree were never married and currently live apart. Id. ¶¶ 3-4. At the time of the acts alleged in the complaint, Akey and Dupree had recently concluded a lengthy custody dispute in Placer County Superior Court. Id. ¶ 11. Under the resulting custody order, N.D. was to live with Akey, and Dupree was to have regular unsupervised visits with N.D. from Tuesday morning to Wednesday morning each week and on alternating weekends. Id. After the order went into effect, there was continuing rancor between the parents, id.; in the days leading up to the incident underlying the complaint, Akey requested a court-ordered drug test of Dupree on September 6, 2013, id. ¶ 16, and Dupree requested a drug test of Akey on September 7, 2013, id. ¶ 17.
On the morning of Thursday, September 12, 2013, Akey and her husband, plaintiff Ryan Cornacchioli, took N.D. to school, expecting to pick him up that afternoon. Id. ¶ 19. Unbeknownst to Akey, defendant Placer County Family and Children Services ("FCS") had recently received a report from N.D.'s school. Id. ¶ 20. According to the report, N.D. had said that Cornacchioli choked and threatened N.D. Id. Defendant social worker Gloria Sutton, an FCS employee, began an investigation on September 12, 2013 by going to N.D.'s school andspeaking with N.D. and N.D.'s teacher. Id. ¶ 21. Sutton then spoke with Dupree on the phone, who confirmed that N.D. had mentioned the choking on September 10. Id. ¶ 21. On this basis, Sutton, with the approval of defendant social worker Scott Myers, made the decision to give full custody to Dupree. Id. ¶ 22. At Sutton's request, Dupree picked up N.D. from school on September 12. Id.
Also on September 12, 2013, Sutton called Akey to discuss the allegations of Cornacchioli's abuse of N.D. Id. ¶ 23. Because Akey put her phone on speaker mode, Cornacchioli and Clayton heard the entire conversation, which included sharing allegations that Cornacchioli had strangled and threatened to kill N.D. Id. ¶¶ 23-24. In response, Akey told Sutton that Cornacchioli was out of town on military duty prior to September 10 and that N.D. had not come back into their custody until after school on September 11, and thus the allegations could not possibly be true. Id. ¶ 24. Undeterred, Sutton explained that Dupree retained full custody during the pending FCS investigation. Id. Sutton further pressured Akey to consent to an FCS order giving immediate and full custody to Dupree; Akey declined. Id. ¶ 25. In a follow-up conversation with Sutton's supervisor, Myers similarly pressured Akey to consent to give custody to Dupree; Akey again declined. Id. ¶ 26. Although Myers explained the investigation would be over by September 17 and there would be a reunification plan, id. ¶ 28, N.D. remained in Dupree's sole custody until March 2014, id. ¶ 22.
Plaintiffs point to a series of alleged violations related to these incidents, including FCS's improper removal of N.D., id. ¶¶ 15-28, and FCS's wrongful reporting of Cornacchioli to the Department of Justice ("DOJ") Child Abuse Central Index. Id. ¶¶ 29-35. Plaintiffs point to the fact that Cornacchioli was away on military duty at the time of these incidents to show that the allegations against Cornacchioli were demonstrably false and an improper basis for FCS's removal of N.D. and reporting of Cornacchioli. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiffs allege Sutton and Myers failed to follow proper procedures in their investigation, id. ¶¶ 37-38, failed to make a good faith investigation, id. ¶¶ 39-45, fabricated evidence, id. ¶¶ 46-47, and suppressed exculpatory evidence, id. ¶¶ 48-50.
Based on these incidents, plaintiffs filed a Government Tort Claims Act claim against defendants on March 11, 2014. Id. ¶ 36. The claim was rejected by the County of Placer and then by the Judicial Council of California in April 2014. Id.
Plaintiffs filed the original complaint on October 12, 2014, the first amended complaint on April 10, 2015, the second amended complaint on September 30, 2015, and the operative third amended complaint on April 6, 2016. Compl., ECF No. 1; First Am. Compl. ("FAC"), ECF No. 20; Second Am. Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 29; TAC. Plaintiffs filed each of the amended complaints after the court granted defendants' motions to dismiss, at least in part. See Orders, ECF Nos. 18, 26, 37. Defendants answered the operative third amended complaint on May 5, 2016. Am. Answer, ECF No. 45.
Plaintiffs' third amended complaint includes twenty-six claims, fifteen of which are against defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the basis of alleged federal constitutional violations. TAC ¶¶ 51-196. All three plaintiffs assert procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment against all defendants, while only Akey and N.D. assert a substantive due process right to an unimpaired parent-child relationship under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against all defendants. Id. The federal claims are brought against Placer County based on a theory of municipal liability under Monell. Id. ¶¶ 51-64 (counts 1-2), 109-22 (counts 7-8), 167-74 (count 13).
Plaintiffs also bring eleven state law claims against defendants on the basis of alleged state constitutional violations. Id. ¶¶ 197-255. Each of the state claims asserts state constitutional violations analogous to the federal claims. Id. The state claims are brought against Placer County under a theory of vicarious liability. Id. ¶¶ 211-16 (count 20), 234-38 (count 23), 251-55 (count 26).
As noted, plaintiffs move the court to (1) continue the trial date, (2) grant leave to amend their Monell claims, (3) grant leave to amend their NIED/IIED claims, and (4) reconsider two of the magistrate judge's rulings. In the following sections, the court addresses each of plaintiffs' motions in turn.
The court issued an initial pretrial scheduling order in March 2015, in which the court set a discovery cut-off of March 7, 2016, and set trial for September 19, 2016. Scheduling Order March 24, 2015, ECF No. 19. Based on the parties' subsequent stipulation, the court found good cause and modified the initial scheduling order, extending discovery until September 30, 2016 and resetting trial for April 3, 2017.7 Scheduling Order Feb. 10, 2016, ECF No. 36. On September 28, 2016, plaintiffs filed the current motion to continue the trial date. Mot. Continue. Plaintiffs request a 90- to 120-day extension of the discovery period, with trial reset to after August 2017. Defendants oppose the motion, but also agree to continue the trial date if the court grants either of plaintiffs' pending motions to amend the complaint. Opp'n Mot. Continue at 2.
The pretrial scheduling order is designed to allow the district court to better manage its calendar and to facilitate the more efficient disposition of cases by settlement or by trial. See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 607-08 (9th Cir. 1992). A scheduling order may only be changed with the court's consent and for "good cause." Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). A scheduling order is not "a frivolous piece of paper, idly entered, which can be cavalierly disregarded by counsel without peril." Gestetner Corp. v. Case Equip. Co, 108 F.R.D. 138, 141 (D. Me. 1985). On the other hand, the "good cause" standard requires less than the "manifest injustice" test used to modify a final pretrial order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(e); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, 1983 Advisory Committee Notes ("Since the scheduling order is entered early in the litigation, this standard seems more appropriate than a 'manifest injustice' or 'substantial hardship' test."). When litigants request changes to a scheduling order, the court's inquiry focuses on their diligent efforts to comply. See Johnson, 975 F.2d at 609. A district court has "broad discretion" to grant or deny a continuance. United States v. Flynt, 756 F.2d 1352, 1358 (9th Cir. 1985).
Defendants argue plaintiffs' motion is subject to denial on the simple grounds that it does not include an express Rule 16 request to modify the scheduling order. Opp'n Mot. Continue at 3 (citing Johnson, 975 F.2d at 608-09). Defendants raise this same argument in response to plaintiffs' motion to amend the complaint, discussed below. For the reasons discussed in that section, the court declines to deny plaintiffs' motion to continue on this basis and proceeds to determine whether plaintiffs establish good cause to continue the trial date.
Plaintiffs base their request to amend the scheduling order on two compelling...
To continue reading
Request your trial