Akin v. Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge

• Decision Date: 05 September 1963
• Docket Number: No. 19642.,19642.
• Citation: 322 F.2d 749
• Parties: Jim AKIN, Appellant, v. LOUISIANA NATIONAL BANK OF BATON ROUGE et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

322 F.2d 749 (1963)

Jim AKIN, Appellant, v. LOUISIANA NATIONAL BANK OF BATON ROUGE et al., Appellees.

No. 19642.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

September 5, 1963.

Lloyd J. Cobb, New Orleans, La., Harold B. Sanders, Dallas, Tex., Cobb & Wright, New Orleans, La., for appellant.

Ben R. Miller, Alvin B. Rubin, Sanders, Miller, Downing, Rubin & Kean, Baton Rouge, La., for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON, WISDOM and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

WISDOM, Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Jim Grant Akin, a citizen of Texas, brought this action in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana against Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge, the Testamentary Executor of the Succession of Charles W. Lamar, Jr., the plaintiff's deceased adoptive father. The plaintiff also joined as defendants the testamentary heirs of the decedent, Mrs. Lamar and two minor children. The complaint prays for a judgment "ordering and decreeing that said Defendants, and each of them, recognize the rights of Plaintiff as an adopted child and heir of Charles W. Lamar, Jr., Deceased, and as such entitled to her legitime or forced portion of his Estate, being two-ninths (2/9th) thereof." Jurisdiction was invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship. The district court declined to accept jurisdiction. We reverse and remand.

The plaintiff is the daughter of her mother's first marriage. Lamar, the decedent, adopted her as his child May 22, 1935, by a court decree in New Mexico, eight months after he and her mother were married. At the time, the plaintiff was seven years old. Two years later the plaintiff's mother obtained a divorce from Lamar in Texas. Ancillary to the divorce, the Texas court issued a decree declaring "that the said relationship of parent and child, heretofore existing between * * * Charles W. Lamar, Jr. and Jim Grant Lamar be and it is hereby dissolved, terminated and held for naught, and that the name of said child is here changed by the Court so that henceforth her name is and shall be Jim Grant". The Texas court found that it had "jurisdiction both of the parties and of the subject matter brought before the court". Lamar later remarried. At the time of his death in 1960, and for many years before his death, he was domiciled in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He left a substantial estate in trust to his widow and their two minor adopted children. The plaintiff was not named as a beneficiary in Lamar's will. The will was probated in the 19th Judicial District Court for the Parish of East Baton Rouge on June 20, 1960. Succession proceedings have not yet terminated.

On motion of the defendant, the district court dismissed the action without prejudice to the plaintiff's right to intervene in the State court succession proceedings. The district court based its decision on two grounds:

(1) "Probate matters are not within the jurisdiction of the federal courts * * * If successful, this, of course, would amount to an annulment of certain portions of the decedent\'s will. Under Louisiana law, a probated testament may be annulled only by a direct action brought in the succession proceedings."

(2) In effect the plaintiff seeks merely a declaratory judgment "that certain portions of decedent\'s will, as probated, are invalid and should be reduced in her favor. * * * The Court may decline to give declaratory relief in the exercise of its sound discretion." Here jurisdiction is declined, because "the case involves difficult questions of state law affecting public policy of the state."

I.

There are several reasons why a federal court has no jurisdiction to probate a will or to administer an estate. Historically, the equity jurisdiction conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, and Section 24 of the Judicial Code is that of the English Court of Chancery in 1789. It did not extend to probate matters. The probate of wills and the grant of letters of administration were exclusively within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts of England. Markham v. Allen, 1946, 326 U.S. 490, 66 S.Ct. 296, 90 L.Ed. 256. In addition, some courts have said that probate matters are not "cases or controversies within the meaning of Article III of the Constitution." In re Broderick's Will, 1874, 21 Wall. 503, 517, 22 L.Ed. 599; Byers v. McAuley, 1893, 149 U.S. 608, 13 S.Ct. 906, 37 L.Ed. 867. It has also been suggested that since the source of authority to make a will is derived from state law probate proceedings are part of the requirement to make it effective. Sutton v. English, 1918, 246 U.S. 199, 38 S.Ct. 254, 62 L.Ed. 664; O'Callaghan v. O'Brien, 1905, 199 U.S. 89, 25 S.Ct. 727, 50 L.Ed. 101.

It is equally settled, however, that once a will has been probated, an action by a legatee, heir, or other claimant against an executor becomes a suit between the parties that is a justiciable controversy within the scope of federal jurisdiction if the other jurisdictional requirements are met. Thus, the Cyclopedia of Federal Procedure, § 2.87 (3d Ed.1951) enumerates a long list of varied actions which might seem to be "probate matters", were that term used loosely, but are causes properly subject to federal jurisdiction: "No interference with state court proceedings appearing, and the primary elements of federal jurisdiction being present, federal courts may, if they see fit, entertain proceedings involving recovery of shares or establishment of interests in an estate; recovery of a legacy or bequest under a will that has been probated; determination of whether an alleged widow was decedent's wife; validity of alleged transfer of an interest; partition of properties; enforcement of liens and mortgages, or equities arising from settlement and distribution and elections of the parties."

Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 1909, 215 U.S. 33, 30 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed. 80, which arose in Louisiana, is a leading decision on the subject. In Waterman an heir brought suit in the federal court against the decedent's executor for the determination of an asserted interest in a lapsed legacy and the consequent increase in the residuary estate. In that case, as in the case before us, the executor contended that under the law of Louisiana an action looking to settlement under a will may be brought only in the succession proceedings. The Supreme Court held that "the Federal court has jurisdiction for the purpose of ascertaining the rights of the complainant to recover as against the executor, and the interest of the persons before the court in the fund". The Supreme Court said:

"The controversy is within the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States as heretofore recognized in this court, and such jurisdiction cannot be limited or in anywise curtailed by state legislation as to its own courts. The complainant, it is to be noted, does not seek to set aside the probate of the will which the bill alleges was duly established and admitted to probate in the proper court of the state."

"The United States Circuit Court, by granting this relief, need not interfere with the ordinary settlement of the estate, the payment of the debts and special legacies, and the determination of the accounts of funds in the hands of the executor, but it may, and we think has the right to determine as between the parties before the court the interest of the complainant in the alleged lapsed legacy and residuary estate, because of the facts presented in the bill. The decree to be granted cannot interfere with the possession of the estate in the hands of the executor, while being administered in the probate court, but it will be binding upon the executor, and may be enforced against it personally. If the Federal court finds that the complainant is entitled to the alleged lapsed legacy and the residue of the estate, while it cannot interfere with the probate court in determining the amount of the residue arising from the settlement of the estate in the court of probate, the decree can find the amount of the residue, as determined by the administration in the probate court in the hands of the executor, to belong to the complainant, and to be held in trust for her, thus binding the executor personally * * *."

In Markham v. Allen, 1946, 326 U.S. 490, 66 S.Ct. 296, 90 L.Ed. 256, the defendants challenged the district court's jurisdiction to hear a suit by the Alien Property Custodian against the executor and resident heirs to determine the Custodian's right to share in the decedent's estate, then in the course of probate administration in the state court. Upholding the lower court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court pointed out:

"It has been established by a long series of decisions of this Court that federal courts of equity have jurisdiction to entertain suits `in favor of creditors, legatees and heirs\' and other claimants against a decedent\'s estate `to establish their claims\' so long as the federal court does not interfere with the probate proceedings or assume general jurisdiction of the probate or control of the property in the custody of the state court. Waterman v. Canal-Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 215 U.S. 33, 43 30 S.Ct. 10, 54 L.Ed. 80, and cases cited. See Sutton v. English, supra, 246 U.S. 199 205 38 S.Ct. 254, 62 L.Ed. 664; United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477 56 S.Ct. 343, 80 L.Ed. 331; Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613, 619 56 S.Ct. 600, 80 L.Ed. 920; United States v. Klein, 303 U.S. 276 58 S.Ct. 536, 82 L.Ed. 840; Princess Lida of Thurn and Taxis v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456, 466 59 S.Ct. 275, 83 L.Ed. 285." 326 U.S. at 494, 66 S.Ct. at 298, 90 L.Ed. 256.

This Court has had several cases analogous to the instant case. In Looney v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 5 Cir., 1956, 235 F.2d 436, cert. den'd., 352 U.S. 925, 77 S.Ct. 222, 1 L.Ed.2d 161, we held that a federal district court could entertain a declaratory judgment action seeking a ruling that a testamentary trust was void as violative of...