Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Civil Action No. 17-675 (BAH)

• Decision Date: 10 September 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17-675 (BAH)
• Parties: Todd AKINS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

332 F.Supp.3d 1

Todd AKINS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-675 (BAH)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed September 10, 2018

Paul G. Gaston, Law Offices of Paul G. Gaston, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BERYL A. HOWELL, Chief Judge

Over twenty years ago, on June 25, 1996, the Khobar Towers complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed military personnel from the United States and other allied forces, was bombed, causing extensive damage to the buildings, killing dozens of people, including nineteen American service members, and injuring many more. Compl. at 3 & ¶ 28, ECF No. 1. Among the injured are fifteen of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit, who, as members of the armed forces "survived the blast." Id. at 3. The plaintiffs also include twenty-three of the survivors' "immediate family members," and one family member of another service member, who was injured in the attack but is not a plaintiff. Id.¹ The plaintiffs allege that the defendants Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran") and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC") "caused and facilitated the terrorist attack at the Khobar Towers," id. ¶ 31, and seek damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's ("FSIA") terrorism exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. Despite multiple efforts to effectuate service, the defendants have not entered appearances nor defended against this action. The plaintiffs now seek entry of default judgment against both defendants. Pls.' Mot. for Default J. as to Liability ("Pls.' Liability Mot."), ECF No. 22; Pls.' Mot. for Default J. as to Damages ("Pls.' Damages Mot."), ECF No. 25. For the reasons detailed below, the plaintiffs' motions are granted in part and denied in part.²

I. BACKGROUND

"[T]he history of litigation" in this Court "stemming from the bombing of Khobar Towers ... is extensive." Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 750 F.Supp.2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (citing Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 459 F.Supp.2d 40, 46–51 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.) and Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 466 F.Supp.2d 229, 248 (D.D.C. 2006) (" Heiser I ") (Lamberth, J.) ). The plaintiffs correctly point out that in "two of those prior decisions, the Court heard extensive evidence, including expert testimony, and held that the same two Defendants" named in the instant suit "were liable, jointly and severally, for the same June 25, 1996, terrorist attack on the Khobar Towers at issue here." Pls.' Mem. Supp. Pls.' Liability Mot. ("Pls.' Liability Mem.") at 8, ECF No. 22-1. In view of this prior litigation, the plaintiffs request that this Court "take judicial notice of prior findings of fact and supporting evidence imposing liability under Section 1605A (and its predecessor, Section 1605(a)(7) ) on Iran and IRGC for providing material support and resources to the terrorists who attacked the Khobar Towers complex on June 25, 1996." Pls.' Liability Mem. at 10.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to take judicial notice, on its own or at the request of a party, of adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute because" they "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(a)–(c). " ‘[A]djudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case’ while ‘legislative facts ... are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a legislative body.’ " NOW, Wash., D.C. Chapter v. Soc. Sec. Admin. of Dep't of Health & Human Servs. , 736 F.2d 727, 737 n.95 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Robinson, J., concurring) (quoting Advisory Committee Note to FED. R. EVID. 201(a) ). Rule 201 has been applied frequently in this jurisdiction for courts to take notice of, and rely on, facts found in earlier proceedings, "without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced," Harrison v. Republic of Sudan , 882 F.Supp.2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 811 F.Supp.2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011) ), "even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge," Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic , 249 F.Supp.3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 664 F.Supp.2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009) ("Relying on the pleadings and the ... findings of other judges in this jurisdiction.") ). In this way, rather than require litigants to present such evidence anew in each lawsuit stemming from the same terrorist attack, courts have "determined that the proper approach is one ‘that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation ... without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced,’ " so that "courts may reach their own independent findings of fact" predicated "on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases." Anderson v. The Islamic Republic of Iran , 753 F.Supp.2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.) (quoting Rimkus , 750 F.Supp.2d at 172 ); see also Foley , 249 F.Supp.3d at 191 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (finding same "approach appropriate" and "tak[ing] judicial notice of the requested findings"); Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 879 F.Supp.2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (finding courts permitted "in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation" (quoting Rimkus , 750 F.Supp.2d at 163 ) ); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 873 F.Supp.2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (Lamberth, J.) (taking "judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases").

Thus, the factual evidence developed in other cases involving the same conduct by the same defendants is admissible and may be relied upon in this case. At the same time, the judicial findings derived from those facts are not dispositive here since courts must "reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them." Rimkus , 750 F.Supp.2d at 172. Persuaded that this common-sense approach is both efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendants' interests, this Court will adopt it and grant the plaintiffs' request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I and Blais , as well as supplemental evidence provided by the plaintiffs. The evidence regarding the terrorist attack at issue is summarized first, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.

A. THE KHOBAR TOWERS ATTACK

"The Khobar Towers was a residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed the coalition forces charged with monitoring compliance with U.N. security council resolutions." Blais , 459 F.Supp.2d at 47. On June 25, 1996, a 5,000-pound truck bomb was detonated outside the Khobar Towers complex, and the resulting blast "sheared off the entire face of the Khobar Towers complex and shattered windows up to a half mile away." Compl. at 3. "The explosion killed dozens of persons including nineteen American servicemen," and "[h]undreds of others were injured and burned." Id. ¶ 28. "The investigation determined that the force of the explosion was the equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT," which was, according to the Department of Defense, "the largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time." Blais, 459 F.Supp.2d at 47–48.

B. IRAN AND IRGC'S ROLE

"Iran is a foreign state and has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism pursuant to section 69(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 ( 50 U.S.C.A. § 2405(j) ) continuously since January 19, 1984." Blais , 459 F.Supp.2d at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Compl. ¶ 20. The "IRGC has been described by expert testimony as ‘a nontraditional instrumentality of Iran’ that acts as ‘the military arm of a kind of shadow government answering directly to the Ayatollah and the mullahs who hold power in Iran.’ " Rimkus , 750 F.Supp.2d at 173 (quoting Blais , 459 F.Supp.2d at 47 ). "[W]ith its own separate ministry, [it] has evolved into one of the most powerful organizations within Iran," and "functions as an intelligence organization." Compl. ¶ 22.

The Khobar Towers bombing "was carried out by individuals recruited principally by a senior official of the IRGC, Brigadier General Ahmed Sharifi. Sharifi, who was the operational commander, planned the operation and recruited individuals for the operation at the Iranian embassy in Damascus, Syria." Blais , 459 F.Supp.2d at 48. The truck bomb itself "was assembled at a terrorist base in the Bekaa Valley which was jointly operated by the IRGC and by the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah," and the attack "was approved by Ayatollah Khameini, the Supreme leader of Iran at the time." Id.

Under the "day to day oversight" of Dale Watson, then the deputy counterterrorism chief of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"), the FBI, led by then-director Louis Freeh, "conducted a massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents." Id. That investigation led to a June 21, 2001, indictment against "13 identified members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hezb[o]llah organization," which indictment "frequently refers to direction and assistance from Iranian government officials" in the plot to bomb the Khobar Towers. Heiser I , 466 F.Supp.2d at 252. The FBI also interviewed "six admitted members of the Saudi Hezbollah organization, who were arrested by the Saudis shortly after the bombing" and "admitted to the FBI their complicity in the attack ... and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel necessary to carry out the attack on the Khobar Towers." Id. at 253. Those Saudi Hezbollah members provided information about "how each was recruited and trained by the Iranian government," and stated that Iran and the IRGC had "collectively" selected the...