Akins v. Randolph County Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1994
• Citation: 643 So.2d 995
• Parties: 95 Ed. Law Rep. 456 Barbara AKINS, Cecil Halsay, Dorothy Hill, Lois Moon, Willie Moon, and Billy D. Williamson, for themselves and all others similarly situated v. RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Paul Hodge, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Education of Randolph County. AV92000693.
• Court: Alabama Court of Civil Appeals

Page 995

643 So.2d 995

95 Ed. Law Rep. 456

Barbara AKINS, Cecil Halsay, Dorothy Hill, Lois Moon, Willie Moon, and Billy D. Williamson, for themselves and all others similarly situated v. RANDOLPH COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and Paul Hodge, in his official capacity as Superintendent of Education of Randolph County.

AV92000693.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

June 3, 1994.

Edward Still, Birmingham, for appellants.

Donald B. Sweeney, Jr. of Rives & Peterson, Birmingham, for appellees.

L. CHARLES WRIGHT, Retired Appellate Judge.

The appellants are six bus drivers employed by the Randolph County Board of Education. The Board and the appellants entered into contracts of employment in the summer of 1990 for the 1990-91 school year. All contracts were similar and provided, in part, the following:

"1. That the party of the first part hereby appoints the party of the second part transportation agent on ____ Route at a salary of ____ Dollars ($____) per twenty scholastic days, payable monthly, for such time as the party of the first part shall need such service, beginning ____, 19__.

"2. That the party of the second part agrees to run a motor truck over this route, as outlined by the Board of Education, every school day during the life of this contract and convey to the ____ School, all school children from this route and in addition such children from other surrounding districts as he may be reasonably able to carry."

On January 24, 1991, due to inclement weather, the superintendent dismissed school at 10:00 a.m. The bus drivers returned the students to their homes. The Board subsequently designated February 18, 1991, as the make-up day for the lost day in January. February 18, 1991, had initially been designated as a "professional day"--one in which the teachers were scheduled to work, but the students were not scheduled to attend school, and the bus drivers were not scheduled to transport the students.

The appellants requested that they be paid extra compensation for working on February 18, 1991. The Board asked the Department of Examiners of Public Accounts whether the appellants were entitled to extra pay. The department responded in the negative. The Board thereafter refused the appellants' request for additional compensation.

The appellants then filed an action on the contract in the Circuit Court of Randolph County. After pleadings, affidavits, documents, and motions, the appellants and the Board agreed that the case was appropriate for summary judgment. The trial court entered an order, granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of the Board. The bus drivers appeal.

The appellants assert that the trial court erred in its interpretation of the contract. They insist that they are contract employees. Their position is that the 175 days listed on the school calendar at the time the contracts were executed would be the "school days" to which the contracts refer. They insist that because they worked 176 days, they should receive additional compensation.

The Board's position is that the appellants were salaried employees, paid on a monthly basis to drive "every school day."

In entering judgment in favor of the Board, the trial court stated the following:

"[T]he drivers were paid equal amounts each month including the month of May which actually contained only fifteen (15) school days. The Court is satisfied that the contract in question establishes the drivers as salaried employees. The Court is also satisfied that the conduct of the School Board in paying the drivers in equal installments and the conduct of the drivers in accepting these payments reinforces the idea that the drivers are salaried employees."

We find the terms of the contract to be ambiguous--that is, the contract is reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning. Vainrib v. Downey, 565 So.2d 647 (Ala.Civ.App.1990). In an action on contract, summary judgment is appropriate only where the agreement is unambiguous. Harrington v. Feld, 586 So.2d 220 (Ala.Civ.App.1991). That principle of law, however, is not germane to the outcome of this case because we deem the procedure utilized to have been a submission on the merits since all relative evidence was offered by the parties.

Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law to be determined by the trial court. Vainrib. Once a court determines that an agreement is ambiguous, it becomes...