Akinseye v. District of Columbia, No. 02-7040.

• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (District of Columbia)
• Writing for the Court: Karen LeCraft Henderson
• Citation: 339 F.3d 970
• Parties: Oyin AKINSEYE, et al., Appellants, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Decision Date: 15 August 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-7040.

Page 970

339 F.3d 970 Oyin AKINSEYE, et al., Appellants,
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee. No. 02-7040. United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Argued May 12, 2003. Decided August 15, 2003.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (No. 01cv01769).

Robert I. Berlow argued the cause for the appellants. Arthur H. Fawcett, Jr. and Myrna Lee Fawcett were on brief.

Donna M. Murasky, Assistant Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia, argued the cause for the appellee. Charles L. Reischel, Deputy Corporation Counsel, at the time the brief was filed, was on brief.

Eileen L. Ordover was on brief for amici curiae Senators Edward M. Kennedy et al. in support of the appellants.

Carl W. Hampe was on the brief for amici curiae Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates et al. in support of the appellants.

Before: HENDERSON, RANDOLPH and GARLAND, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON.

Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge GARLAND.

KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

The appellants, minor children and the parents, guardians and court-appointed advocates of minor children, challenge the district court's order dismissing their complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The appellants had initiated administrative proceedings under the Individuals with Disabilities Education

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Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq., to compel the District of Columbia (District) to provide special education services to the disabled minor children in this action. The District settled with each of the appellants and voluntarily agreed to pay attorney's fees which, the appellants contend, were paid late. They filed this action to recover interest on the late-paid fees. The district court granted the District's motion to dismiss on the ground that under the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 532 U.S. 598, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001), parties who settle their claims at the administrative level are not "prevailing parties" entitled to attorney's fees under the IDEA. Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 193 F.Supp.2d 134 (2002).

* * *

We do not reach the question of whether one may recover attorney's fees as a "prevailing party" under the IDEA if the matter is settled at the administrative stage because we conclude that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the case. Although the District has not raised lack of jurisdiction in these proceedings, we may raise the question of subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte. Houston Bus. Journal, Inc. v. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 86 F.3d 1208, 1211 (D.C.Cir.1996). Moreover, because subject-matter jurisdiction is "an Art. III as well as a statutory requirement . . . no action of the parties can confer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court." Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982).

The only asserted basis for subject-matter jurisdiction is section 1415(i)(3)(B) of the IDEA, which provides that "[i]n any action or proceeding brought under this section, the court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). Yet in their complaint the appellants did not seek the recovery of attorney's fees under the IDEA, but rather the recovery of some $17,000 in interest for the delayed payment of such fees. In other words, they...