Akinyemi v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: Fitzgerald Smith
• Citation: Akinyemi v. Jp Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 908 N.E.2d 163, 391 Ill. App. 3d 334, 330 Ill.Dec. 311 (Ill. App. 2009)
• Decision Date: 08 May 2009
• Docket Number: No. 1-08-2850.,1-08-2850.
• Parties: Christopher L. AKINYEMI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.

908 N.E.2d 163

Christopher L. AKINYEMI, Individually and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 1-08-2850.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Fifth Division.

May 8, 2009.

Norman Rifkind, Amelia S. Newton, Heidi Vonderheide, Lasky & Rifkind, Ltd., Chicago, for Appellant.

Louis D. Bernstein, Melinda J. Morales, Much Shelist Denenberg Ament & Rubenstein, P.C., Chicago, for Appellee.

Presiding Justice FITZGERALD SMITHdelivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff-appellant Christopher L. Akinyemi, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated (plaintiff), filed a class action complaint against defendant-appellee JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (defendant), regarding a bonus offer upon the opening of a new account at defendant bank. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court erred when it granted defendant's motion because he alleged sufficient facts to sustain his pleadings. He asks that we reverse the court's order and remand the cause for further proceedings. For the following reasons, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In late 2007, plaintiff received a coupon regarding a bonus offer relating to accounts at defendant bank. On its face, the coupon stated:

"$100 when you open a Chase Free Checking^SM account with Direct Deposit!" The front of the coupon referred the holder to the reverse side "for additional information." The back of the coupon stated, in pertinent part:

"Chase Free Checking requires a $100 minimum opening deposit of new money (money not currently held by Chase or its affiliates) to qualify for the bonus. Chase Free Checking has no monthly service fee when you have a monthly direct deposit. * * * Bonus will be automatically deposited into your account within 10 business days of account opening, but not considered part of the minimum opening deposit. * * *

Customers opening a personal checking account are eligible for this offer, excluding High School Checking^SM, Chase College Checking^SM, Chase Access Checking^SM, New Jersey Consumer Checking Account and Chase Basic Checking SM."¹

On December 4, 2007, during the term of the coupon's offer, plaintiff opened a personal checking account known as a "Chase Workplace Checking" account (Workplace account) at one of defendant's branches. He presented the coupon and $100 of his own money as his opening deposit.² However, plaintiff did not set up direct deposit on this account.

When, by January 18, 2008, plaintiff did not receive the $100 bonus automatically deposited into his Workplace account, he filed a suit against defendant on behalf of all consumers who received a coupon for cash deposit upon the opening of a personal checking account with defendant but did not have the bonus credited to their account. On January 29, 2008, before plaintiff served defendant with the complaint and before plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, defendant credited plaintiff's Workplace account with a $100 bonus deposit. Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification on January 31, 2008.

The class action cause proceeded, as the trial court permitted plaintiff to file an amended complaint in May 2008. Defendant then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2006)), stating that plaintiff failed to plead that he performed all his obligations under the contract to receive the $100 bonus, that he failed to plead damages, and that his claim was moot because he actually received the bonus. On September 29, 2008, the trial court issued a written order granting defendant's motion and stating that "the Amended Class Action Complaint is dismissed in its entirety, with prejudice."

ANALYSIS

On appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion because he alleged sufficient facts for a breach of contract action in order to survive dismissal under either section 2-615 or section 2-619 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-615, 2-619 (West 2006); see also 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2006) (combining these two sections into one motion to dismiss). We disagree.

A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 attacks the legal sufficiency of the complaint by alleging defects on its face. See Bunting v. Progressive Corp., 348 Ill.App.3d 575, 580, 284 Ill.Dec. 103, 809 N.E.2d 225 (2004). Upon review of a section 2-615 motion, we examine the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all well-pled facts and reasonable inferences therefrom. See Bunting, 348 Ill. App.3d at 580, 284 Ill.Dec. 103, 809 N.E.2d 225. If these are not sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief may be granted, then dismissal of the cause is appropriate. See Pecoraro v. Balkonis, 383 Ill.App.3d 1028, 1033, 322 Ill.Dec. 469, 891 N.E.2d 484 (2008). A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619, meanwhile, admits the legal sufficiency of the complaint but raises defects or other matters either internal to or external from the complaint that would defeat the cause of action. See Hermitage Corp. v. Contractors Adjustment Co., 166 Ill.2d 72, 85, 209 Ill.Dec. 684, 651 N.E.2d 1132 (1995); Jenkins v. Concorde Acceptance Corp., 345 Ill.App.3d 669, 674, 280 Ill.Dec. 749, 802 N.E.2d 1270 (2003). While a trial court should not grant such a motion unless it is clear that there is no way a plaintiff may recover (see Ostendorf v. International Harvester Co., 89 Ill.2d 273, 280, 60 Ill. Dec. 456, 433 N.E.2d 253 (1982)), dismissing a cause pursuant to section 2-619 efficiently allows for the disposal of issues of law or easily proved facts early in the litigation process. See Coles-Moultrie Electric Cooperative v. City of Sullivan, 304 Ill.App.3d 153, 158, 237 Ill.Dec. 263, 709 N.E.2d 249 (1999).

We review appeals from dismissals pursuant to both sections de novo. See Morris v. Williams, 359 Ill.App.3d 383 386, 296 Ill.Dec. 65, 834 N.E.2d 622 (2005); accord Bunting, 348 Ill.App.3d at 580, 284 Ill.Dec. 103, 809 N.E.2d 225; see also Cohen v. McDonald's Corp., 347 Ill.App.3d 627, 632, 283 Ill.Dec. 451, 808 N.E.2d 1 (2004) (grant of section 2-619.1 combined motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo). We further note that while the trial court did not provide an explanation for its holding here, we, as the reviewing court, may affirm its judgment on any basis appearing in the record. See White v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 368 Ill.App.3d 278, 282, 305 Ill.Dec. 737, 856 N.E.2d 542 (2006).

Turning first to plaintiff's contentions regarding section 2-615 of the Code, we hold that he failed to sufficiently plead a claim against defendant for breach of contract.

To properly plead a breach of contract claim, plaintiff must allege the existence of a valid contract, his performance under its terms, a breach by defendant, and resulting injury to plaintiff. See, e.g., Van Der Molen v. Washington Mutual Finance, Inc., 359 Ill.App.3d 813, 823, 296 Ill.Dec. 206, 835 N.E.2d 61 (2005). Plaintiff alleged a contract existed on the basis of the coupon he received from defendant. In addition, the facts in the record demonstrate that plaintiff fulfilled the following obligations under that contract: he opened a Workplace checking account at one of defendant's branches (which defendant does not dispute qualified under the coupon) before the coupon's expiration date, he deposited $100 of "new" money to open that account, he did not combine the coupon or account with any other offer, and he kept the account open. However, plaintiff failed to allege in his complaint his compliance with one remaining obligation: to open the account with direct deposit. Indeed, plaintiff admits throughout the record and in his brief on appeal that he did not open the account with direct deposit, nor did he ever change the terms of the account he opened to include direct deposit.

Plaintiff argues that the terms on the reverse side of the coupon do not require direct deposit to receive the $100 bonus as offered. This is wholly incorrect. Examining the language on the front side of the coupon, we find that it unambiguously and clearly states, in large font no less, "$100 when you open a Chase Free Checking^SM account with Direct Deposit!" This language undoubtedly dictates that customers opening a Chase Free Checking account will receive $100 only if and when they open that account with direct deposit. They may very well open an otherwise qualifying personal checking account without direct deposit (for which the record indicates defendant charges a $10 monthly fee), but customers who do so will not be eligible for the $100 bonus. Moreover, nothing on the back of the coupon contradicts this commonsense conclusion. The front of the coupon directs the bearer to the reverse for "additional" information, not terms that replace or preempt those on the front. Further, the only portion of this "additional" information that deals with direct deposit simply describes that there is no monthly service fee on accounts with direct deposit—an added incentive to follow the coupon's directions. The information does not, in contrast to plaintiff's interpretation, make any statement contradictory to the language on the front that requires direct deposit on a new personal checking account opened to receive the $100 bonus as offered.

As plaintiff readily admits, he did not open his Workplace account with direct deposit. Based on the plain language of the coupon, it is obvious that this was a requirement of the bargained-for offer that plaintiff did not fulfill. To hold otherwise would be to accept plaintiff's argument that the coupon indicated that the bonus was available to those customers who opened accounts without direct deposit. This is simply not what the clear and unambiguous language of the contract offer stated here, and we cannot conclude otherwise....