Akridge v. Atlanta & W. P. R. Co
| Decision Date | 27 August 1892 |
| Citation | 16 S.E. 81,90 Ga. 232 |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
| Parties | AKRIDGE . v. ATLANTA & W. P. R. CO. |
Railroad Companies — Frightening Houses — Blowing Whistle—Instructions.
1. The statute touching the ringing of the bell of a locomotive in a city, town, or village, instead of sounding the whistle, is confined to signaling for the approach of crossings. It is not unlawful to make, by whistling, proper and necessary signals of approaching a station, as warning to adjust the switches. Though the case on trial may be subject to some exception to a general rule of law, the court in charging the jury may state the general rule to enable the jury to understand and properly apply the exception. In the present case it does not affirmatively appear that the exception was not given in charge as well as the general rule.
2. In every case of alleged personal injury by negligence, where there was any considerable interval of time between the discovery of the negligence and its injurious effect, the jury ought to be made acquainted with the rule of law which puts the plaintiff on the exercise of ordinary care to avoid the consequences of the defendant's negligence.
3. A railroad company has no right to continue blowing a locomotive whistle in a city, town, or village, for the purpose of giving a signal of approach to the station, after the engineer discovers that a blast of the whistle already given has frightened a horse drawing a vehicle along the public road, and that the horse will probably be more frightened by continuing to blow till the signal is completed, the driver seated in the vehicle being engaged in an effort to control the animal. But it is a question for the jury whether the circumstances were such as to apprise the engineer, or put him on notice, of the peril which would be occasioned by continuing to blow the whistle.
4. There being no direct evidence of the plaintiff's want of skill, or that the horse was vicious, and no circumstances from which the facts were fairly inferable, it was error to charge the jury that if they believed, from the evidence, "the sole and real cause of the plaintiff's injury was the wild, vicious, and refractory disposition of the horse he drove, and the plaintiff s inability to control him, or the plaintiff's want of care or skill in the management of him, the plaintiff cannot recover."
5. The court erred in charging the jury, but not in denying any of the requests to charge.
(Syllabus by the Court.)
Error from city court of Atlanta; Howard Van Epps, Judge.
Action by J. D. Akridge against the Atlanta & West Point Railroad Company for damages caused by frightening his horse. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Reversed.
The folio wing is the official report:
Plaintiff alleged that about September 22, 1890, he was driving a gentle mare in a sulky, going south along the East Point road. He was within the corporate limits of the town of East Point, and at or near the point known as " Verbena Station, " at which point the dirt road runs parallel with defendant's railroad, there being only 30 or 40 feet between the two, the ground between being level, and a plain view of either way may be had from the other. A freight train of defendant, bound south, approached the point where plaintiff was driving, and in plain view of him. The hour was about 6 or half past 6 in the afternoon. Just before the train got even with plaintiff it blew the whistle long and loud, at which the horse became frightened and started to run, but plaintiff managed to hold her. The engineer, still being in clear view of plaintiff, and seeing his animal frightened by the whistling, blew...
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