Akron v. Cook
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Writing for the Court | QUILLIN; REECE, P.J., and BAIRD |
| Citation | Akron v. Cook, 67 Ohio App.3d 640, 588 N.E.2d 157 (Ohio App. 1990) |
| Decision Date | 16 May 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 14377,14377 |
| Parties | CITY OF AKRON, Appellee, v. COOK, Appellant. |
Renee W. Green, Asst. Pros. Atty., Akron, for appellee.
Rebecca Hazlett-Cook, Akron, for appellant.
The prime issue in this traffic violation case is whether the prosecution must present direct evidence to prove the lawful placement of a traffic control device when the issue is not raised in the trial court. For the reasons that follow, we hold that proof of the existence of a traffic control device permits an inference that it was lawfully placed.
On September 14, 1989, defendant-appellant, Mack D. Cook II, was driving west on East Market Street in Akron, Ohio. Cook proceeded to the intersection of Market Street and Main Street, and stopped his vehicle in the left-turn-only lane on Market Street. After allowing several other automobiles to continue eastward through the intersection, Cook made a left turn onto South Main Street. Akron police officer, William Biasella, then stopped Cook's vehicle and issued him a citation for making an illegal left turn, a violation of Akron City Code Section 70.20.
At trial, Biasella testified that at the time of Cook's citation the usual left-turn arrow on the Market Street traffic signal was not operating because of major street reconstruction. Biasella also testified that a "no left turn" sign was posted on a construction barrel in view of westbound Market Street traffic at the intersection. Another "no left turn" sign was posted next to the Market Street traffic signal hanging above the intersection. Cook, however, testified that the left-turn arrow was functioning and that he saw no signs prohibiting a left turn. He asserted he turned left as permitted by the left-turn arrow.
Akron City Code Section 70.20(A) provides in part:
"(A) No pedestrian or driver of a vehicle shall disobey the instructions of any traffic-control device placed in accordance with the provisions of this traffic code * * *."
Although the issue was not raised in the trial court, Cook now contends that the city of Akron failed to prove that the "no left turn" signs were placed pursuant to lawful authority.
Cook relies on Columbus v. Gibbons (Mar. 15, 1988), Franklin App. No. 87AP-681, unreported, 1988 WL 33591. In Gibbons, supra, the court was construing a Columbus ordinance which is similar to both the subject Akron ordinance and R.C. 4511.12. The court held that an element of the crime of disobeying a traffic control device is that the sign was placed under the authority of the service director. Because there was no proof of such fact, the appellate court reversed the conviction. We cannot tell from the opinion whether that issue had been raised in the trial court. We believe Gibbons is distinguishable.
It has been held that once the prosecution has proved that a traffic control device exists in a specific location, such device is presumed to be official and properly placed, and the burden of going forward to rebut such presumption falls on the defendant. Independence v. Peterson (Mo.App.1977), 550 S.W.2d 860; State v. Piscopio (1976), 117 R.I. 300, 366 A.2d 146; State v. Cooper (1974), 129 N.J.Super. 229, 322 A.2d 836. These cases were decided before Sandstrom v. Montana (1979), 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, and later cases which hold that conclusive presumptions and burden-of-proof-shifting presumptions are unconstitutional.
While conclusive presumptions and burden-of-proof-shifting presumptions have been struck down by the United States Supreme Court, that court has made it clear that permissive inferences do not suffer from the same constitutional infirmity, provided it is made clear to the trier of fact that the inference to be drawn from an established fact is not mandatory. Carella v. California (1989), 491 U.S. 263, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 105 L.Ed.2d 218; Rose v. Clark (1986), 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460.
We first note that it has been held that in absence of evidence to the contrary, public officials, administrative officers, and public authorities, within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred upon them by law, will be presumed to have properly performed their duties in a regular and lawful manner and not to have acted illegally or unlawfully. State, ex. rel. Speeth, v. Carney (1955), 163 Ohio St. 159, 56 O.O. 194, 126 N.E.2d 449, paragraph ten of the syllabus. This is expressed in the legal maxim, omnia praesumuntur legitime facta danec probetur in contrarium, that is, all things are presumed lawfully done, until proof be made to the contrary. Cooper, supra, 129 N.J.Super. at 232, 322 A.2d at 838. We also note that it is a crime to place an unauthorized traffic control device. R.C. 4511.16.
Accordingly, we hold that when it has been established that a traffic control device exists, a permissive inference arises that such device was placed pursuant to lawful authority. See, generally, 1 Weinstein's Evidence (1989), Section 303.
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