Akstin v. City of Charlotte

• Decision Date: 17 January 2023
• Docket Number: Civil Action 3:22-CV-00284-RJC-DSC
• Parties: MEGAN AKSTIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of North Carolina

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MEGAN AKSTIN, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHARLOTTE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:22-CV-00284-RJC-DSC

United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Charlotte Division

January 17, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND RECOMMENDATION

DAVID S. CAYER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

THIS MATTER is before the Court on the “City of Charlotte's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint with Prejudice,” Doc. 10, and the parties' associated briefs and exhibits, Docs. 11-12.

The Motion has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and is ripe for consideration.

Having fully considered the arguments, the record, and the applicable authority, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss be granted in part and denied in part as discussed below.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Accepting the allegations of the Amended Complaint, Doc. 8, as true Plaintiff filed this action related to her employment with Defendant as a Firefighter II. Defendant has employed her as a Firefighter since 2010. On or about September 26, 2016 while off-duty, Plaintiff was involved in a serious automobile accident. She was placed on light duty due to her injuries. In 2020 and 2021, Plaintiff made several complaints regarding treatment of canines in the Fire Department. She was removed from any involvement with the canine program on or about March 10, 2021. Plaintiff informed her supervisor that she would be filing an EEOC claim for retaliation. On March 31, 2021, she was informed that Defendant was revoking her light duty status. She could return to work upon being cleared to work on the fire apparatus. Subsequently, Plaintiff applied for disability through UNUM, Defendant's disability provider. Defendant misrepresented to UNUM that Plaintiff was an Office Assistant instead of a Firefighter, resulting in her being denied shortterm and long-term disability benefits.

On September 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimination based upon her sex and disability and for retaliation. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue on March 29, 2022.

Plaintiff brings claims alleging: (1) sex discrimination under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. §1983; (2) retaliation under Title VII; (3) failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act; (4) negligent misrepresentation; and (5) violation of Article 1, Section I and Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.

Defendant filed this Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that Plaintiff's claims are time barred and the Complaint falls short of the minimum pleading requirements for her multiple claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the court should accept as true all well-pleaded allegations and should view the complaint in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff's “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). “[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 546. A complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will survive if it contains enough facts to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In Iqbal, the Supreme Court articulated a two-step process for determining whether a complaint meets this plausibility standard. First, the court identifies allegations that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (allegation that government officials adopted challenged policy “because of” its adverse effects on protected group was conclusory and not assumed to be true). Although the pleading requirements stated in “Rule 8 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] mark[] a notable and generous departure from the hyper[-]technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era . . . it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Id. at 678-79.

Second, to the extent there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their truth and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief. Id. at 679. “Determining whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief “will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. “Where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'- “that the pleader is entitled to relief,”” and therefore should be dismissed. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

The sufficiency of the factual allegations aside, “Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law.” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. City of Lexington, 722 F.3d 224, 228 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989)). Indeed, where “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, a claim must be dismissed.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327; see also Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 521 Fed.Appx. 278, 293 (4th Cir. 2013)). The court must not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies and Scope of the EEOC Charge

“Prior to pursuing a Title VII claim in federal court, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the [EEOC].” Hentosh v. Old Dominion Univ., 767 F.3d 413, 416 (4th Cir. 2014); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e)(1), (f)(1). In Fort Bend Cty., Texas v. Davis, 139 S.Ct. 1843, 1850-51 (2019), the Supreme Court held that failure to exhaust administrative remedies is grounds for dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) rather than 12(b)(1). This “exhaustion requirement is a non-jurisdictional ‘processing rule, albeit a mandatory one' that must be enforced when properly raised.” Walton v. Harker, 33 F.4th 165, 175 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fort Bend Cnty., 139 S.Ct. at 1851A). Since Fort Bend Cty. was decided, courts in this District have repeatedly held that a plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies applicable to discrimination claims warrants dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g., Krings v. AVL Techs., 1:20-CV-259-MR-WCM, 2021 WL 1235129, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 10, 2021) (dismissing plaintiff's claims where plaintiff filed suit before the EEOC had issued a right-to-sue letter); Gill v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., No. 3:18-cv-681-MOC-DSC, 2019 WL 4439496, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 16, 2019) (dismissing discrimination claims plaintiff failed to raise in his EEOC Charge under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); see also McCaskey v. U.S.P.S., No. 3:18-cv-411-RJC-DCK, 2021 WL 1537793 (W.D. N.C. Mar. 26, 2021) (dismissal of ADA claim warranted under 12(b)(6) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies with the EEOC).

While Ford Bend Cty. involved a Title VII claim, the rule announced there also applies to Plaintiffs ADA claim here. See Stewart v. Jones Util. & Contracting Co. Inc., No. 19-14115, 2020 WL 1313636, at *1 (11th Cir. Mar. 19, 2020) (citing Fort Bend Cty., 139 S.Ct. at 1846, 1849, 1851 (2019)) (requirement that plaintiff exhaust her administrative remedies with the EEOC before filing a complaint under Title VII or the ADA “is a mandatory claims-processing rule, not a jurisdictional prerequisite[.]”); Cowgill v. First Data Techs., Inc., No. CV ADC-19-2565, 2020 WL 551913, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2020) (“Though the Supreme Court in Davis [Fort Bend Cty.] was addressing a Title VII Charge, plaintiffs must follow identical EEOC procedures when bringing a Charge of Discrimination under both Title VII and the ADA.”).

Under Title VII, an aggrieved individual must file a complaint with the EEOC “within [180] days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Before filing a lawsuit alleging employment discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies before the EEOC. See Underdue v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14cv183, 2016 WL 3452492, at *2 (W.D. N.C. June 6, 2016) (noting that “the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA share enforcement procedures, including the requirement that a plaintiff must first exhaust administrative remedies before filing a federal lawsuit”).

Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated the ADA and Title VII by engaging in discriminatory conduct in October 2020, December 2020, January 2021, and March 2021. She did not file her Charge of Discrimination with the EEOC until September 27 2017. Any claim arising before March 31, 2021 - 180 days prior to September 27, 2021 - is time-barred. See Davis v. Weiser Sec. Servs., No. 3:13-cv-00522-MOC-DSC, 2016 WL 818913, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Feb. 3, 2016) (recommending defendant's motion to dismiss pro se plaintiff's complaint be granted where plaintiff failed to file EEOC...