Aktar v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 29 October 1997 |
| Docket Number | B106453,Nos. B101267,s. B101267 |
| Citation | 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 595,58 Cal.App.4th 1166 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | , 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8366, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,463 Mustari AKTAR, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Eloise ANDERSON, as Director etc., Defendant and Appellant. Eloise ANDERSON, as Director, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent, Mustari AKTAR, et al., Real Parties in Interest. |
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charlton G. Holland, III, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John H. Sanders, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Sandra L. Goldsmith, Deputy Attorney General, for Defendant and Appellant and Petitioners.
No appearance by Respondent.
Kirk McInnis, Oakland, for Plaintiffs and Respondents and Real Parties in Interest.
Defendant and appellant Eloise Anderson, director of the California Department of Social Services, and the California Department of Social Services (hereafter, the Department), appeal an order granting a preliminary injunction in favor of plaintiffs and respondents Mustari Aktar, Ingrid Monakil, Henrietta Russell, and all persons similarly situated (hereafter, Aktar). The Department also filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting this court to dissolve the preliminary injunction. The two matters have been consolidated.
The trial court enjoined the Department from involuntarily collecting food stamp overissuances stemming from administrative error. A subsequent amendment to the federal food stamp law requires the states to pursue such overissuances by involuntary means, if necessary. The essential issue presented is whether existing state law requires the Department to comply with the amended federal law, or whether a new law must be enacted by the Legislature to compel compliance.
We conclude Welfare and Institutions Code section 10600 directs the Department to comply fully with federal law in administering its social service programs. Further, Welfare and Institutions Code section 18903 specifically mandates the Department to fulfill its food stamp agreement with the federal government. That agreement requires the Department to administer the program in conformity with federal law, including any changes in federal law and regulations. Consequently, the Department is mandated by existing state law to comply with the amended federal food stamp law. Therefore, the Department cannot be enjoined from pursuing collection by involuntary means of overissuances which occurred after the effective date of the amendment to the federal law.
As to administrative error overissuances which occurred prior to the new enactment, the new law does not apply.
The order granting the preliminary injunction shall be modified accordingly to permit the involuntary collection of administrative error overissuances which occurred subsequent to the enactment of the new law.
In 1994, the Department issued a regulation, Manual of Policy and Procedure section 63-801.443(b), authorizing the collection of food stamp overissuances resulting from administrative error.
On September 22, 1995, Aktar filed a first amended petition for writ of mandate and a class action complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against the Department, seeking to prevent the Department from using any nonvoluntary means to collect from recipients overissuances of food stamps resulting from administrative error. 1
On January 12, 1996, Aktar brought a motion for a preliminary injunction to prohibit the Department from collecting food stamp administrative error overissuances by any means other than voluntary repayments and to prohibit the Department from instructing the Franchise Tax Board (FTB) to offset state income tax refunds to satisfy such claims. Aktar argued the Department could collect overissuances of food stamps due to Aktar also argued that leaving aside whether the Department were authorized to use involuntary means to collect administrative error food stamp overissuances, the Department could not use the state tax intercept program under Government Code section 12419.5 to recoup such overissuances because the Department was not collecting an "amount due a state agency," but rather it was collecting monies on behalf of the federal government, and because the Department had failed to establish an "amount due."
administrative error through involuntary means only if there existed specific state statutory authority for such collection or if federal law required it. Aktar contended the Department lacked such authority because no state statute authorized the involuntary collection of administrative error food stamp overissuances and that federal law did not require such collection.
The Department argued Aktar's position was erroneous because: the Department was not barred from using involuntary means of recouping food stamp overissuances caused by administrative error; state law authorizes collection of such food stamp overissuances; federal law also requires the states to collect such food stamp overissuances; and administrative error food stamp overissuances are subject to recoupment pursuant to the state tax intercept program.
On February 27, 1996, the trial court granted the motion for preliminary injunction. The trial court found "neither state nor federal law requires coercive collection of food stamp overpayments" and concluded
The order granting the preliminary injunction provides:
On March 12, 1996, the Department filed notice of appeal from the order granting the preliminary injunction. 2
On August 22, 1996, Congress enacted Public Law 104-193, 110 Statutes at Large 2332, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), thereby amending the federal Food Stamp Act of 1977 (7 U.S.C. § 2022). (Pub.L. No. 104-193 (Aug. 22, 1996) 1996 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, No. 2, § 844 [hereinafter, section 844].) Section 844 directs the states to collect any overissuance of coupons by reducing the allotment of a household, withholding amounts from unemployment compensation, recovering monies from federal pay or a federal income tax refund, or by any other means. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2022(b)(1).)
On August 27, 1996, the Department was notified by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that the states were required to implement section 844 upon enactment of PRWORA, and in any case where the state has failed to apply these new collection provisions on September 22, 1996, that case will be treated as an "error" and fiscal quality control sanctions would follow. 3
On October 11, 1996, during the pendency of the appeal, the Department filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court seeking to Due to the statewide importance of the issues presented, this court issued an order to show cause as to why the relief requested in the petition should or should not be granted, ordered the petition to be heard concurrently with the appeal, and ordered the appeal expedited.
dissolve the [58 Cal.App.4th 1173] preliminary injunction issued by the superior court in light of the new federal law.
The Department contends: in reviewing the order granting the preliminary injunction, this court must apply the law in effect at the time the appeal is heard; the Supremacy Clause, the state plan pursuant to which the state participates in the federal food stamp program, and state law, all require the state to comply with section 844 of PRWORA immediately, and therefore the order enjoining compliance therewith must be reversed; the requested relief is necessary so that the Department can comply with the new federal mandates regarding collection of food stamp overissuances contained in PRWORA, avoid unnecessary sanctions and not jeopardize accessibility to the federal food stamp program for the many low income Californians who rely on food stamps to meet their nutrition needs; and there is no lawful basis for separately enjoining the Department from utilizing the FTB to intercept state income tax refunds to satisfy claims for overpayments of food stamps caused by administrative error.
The federal food stamp program was enacted in 1964 to "alleviate such hunger and malnutrition" among America's poor. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2011.) Under the program, eligible households receive food stamp coupons that can be redeemed for food items at participating retail stores. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(a).) The Program is administered nationally by the Secretary of the USDA, who is responsible for issuing regulations consistent with the Food Stamp Act. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(a), (c).)
States that participate in the food stamp program designate a state agency that is responsible for administering the program at the state level. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(n).) The state agency must administer the program in compliance with the Act and its implementing regulations. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2020(e)(5), (e)(6).) While the federal government bears responsibility for the cost of food stamp benefits (7 U.S.C.A. § 2013(a)), the states share with the federal government the costs of administering the program. (7 U.S.C.A. § 2025.)
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