Alabama Cent. R. Co. v. Long

• Decision Date: 14 January 1909
• Citation: 48 So. 363,158 Ala. 301
• Parties: ALABAMA CENT. R. CO. v. LONG.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

48 So. 363

158 Ala. 301

ALABAMA CENT. R. CO. v. LONG.

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 14, 1909

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1909.

Appeal from Chancery Court, Walker County; A. H. Benners Chancellor.

Suit by the Alabama Central Railroad Company against Z. M. Long, as administratrix of John B. Long, deceased. From a decree sustaining a demurrer to the bill, complainant appeals. Reversed and rendered.

W. C Davis and A. F. Fite, for appellant.

Lacy &amp Lacy, for appellee.

DENSON J.

This bill is filed by the Alabama Central Railroad Company, a corporation, to enjoin an ejectment suit commenced against it in the circuit court of Walker county by Z. M. Long, as the administratrix of the estate of John B. Long, deceased, to recover a strip of land 20 feet wide through the N.W. 1/4 of the N.W. 1/4 of section 34, township 13, range 7 W., in said county, over or upon which complainant's road is constructed. The bill shows that the road was constructed over said land under a contract in writing made by John B Long during his lifetime with the complainant in the words and figures following:

"Know all men by these presents, that I, John B. Long, for and in consideration of the sum of one dollar to me in hand paid by the Alabama Central Railroad, a corporation, do hereby agree and covenant to execute to said corporation a quitclaim deed, in proper form, conveying to said corporation such lands as may be in actual use or occupancy by it on the completion of its roadbed over the following described land, together with the usual right of way privileges, said roadbed to be constructed west of the South Lowell public road and over the S.W. 1/4 of the S.W. 1/4 of section 27, and the N.W. 1/4 of the N.W. 1/4 of section 34, township 13, range 7 West, in Walker county, Alabama, center of track to be seventy feet or more west of the present log barn.

"Given under my hand and seal this ______ day of October, 1906.

"[Signed] John B. Long.

"Attest: N.M. Appling."

The equity of the bill is rested upon two theories: First, that the road was constructed over the land under said contract, with the knowledge and consent of the said John B. Long, and at great expense to the complainant. In this respect the complainant offers to do equity, and to pay to the estate of John B. Long, deceased, as compensation for the land or right of way, whatever sum the court might ascertain and decree the complainant to be liable for. So far as this theory is concerned, we are of the opinion that under the averments of the bill it is unassailable. Southern Railway Co. v. Hood, 126 Ala. 312, 28 So. 662, 85 Am. St. Rep. 32. So, indeed, the chancellor seems to have treated it, for in his opinion, as here certified in the record, he bases his decree sustaining the demurrer solely upon the grounds that were directed against the second theory or phase of the bill. This second theory or phase of the bill is an attempt to have the contract above set out specifically performed, by requiring the respondent, as administratrix, to execute the deed stipulated for. Against that part of the bill which seeks to have the written contract specifically performed, the point was made, by demurrer, that the bill "shows that the agreement made by said Long is void for want of sufficient description of the land agreed to be conveyed by him to the complainant." In other words, the respondent contends that the agreement is obnoxious to the statute of frauds.

The general principle of law in respect to the remedy by specific performance of agreements for the sale of lands is "that the equitable remedy rests largely in the judicial discretion, directed and regulated by defined rules. This contract must be just, fair, and reasonable, must be reasonably certain in respect to the subject-matter, the terms, and stipulations, and must be founded upon a valuable consideration" (Carlisle v. Carlisle, 77 Ala 339, 341; Moon v. Crowder, 72 Ala. 79; 4 Pom. Eq. § 1404); and the statute of frauds is offended unless the contract for the sale of lands expresses a valuable consideration and describes the subject-matter directly, or makes reference to something outside of the writing, by a...