Alabama City, G. & A. Ry. Co. v. Appleton

• Citation: 171 Ala. 324,54 So. 638
• Court: Supreme Court of Alabama
• Decision Date: 02 February 1911
• Parties: ALABAMA CITY, G. & A. RY. CO. v. APPLETON.

54 So. 638

171 Ala. 324

ALABAMA CITY, G. & A. RY. CO. v. APPLETON.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 2, 1911

Appeal from City Court of Gadsden; John H. Disque, Judge.

Action by H. L. Appleton against the Alabama City, Gadsden & Attalla Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Count 11 is as follows: "Plaintiff claims of defendant, a corporation, the sum of $10,000 as damages, for this: On or about the 23d day of September, 1906, the defendant was engaged in operating an electric power plant in the city of Gadsden, from which defendant furnished electricity to arc lights to light the streets of said city, and also to incandescent lamps or globes for lighting the residences and outhouses of the citizens of said city; that, in order to utilize the said electricity which defendant furnished from its plants for said lighting purposes, the defendant strung wires overhead on poles along the streets of said city; that one of these wires was used for furnishing electricity for lights, arc lights, in said city, and that another of said wires was used as a primary or circuit wire to furnish electricity to wires attached to residences and barns for lighting the same; that incandescent lamps or globes were attached to the end of the said wires for said barns and residences; that the voltage used for each of said arc light wires and primary wires was for each highly dangerous, and much greater than that used on said wires for lighting residences and barns; that on or about said date plaintiff was residing in the said city, with his wife, Mrs. L. L Appleton, and defendant, for a reward, furnished electricity to plaintiff's residence and barn by means of wires at the end of which were attached incandescent lamps or globes that on the evening of said day plaintiff's wife was at said barn, and, needing a light, she took hold of the incandescent lamp or globe to turn on the current, when she was thrown violently to the ground and rendered unconscious by a heavy charge of electricity by the wire in the barn to which said lamp or globe was attached; that said electric current badly burned her hand, violently shocked her nervous system, producing nervous prostration and injuring her head and stomach, and caused her to be sick and confined to her room for several months, and permanently injuring her. [ Here follows catalogue of plaintiff's damages resulting from said injuries.] And plaintiff avers that said injuries were caused to his wife by reason of the negligence of the agents and servants of the defendant, in that they negligently charged or allowed the wire that furnished said barn with electric light to be charged with an unreasonable unnecessary, and dangerous amount of electricity from said primary or arc wires, which was transmitted to plaintiff's wife when she attempted to turn on said electric light, and injured her as averred, to plaintiff's damages as herein claimed."

The following is charge 21: "The court charges the jury that it was not negligence to fail to discover the broken pin supporting the wire, if the rotten portion of it was down in the hole of the cross-arm, so that this condition could not have been seen, except by removing the pin from the hole and taking off the glass insulator thereon."

Hood &amp Murphree, for appellant.

Bilbro, Inzer & Stephens and Goodhue & Blackwood, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

Action by husband (appellee) for losses occasioned him in consequence of personal injury wrongfully inflicted, it is alleged, by the defendant (appellant) on the wife.

According to the plaintiff's theory, the cause of the injury was the overcharging, by defendant's negligent act or omission, of an electric "droplight" installed by defendant in the barn of plaintiff; the contact being afforded by the wife's effort to turn on light in the usual way.

A number of the errors assigned and insisted upon in brief relate to the rulings on the admission of evidence, and to instructions to the jury, with respect to the elements, character, and measure of damages recoverable in actions of this nature. The general subject was dealt with in Southern Railway Co. v. Crowder, 135 Ala. 417, 33 So. 335. The court correctly applied the principles announced in the cited decision to the cause at bar.

That the permanency vel non of an injury wrongfully inflicted upon a wife is an inquiry necessarily involved, in actions of this character, in the ascertainment of damage suffered by the husband, by way of immediately consequent loss of her services to him and of her consortium (if so) with him cannot, we think, be doubted. Southern Ry. Co. v. Crowder, supra. Expense incurred by a husband in the employment, in the treatment of injuries to his wife, of such medical or surgical skill as ordinary prudence would, under the circumstances, suggest is a legitimate element of the damages proximately resulting from a wrongfully inflicted injury upon her. B. R. L. & P. Co. v. Anderson, 163 Ala. 72, 50 So. 1021. The court affirmatively instructed the jury that, if the injury was wrongfully inflicted upon Mrs. Appleton, the plaintiff was entitled to recover the expense of the journey to and from, and the cost of professional services at, Rome, Ga., and also the expense incurred in bringing Dr. Hamilton from Rome to Gadsden to attend Mrs. Appleton. This instruction of the jury necessarily concluded that the trip to Rome, the services secured there, and the calling of Dr. Hamilton to Gadsden were such acts, incurring liabilities and expenses, as comported with ordinary prudence in the premises, and were, hence, within the causes proximately resulting from the injury and for which liability attaches to a tort-feasor. There was undisputed opinion evidence to the effect that to take the wife to Rome for treatment gave promise of better results, that the work could be done better there, and that the trip was taken after advice with Dr. Hamilton. In the absence of countervailing evidence, we think ...