Alabama Dept. of Transp. v. Williams, 1060619.

Citation984 So.2d 1092
Decision Date19 October 2007
Docket Number1060619.
PartiesALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION v. Donald Frank WILLIAMS and James G. Harrell, Jr.
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Matthew C. McDonald, deputy atty. gen., and Kenneth A. Watson of Miller, Hamilton, Snider & Odom, L.L.C., Mobile, for appellant.

Warren C. Herlong, J. Casey Pipes, and Christopher T. Conte of Helmsing, Leach, Herlong, Newman & Rouse, P.C., Mobile, for appellees.

LYONS, Justice.

The Alabama Department of Transportation ("ALDOT") appeals from a judgment of the Mobile Circuit Court awarding Donald Frank Williams and James G. Harrell, Jr. ("the landowners"), interest of $47,313.92 on a judgment in an eminent domain case. We reverse and remand.

I. Facts and Procedural History

At some time before 2004, ALDOT began eminent domain proceedings to acquire from the landowners certain real property in Mobile County for a right-of-way project. ALDOT offered the landowners $137,400 in compensation; they rejected that offer. On January 14, 2004, ALDOT filed a condemnation action in the Mobile Probate Court to obtain the property. The probate court determined compensatory damages for the property to be $352,346. Both ALDOT and the landowners appealed to the Mobile Circuit Court. ALDOT deposited the amount of the probate court's judgment into the circuit court. The landowners withdrew $137,400 (the amount of ALDOT's original offer for the property); $214,946 remained on deposit with the circuit court. On July 14, 2004, ALDOT obtained the right to possess the property and began construction activity shortly thereafter. The case proceeded to a jury trial in the Mobile Circuit Court. On May 18, 2005, the jury entered a verdict that determined compensatory damages for the property to be $483,000. On June 3, 2005, the circuit court calculated prejudgment interest due on the compensatory damages to be $28,746.35, and entered a judgment of condemnation in favor of ALDOT, with a compensation award of $511,746.35 to the landowners (damages of $483,000 plus prejudgment interest of $28,746.35).

ALDOT appealed the circuit court's judgment to this Court, depositing an additional $159,400.35 into the circuit court for a total principal amount of $374,346.35 on deposit in the circuit court. On July 14, 2006, this Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment, without an opinion. Alabama Dep't of Transp. v. Williams (No. 1041564, July 14, 2006), ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.2006) (table). On October 19, 2006, the Mobile circuit clerk paid the landowners $389,060.69, representing $374,346 in principal1 (the difference between the circuit court's judgment of $511,746.35 and ALDOT's original offer of $137,400), plus $14,714.69 in accumulated interest actually earned on the funds, which had been deposited in an interest-bearing account.

The landowners then sought postjudgment interest on the circuit court's judgment entered on June 3, 2005, in the amount of $511,746.35, reduced by the amount of the previous disbursement to the landowners in the probate court of $137,400 (hereinafter "the principal amount"). The landowners contended that they were entitled to postjudgment interest at a rate of 12% of the principal amount calculated pursuant to §§ 8-8-10 and 18-1A-30, Ala.Code 1975. ALDOT did not oppose an award of postjudgment interest but argued that the proper interest rate on the principal amount should be that provided in § 18-1A-211(a), Ala.Code 1975.

Section 18-1A-211 states:

"(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the judgment shall include interest at a rate equal to the most recent weekly average one-year constant maturity yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, upon the unpaid portion of the compensation awarded. The interest shall commence to accrue on the date of entry of the judgment.

"(b) Except as provided by Section 18-1A-111, the judgment may not include any interest upon the amount represented by funds deposited into probate court by the plaintiff for the period after the date of deposit."

ALDOT provided documentation to the circuit court indicating that on June 3, 2005, the date of the judgment, the applicable interest rate determined pursuant to § 18-1A-211(a) was 3.28%.

Both ALDOT and the landowners treated the interest due as subject to an offset in the amount of $14,714.69, the amount of interest earned on the additional money ALDOT had deposited into the circuit court after the entry of the circuit court's judgment that was due and payable to the landowners at the conclusion of the proceedings. Under the landowners' calculation based on a rate of 12%, the net interest due is $47,313.92. Under ALDOT's calculation based on a rate of 3.28%, the net interest due is $2,239.87. The circuit court accepted the landowners' calculation of postjudgment interest and entered a judgment in favor of the landowners for $47,313.92. ALDOT appealed.

II. Standard of Review

Because the issue presented by this appeal concerns only questions of law involving statutory construction, our review is de novo. Whitehurst v. Baker, 959 So.2d 69 (Ala.2006). See also Taylor v. Cox, 710 So.2d 406 (Ala.1998).

III. Jurisdiction

We first address the landowners' contention that this Court does not have jurisdiction to decide this appeal. In the statement of jurisdiction in their brief to this Court, without any further discussion or citation to any authority, the landowners state:

"This Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $10,000. Ala.Code, § 18-1A-288."

Section 18-1A-288, entitled "Appeal from final judgment of circuit court," provides:

"After entry of final judgment in the circuit court, any party may, within 42 days thereafter, upon giving bond or security for costs as in other cases, file a notice of appeal to the court of civil appeals where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, does not exceed $10,000.00. Where the amount involved, exclusive of interest and costs, exceeds $10,000.00, such appeal shall be to the supreme court."

(Emphasis added.)

In its response to the landowners' contention that this Court lacks jurisdiction over this appeal because the amount in controversy does not exceed $10,000, ALDOT argues only that the statutory language requires that appellate jurisdiction in eminent domain cases be determined by the amount of compensation awarded for the taking. Because the taking here resulted in an award of $483,000 before interest is added, a sum well in excess of $10,000, ALDOT contends that this Court, and not the Court of Civil Appeals, has appellate jurisdiction over this case.

We need not decide whether appellate jurisdiction over this case must be determined by the amount of interest in controversy or by the amount of the compensation awarded the landowners in the original judgment. Upon reviewing the parties' contentions, it becomes readily apparent that this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal. The landowners contend that the postjudgment-interest award should be $47,313.92. ALDOT contends that the postjudgment-interest award should be $2,239.87. Because the total postjudgment-interest calculation from the landowners' perspective exceeds $10,000, this case is properly within the jurisdiction of this Court. That our rejection of the landowners' contention would result in an award of less than $10,000 does not oust this Court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the issue before us. See Harper v. Regency Dev. Co., 399 So.2d 248, 260-61 (Ala.1981). Thus, whether appellate jurisdiction is determined by the amount of interest in controversy or by the original judgment that determined the amount of compensation to be awarded to the landowners, this Court has appellate jurisdiction of this case.

IV. Rate of Postjudgment Interest

ALDOT argues that the circuit court should have calculated postjudgment interest in this eminent domain case pursuant to § 18-1A-211. The landowners argue that the circuit court properly calculated postjudgment interest at 12% pursuant to § 8-8-10, which provides generally for postjudgment interest,2 and § 18-1A-30(b), which provides for interest to be paid on funds deposited into court when an eminent domain case is appealed to the circuit court from the probate court.3

This Court discussed the history of § 18-1A-211 in Williams v. Alabama Power Co., 730 So.2d 172 (Ala. 1999):

"Before the enactment of § 18-1A-211, Alabama did not have a statute providing for the calculation of prejudgment interest in delayed-payment condemnation cases. However, in 1985, Alabama joined a majority of states in adopting a uniform method of calculating prejudgment interest. See the commentary to § 18-1A-211, Ala.Code 1975. In its original form, § 18-1A-211(a) was a modified version of § 1202 of the Uniform Eminent Domain Code. It read as follows:

"`(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the judgment shall include interest at a rate equal to the rate allowed to be charged on money judgments as set forth in section 8-8-10 as amended at the date of the final order in the circuit court upon the unpaid portion of the compensation awarded. The interest shall commence to accrue upon the date of valuation and be calculated to the earlier of the date of deposits into the probate court or date of entry of the judgment.'

"However, § 18-1A-211(a) was amended effective July 28, 1995. The amended § 18-1A-211(a) no longer addresses prejudgment interest. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:

"`(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the judgment shall include interest at a rate equal to the annual interest rate prevailing on the 52-week United States Treasury Bills at the date of the final order in the circuit court upon the unpaid portion of the compensation awarded. The interest shall commence to accrue on the date of entry of the judgment.'

"(Emphasis added [in Williams].) Although the commentary to § 18-1A-211 was...

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