Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., Inc. v. Hudson

• Decision Date: 27 May 1983
• Parties: ALABAMA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. D.W. HUDSON as Father of Jeffrey Scott Hudson, a deceased minor, Bobby Daughtry, James Robinson, and Charles Cade Walker, Sr., as Father of Charles Cade Walker, Jr., a deceased minor. 81-175.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 1208

432 So.2d 1208

ALABAMA FARM BUREAU MUTUAL CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. D.W. HUDSON as Father of Jeffrey Scott Hudson, a deceased minor, Bobby Daughtry, James Robinson, and Charles Cade Walker, Sr., as Father of Charles Cade Walker, Jr., a deceased minor.

81-175.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 27, 1983.

John M. Milling, Jr. of Hill, Hill, Carter, Franco, Cole & Black, Montgomery, William M. Russell, Jr., Tuskegee, for appellant.

Fred D. Gray of Gray, Seay & Langford, Tuskegee, for appellees.

Sidney Gene Landreau of Faulk & Landreau, Phenix City, for appellee Charles Cade Walker.

ALMON, Justice.

This is a declaratory judgment action filed by Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Company, Inc., to determine coverage under an insurance policy. The trial court held that the driver of the vehicle was using it with the express permission of the owner, the named insured under Farm Bureau's policy. We affirm.

James Robinson worked as a farm hand for Bobby Daughtry. On the night of September 28, 1979, Robinson used a one-ton pickup truck belonging to Daughtry to tow his (Robinson's) wife's car home. The car came loose and swerved into the oncoming lane, hitting the car driven by Charles Walker, Jr., and Jeffrey Scott Hudson. Both young men were killed.

Prior to the accident, Daughtry had been leaving the truck with Robinson frequently for at least two reasons: to prevent thefts of tools from the truck and to give Robinson transportation to and from Daughtry's farm. The question presented is whether Daughtry gave Robinson permission to use the truck for his own personal use. This question arises because Daughtry's insurance policy with Farm Bureau extends coverage to Daughtry as the named insured, to his relatives, and to "any other person while using the automobile, provided the actual use of the automobile is with the express permission of the named insured."

This clause in similar Farm Bureau policies has been construed by this Court in Crawley v. Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co., 295 Ala. 226, 326 So.2d 718 (1976); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Mattison, 286 Ala. 541, 243 So.2d 490 (1971); Alabama Farm Bureau Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 286 Ala. 414, 240 So.2d 664 (1970). In Crawley, supra, the driver had the express permission of a business partner of the named insured, but the trial court held the driver was not covered. This Court affirmed, holding that the partner's permission would have sufficed if the partnership had been the named insured and reserving the question regarding a case where the evidence showed that the insurer knew the truck was used primarily in the partnership business. In Mattison, supra, the permission of the named insured's son did not give the driver coverage even though he had the general permission of the named insured to use the car during working hours. In Government Employees Insurance Co., supra, the permission of the named insured's daughter did not extend coverage to the driver.

In this case the permission came directly from the named insured, so the above-cited cases are not entirely apposite. The question here is whether the record contains evidence to support the judgment ¹ that Robinson had Daughtry's express permission to use the truck for his personal use. We find no evidence of permission to use the truck for this specific outing, so the question is whether Daughtry gave Robinson permission to use the truck whenever he wanted or needed to.

Both Robinson and Daughtry denied that such general permission was ever given. The tenor of their testimony indicates, however, that although they were aligned with the boys' fathers as parties defendant, their interests were somewhat different. Indeed, Farm Bureau presented its evidence by calling Daughtry and Robinson as "adverse parties." Daughtry stood to face a substantial claim against his insurance coverage even though neither he nor a member of his family was subject to personal liability. Moreover, Daughtry was a Farm Bureau agent prior to, at the time of, and for some time after the accident; he was the agent on his own policy. The record does not indicate whether Robinson has insurance of his own, but we do note that he is relatively uneducated and susceptible to influence from his employer Daughtry. Daughtry continued to employ him until at least the time of the trial, so he had...