Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Sellers

• Decision Date: 01 May 1891
• Citation: 93 Ala. 9,9 So. 375
• Parties: ALABAMA G. S. R. CO. v. SELLERS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

9 So. 375

93 Ala. 9

ALABAMA G. S. R. CO. v. SELLERS.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 1, 1891

Appeal from circuit court, Jefferson county; JAMES B. HEAD, Judge.

This action was brought by the appellees, Nancy M. Sellers and her husband, I. M. Sellers, against the appellant corporation and sought to recover damages for injuries to the plaintiff Nancy M. Sellers, caused by the wrongful act of the defendant's employe. There were three counts in the complaint. The first count, after alleging that the said Nancy M. Sellers had purchased a ticket for transportation by the defendant as a passenger from Jonesboro to Wheeling points on its road, alleges that instead of stopping at the station of her destination. Wheeling, said train of cars negligently and wrongfully ran 200 yards beyond the station-house; and, though "a heavy and drenching" rain was falling, the said Nancy M. Sellers was put off of said car at a distance of 200 yards beyond the station-house and thereby made to walk through the rain, which greatly injured her health. The second count, after making the same allegations, further alleges that, although it was the defendant's duty to run its train back to the station, it did not do so, and the said Nancy M. Sellers was "compelled by the conductor to get off of the train a great distance from the station, in a hard and drenching rain," which resulted "in great and permanent injury to her health." The third count contains the same preliminary allegations, and then further alleges that although earnestly requested to do so, the defendant refused to run its train back to the station-house, and its conductor caused her to alight from the said train 200 yards from said station-house in the rain, which resulted in the permanent injury of her health. The defendant pleaded the general charge, and denied each and every allegation in the complaint. During the pendency of the suit the husband died, and the suit was revived in the name of Nancy M. Sellers alone. The court charged the jury: "(1) I charge you that if there was a regular stopping place at Wheeling, and the defendant ran its said train by the regular stopping place by reason of any mismanagement of the train, then it was a duty they owed to the plaintiff to take her back to the station, and let her get off. (2) The plaintiffs claim in the case that they are entitled to damages beyond actual damages, and I will leave that question for the jury to decide,-whether, under all the circumstances of the case, there is anything in it to justify punitive or vindictive damages. (3) It is averred in the complaint in this cause that the defendant put off or compelled the said plaintiff to leave the train. Now, I charge that this does not necessarily equal or mean the application of force to remove the said plaintiff from said train." The defendant separately excepted to all these portions of the general charge, and also excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following written charges requested by it, (1, 5, 6, and 7 are general affirmative charges with reference to the whole complaint, and each count respectively:) "(2) The court charges the jury that under the evidence in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any exemplary or punitive damages. (3) The court charges the jury that under the evidence in this case the plaintiff is not entitled to recover any damages unless the jury should find that she is entitled to compensatory damages. (4) The jury are charged that passengers who apply for and receive transportation as passengers on freight trains are not entitled to the comforts and conveniences usually furnished passengers on passenger trains, and that in accepting, after applying for, such transportation, they are charged with notice of the above." "(8) If the jury believe from the evidence that, when the said train was pulled by the usual stopping place at said Wheeling station, the plaintiff got off the said train, and was not put off, nor compelled to get off, but of her own free will left said train, then there can be no recovery under the first and second counts of said complaint, and the jury must so find. (9) The jury are charged that if they believe from the evidence that the said plaintiff was carried past the point at which she should have been allowed to alight, and that she subsequently left said train of her own accord, and without bringing home notice to defendant that she desired or demanded to be carried back to said place, then the jury can consider said testimony as showing that plaintiff waived her right to be carried back to said place, and the jury must so find. (10) The court charges the jury, at the request of defendant, that, in determining whether the defendant was guilty of negligence in passing beyond the point of the railroad opposite the house where passengers were in the habit of getting off the cars, the jury may take into consideration, in connection with all the other evidence in the case, the character of train plaintiff was riding on, the number of cars it was pulling, what efforts the defendant employed to stop the train; and if, from all the evidence in the case, the jury are not reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the defendant was guilty of negligence in passing the alleged station, then the verdict of the jury must be for defendant. (11) The court charges the jury, at the request of the defendant, that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recovery in this case, and the jury further believe from the evidence that the plaintiff could have been cured of her sickness in ten days from the time she was afflicted, and failed to take the proper steps to have herself cured, and she could have secured the means of cure, and failed to do so, that the jury should allow the plaintiff no damages for any sickness or suffering beyond the ten days. (12) The court charges the jury, at request of defendant, that the cause of action laid in the complaint is the wrongful and negligent carrying of plaintiff beyond the station, and for refusing to carry plaintiff back to station after the train had passed it; and the only consideration the jury should give the refusal to carry plaintiff back to the station, if the jury are satisfied the defendant refused to carry plaintiff back, is in estimating the damages the jury will allow plaintiff if the jury should conclude from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to damages. (13) The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages, then, under the evidence in this case, the jury can only allow the plaintiff actual damages,-that is, such damages as directly arose from the injury complained of to the plaintiff; but the jury cannot allow the plaintiff any damages for physicians' bills, or costs of her cure, or for loss of time because of her sickness." There was judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant appeals.

Wood & Wood, for appellant.

Hewitt, Walker & Porter, for appellee.

MCCLELLAN J.

The...