Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Arnold

Decision Date30 May 1888
Citation4 So. 359,84 Ala. 159
PartiesALABAMA G. S. R. CO. v. ARNOLD.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from circuit court, Greene county; S. H. SPROTT, Judge.

This was an action against the appellant, the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, for personal injuries received by the appellee, John W. Arnold, in falling at night from the platform of the railroad station of said company at Boligee which fall he alleged was due to the failure on the part of the railroad company to have the station or depot provided with a light. Arnold had gone to the ticket office, purchased a ticket for transportation on the train then about to arrive, and, on leaving the office, fell from the platform and received the injury here complained of in this suit. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground that it was not the legal duty of defendant to provide good and safe platform and lights, or either such platform or lights, at Boligee station. This demurrer was overruled, and the defendant then filed the following pleas: "(1) That it is not guilty of the matter alleged in said complaint." Second and fourth pleas set up contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff. "(3) And, for a further plea to said complaint, defendant avers that all the injuries the plaintiff therein complained of were the result of accident." "(5) And, for further plea to said complaint, the defendant avers that, at the time of the said injury, *** there was no statute or law of force in Alabama imposing upon defendant the duty, nor any duty resting upon defendant as carrier of passengers, of furnishing any better platform or light or lights, at said station of Boligee, then was furnished at said station at the time of the alleged injury. (6) For further plea *** defendant *** says that *** said Boligee station, at which said injury occurred, is situated upon the said railroad between the capitals of the counties of Greene and Sumter; that the population of the village at and about said station is small, being, to-wit one hundred persons, and the business transacted at said station is small in proportion; that the village at said station of Boligee is not an incorporated town, and has no municipal organization; that there is in said village but few streets, upon which all the business coming thereto is conducted, and which lead up to said station and said station-house, and there are no difficulties therein, but which are free and open to the public, and that said village and station of Boligee is what is commonly called a country station; that said station of Boligee is not nor was lit by gas, electricity, or lamps or lights of any other kind upon the streets thereof, and that the only lights used in said station and village are used in the dwellings and other houses thereof, and are oil-lamps and candles; that, at the time of the alleged injury, said station-house had lamps burning therein, and were either portable or stationary, as the occasion demanded; that the said station-house was amply large for the business transacted at said point, and constructed with as much care as is usual, or required by law or statutes of the state, of such station, or custom or usage upon well-regulated railroad's required; and, on account of the smallness of the village at such station in population and business, the defendant was not, by custom or law required to have the same lighted by both indoor and outdoor light, provided they had indoor lights, which were convenient to the small traveling public, and ready to be used, and subject to their call at any time. And defendant avers that the said plaintiff and the public generally were well acquainted with said station-house, and the approaches thereto, and the habits and customs connected therewith for the regulation and use of said station, and for the use of the lights at and about the same. And the defendant avers that, this being its full duty in the premises, they provided such lights as were required by them at the station; and neither did the plaintiff, nor any one for him, demand any further or additional lights, nor ask to be lighted to or from the stopping place of said trains on said night. And defendant avers that it has done and performed each and every duty required of it by custom or law, and that said injury was not caused by any act, or omission to act, on its part." Plea No. 3, mentioned in the opinion as the plea to which a demurrer was sustained at a former term, set up the statute of limitations of one year to an amended count of the complaint. The amended count contained no new cause of action, and for this reason a demurrer was sustained to the plea. See 80 Ala. 600, 2 South. Rep. 337. The distance from the ticket-office door to the steps fronting the door was shown to be three feet seven inches; this distance being the width of the platform, which was sixteen feet long. The court refused each of the following charges requested by the defendant: "(1) If the jury believe all the evidence, they must find for the defendant under the first count of the complaint. (2) If the jury believe all the evidence, they must find for the defendant under the second count of the complaint. (3) If the jury believe all the evidence, the jury are not authorized to give the plaintiff exemplary damages. (4) If the jury believe all the evidence, they are not authorized to find that the injury to the plaintiff was wanton or intentional, or to assess exemplary damages against the defendant. *** At the time of the fall of Arnold, for which damages are claimed in this suit, there was no law of the state by which a railroad company was required to light its stations or depot buildings at night, if the depot building was of such character as was of customary use by well-regulated railways at stations of like kind and business." There were many assignments of error; but the facts, as narrated above, are sufficient to show all the points as they are decided by the court in the opinion, and to show their bearing on the facts of this present case.

Saml. F. Rice, Wood & Wood, and Thos. R. Roulhac, for appellant.

Jas. B. Head and J. J. Altman, for appellee.

STONE C.J.

This case was before us at a former term. 80 Ala. 600, 2 South Rep. 337. The complaint consisted of two counts: one the original, and the other an amendment, adding a second count. The complaint is the same now as on the former appeal. On that appeal we held that the gravamen of each count was the same,-the failure to have the depot supplied with a light. The first or original count predicates negligence, on the part of the railroad, on the naked averments that Boligee was one of its stations for receiving and discharging passengers; that at that station the railroad had erected a platform and thereon its only ticket office at that place; that plaintiff, desiring to take passage on its train, soon to arrive, had entered the office, and procured a ticket; that it was night-time, very dark, and no light furnished; that the train "was about arriving;" and that the "plaintiff attempted to descend the steps of said platform for the purpose of entering the car, and, in attempting so to do, fell, and thereby received severe personal injuries." The count then avers that "said fall and injuries were caused by the negligence of defendant or its servants, in failing to provide a light at said station, whereby plaintiff would have been able to see his way, and avoid said fall and injuries." The amendment or second count differs from the first only in the following additional averments, giving a more minute description of the place where the injury was suffered: "That said office had in front of and attached to it, fronting its entrance, a platform about three and one-half feet wide, which was accessible by steps, about three and a half feet in width, reaching from the ground to the top of the platform in front of the door of said ticket office, over which steps and platform passengers were required to pass in entering the ticket office. The surface of said platform was elevated about four or four and a half feet above the ground; and plaintiff avers that the construction of said steps and platform, as above described, rendered the same unsafe and dangerous, and liable to cause personal injuries to persons passing over the same." The count then described the injury as it was described in the first count, and complains of the absence of a light as the negligence which caused the injury. Speaking of these counts, we, on the former appeal, said: "The injury and the negligence complained of as the cause are the same as set forth in both counts; and, while it is averred that the construction of the steps and platform rendered them unsafe and dangerous, this does not constitute the negligence alleged to be the cause of the injury, but, as we interpret the count, the allegations are intended to show a greater and more imperative duty to provide a light, from the failure to do which it is distinctly and expressly averred, in the new count, the injuries resulted. Under neither count is the plaintiff entitled to recover for any negligence other than the failure to provide a light." When this case was returned to the circuit court, the defendant demurred to the counts of the complaint collectively, and assigned as cause of demurrer that "there was, at the time mentioned in said complaint, no statute of force in the state of Alabama which required of or imposed upon said defendant the duty to furnish good and safe platform and lights, or either such platform or lights, at Boligee station; nor was there any duty at the common law to furnish said platform or lights." There was, when the injury is alleged to have occurred, February 11, 1885, no statute relating to the subject in Alabama. Our first s...

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