Alabama Great So. R. Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.
| Citation | 127 F. Supp. 363 |
| Decision Date | 03 January 1955 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 6957. |
| Parties | The ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Plaintiff, v. LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
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Jos. F. Johnston and Leigh M. Clark, Cabaniss & Johnston, Birmingham, Ala., Sidney S. Alderman and Henry L. Walker, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
R. E. Steiner, Jr., Montgomery, Ala., Chas. H. Eyster, Decatur, Ala., White E. Gibson, Birmingham, Ala., and J. H. McChord, Louisville, Ky., for defendant.
On November 25, 1951, defendant's railroad train, the Crescent, normally running between Montgomery and New Orleans over its own rails, was proceeding southbound at Woodstock, Alabama, over the plaintiff's tracks, due to a detour caused by a damaged trestle on defendant's line. The detour was made under an arrangement ruled by a written Detour Agreement between the parties. Such train was being operated by plaintiff's employees, and defendant had only one employee thereon, who was there solely for the purpose of keeping a record of the tickets for interline accounting. Plaintiff's northbound train, the Southerner, entered the main line from a passing track, in violation of orders and signals, and a catastrophic, head-on collision ensued.
The collision occurred about 2:35 p. m., approximately three-fifths of a mile north of the small station of Woodstock, on plaintiff's single track line of railroad. Approaching Woodstock the track runs generally in a north-south direction. At Woodstock a siding 1.62 miles long parallels the main track. Certain changes were made in plaintiff's operation of this section of its railroad effective October 10, 1951, about six weeks prior to the accident. On September 24, 1951, plaintiff issued a bulletin addressed "To All Concerned" announcing that changes would be made in train operations, signals and interlockings on this section. Paragraph 1 of that bulletin notified plaintiff's employees that a centralized traffic control system would be placed in service. Paragraph 2 thereof notified that trains or engines would be governed by block and interlocking signals, whose indications would supersede the superiority of trains for both opposing and following movements on the same track. Paragraph 4 stated that interlocking switches and color light signals would be placed in service at Woodstock at the north and south ends of the siding and at other stations named therein.
Following the effective date of this bulletin, October 10, 1951, movement of trains at this point by train orders was superseded by the central traffic control system operating automatic block signals.
Plaintiff's train dispatcher, in charge of and controlling the movements of both of the trains which collided, ordered plaintiff's northbound train No. 48 to take, and remain on, the siding at Woodstock until authorized to proceed upon the main line by a green light from the signal at the north end of the siding. Under plaintiff's rules this order was given by setting the switches and giving the appropriate signals from the lights at both ends of the siding. Plaintiff's northbound train (Southerner, No. 48) entered the siding at Woodstock at the south ends of the switch and passed southbound train 1/47 which was then standing on the main track and was displaying signals informing the crew of the northbound train, No. 48, that train 2/47 (the Crescent) was following. While plaintiff's northbound train No. 48 was entering this siding, the engineer on 1/47 also sounded the proper engine whistle to inform all that a second section (2/47, the Crescent) was following, which the engineer of northbound No. 48 properly acknowledged by two short blasts of the pneumatic horn. There was some conversation between the fireman and engineer of plaintiff's northbound train (No. 48) as to the probability of their meeting the second section (2/47, the Crescent) at Woodstock. Notwithstanding this, plaintiff's engineer on its northbound train No. 48 proceeded through the siding at a speed of between 15 and 25 miles per hour, and in violation of plaintiff's rules.
As shown by the diagram or map made in the official report of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the signal governing northbound movements on the main line track at this point was located between the siding and the main track 347 feet south of the north end of the siding. The signal governing the movement of train No. 48 from the siding on to the main track was located on the east side of this siding 270.5 feet south of the switch leading to the main track. The lights of both of these signals were red, thus warning and directing plaintiff's enginemen on No. 48 to stop as they approached these signals.
Wholly disregarding, or failing to see, the red warning of danger and the imperative command to stop, plaintiff's enginemen on its northbound train No. 48 ran through the closed switch and about 100 feet beyond it onto the main track before they stopped the train.
As soon as the fireman on the northbound train No. 48 observed that the switch to the main track was set against No. 48 he called a warning to his engineer. The engineer, instead of applying the emergency brake, made a brake application only in the first service position. The fireman, realizing that his train would not be stopped short of the switch, again warned the engineer, who again failed to apply the emergency brake but only moved the brake valve to the full service position. The emergency brake was never applied either by the engineer or the fireman, although the fireman, as well as the engineer, had a device which could properly be classified as an emergency brake valve on his side of the engine immediately in front of his seat, by application and use of which he could have applied the brakes in emergency and brought the train to a complete stop.
There is a substantial curve in the main track immediately north of the point where the engine of the northbound train stopped after it had pulled out on the main track. In about one minute after that train had stopped on the main track, southbound train 2/47, the Crescent, came around this curve and the collision occurred.
The engineer on the northbound train, No. 48, after stopping his engine on the main line, got off his engine and went to a telephone booth nearby where he was killed by the overturning portions of the demolished train when the collision occurred.
Plaintiff's rules, promulgated by it and effective at the time and place of the collision, in effect imposed the following requirements:
As stated above, the engineer of the northbound train was killed in the collision. The fireman was subsequently discharged by plaintiff on account of derelictions of duty involved in this collision and particularly for violation of Rules 33 and 1370.
Plaintiff's enginemen on No. 48 (northbound) knew that both trains carried hundreds of passengers besides employees and much equipment, and that a collision would result in death or injury and destruction. They knew the train signals and lights, and also knew the rules that, when in doubt, they should stop in a place of safety and find out. Instead of doing this, they proceeded upon the main line in violation of rules and signals and caused a horrible collision, killing 17 passengers and members of crews, injuring 68, and destroying approximately one million dollars of equipment. They did, and failed to do, a series or succession of acts in violation of their orders, rules and signals.
Invoking the jurisdiction of this court on the grounds of diversity of citizenship and presence of the requisite amount in controversy and proceeding under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201, 2202, plaintiff averred that the parties had arranged for the movement of the southbound train, the Crescent, over plaintiff's lines pursuant to the terms and conditions of a written agreement between the parties, by appropriate reference incorporated with the allegations of paragraph three of the complaint.
Adverting to paragraph 7 of such agreement, plaintiff prayed first, that the court, under the authority of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., order defendant to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration clause therein contained. In the alternative, pointing to the pertinent provisions of paragraph 4 of the same agreement, plaintiff prayed the court to declare the rights and obligations of the parties under the agreement, and to declare that defendant is liable to indemnify plaintiff for the losses resulting from the collision.
Filing its answer, defendant, for the various reasons set out therein, insisted that the detour agreement imposed no obligation upon defendant to indemnify plaintiff for the losses resulting from the collision. By counterclaim, defendant contended that plaintiff was liable to it for the damages it had...
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