Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Bishop

• Decision Date: 05 November 1953
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 153
• Parties: ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO. v. BISHOP.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 530

68 So.2d 530

259 Ala. 629

ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO. v. BISHOP.

7 Div. 153.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Nov. 5, 1953.

Lusk, Swann & Burns, Gadsden, for appellant.

Hawkins & Copeland, Gadsden, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment in the circuit court awarding to appellee damages for injury to his left foot so as to cause its amputation as the result of being run over by a train of cars of appellant.

The accident occurred as appellee was attempting to cross the track of appellant at a crossing of it by a public highway in Attalla, Alabama. Appellee's left foot was caught in the opening or crevice on the inside of the east rail, between the rail and a piece of timber extending parallel with the rail and adjoining the pavement between the rails on its west. The opening or crevice was made so that the flange on the wheels of the cars would have a space in which to roll freely. Some such crevice was necessary in the operation of trains. It was about two inches wide. There was evidence that it should not be less than two and one-fourth inches in width. On the east side of this rail there was also a crevice three inches wide, which did not affect this accident. According to plaintiff's version it was in this crevice that his toes slipped as he fell in jumping from between the rails toward the east to avoid the train bearing down upon him from the south. He extricated his right foot as he lay on his 'belly' but did not get his left foot out before the train ran over it and cut it off.

The count on which the verdict was rendered, in so far as here material to state, was in negligently constructing or maintaining the crossing so that appellee slipped or fell and his left foot caught in the crevice and was run over by the train, all of which was the proximate result of said negligence. The track was straight and unobstructed to the south, from which the train was coming, for one and a half miles on a clear day. The track and crossing were dry and hard. It was a much frequented crossing.

The trial court's interpretation of count 4, on which the verdict was rendered, is as follows:

'The gravamen of count 4 is that the defendant negligently permitted this crevice to exist, thereby rendering said crossing unsafe under conditions mentioned in the complaint, and that plaintiff, while crossing said track, slipped and fell and caught his toe in the alleged crevice, and that the negligence of the defendant in permitting the crevice to exist proximately caused his alleged injury. Nothing is alleged in the complaint about plaintiff's conduct immediately before he fell. In the judgment of this court such conduct was the subject of proof under defendant's plea (in short) of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff, all of which, including the alleged negligence of the defendant, presented a jury question.'

The evidence was without dispute that the track and crossing were well constructed according to practices and requirements for the maintenance of railroads in Attalla, see Northern Alabama Ry. Co. v. Mansell, 138 Ala. 548, 36 So. 459, and that there was nothing abnormal or unusual about the width of those crevices. Prior to that occurrence there had been observed no one in distress in making the crossing.

There was eliminated by the verdict any complaint as to the want of due care with reference to the operation of the train or acts or conduct of its servants or agents in its operation, or other negligence.

The court charged the jury orally as follows:

'It is the duty of the defendant to maintain its public crossings in a reasonably safe condition for the use of pedestrians using the crossing under normal conditions, and also for their use, that is, the use of pedestrians, under extraordinary conditions requiring hurried passage when such extraordinary conditions are occasioned by the defendant in the lawful use of its properties at or near the crossings, and which conditions of extraordinary character the defendant could reasonably anticipate.'

Section 648, Title 37, Code, is as follows:

'Street and other railroad companies shall be required to keep their tracks in repair, using such rails as may be prescribed, and shall maintain and keep in repair the streets between their rails and for eighteen inches on each side, in such manner as the council may prescribe. Any public utility using the streets of the city or town shall at all times, in a manner prescribed by the council, render the use of such streets safe to vehicles and to persons, and all tracks on such street shall, when required by the council, be placed at any fixed grade, and changed, free of expense to the municipality, when found necessary.'

The city council is not shown to have made any requirements or complaint as to the crossing. In the absence of such requirements this statute imposed no new or different obligation on railroads. Southern Ry. Co. v. Qillen, 250 Ala. 536, 35 So.2d 193.

Section 173, Title 48, Code, has been interpreted to mean that 'when injury is shown by a railroad, the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, and that the burden is then shifted to the railroad to rebut or overcome said prima facie case by introducing evidence sufficient to dispute or overcome the said prima facie case of the plaintiff. This may be done by undisputed facts sufficient to rebut the prima facie case, and, when so done, would entitle the defendant to the affirmative charge. On the other hand, if the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case and in doing so does not acquit the defendant of negligence or does not also show sufficient evidence to take the negligence to the jury, and this was all, the plaintiff would be entitled to the general charge.' Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Green, 222 Ala. 557, 133 So. 294, 295.

Since the statute has been enacted to read as it now appears in section 173, supra, the burden is on railroads to acquit themselves of negligence (not only in respect to the preceding sections) for killing or injuring persons or stock by trains at any place on its tracks. The same rule now applies to both persons and stock. Ex parte Southern Ry. Co., 181 Ala. 486, 61...