Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. H. Altman & Co.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1914
• Docket Number: 331
• Citation: 191 Ala. 429,67 So. 589
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO. v. H. ALTMAN & CO. et al.

67 So. 589

191 Ala. 429

ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN R. CO. v. H. ALTMAN & CO. et al.

No. 331

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 7, 1914

Rehearing Denied Dec. 17, 1914

Appeal from Tuscaloosa County Court; Henry B. Foster, Judge.

Action by Drewry, Hughes & Co. against the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company. The complaint was amended by substituting H. Altman & Co. and others as plaintiffs, for use of Drewry Hughes & Co. From a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

A.G. &amp E.D. Smith, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Oliver Verner & Rice, of Tuscaloosa, for appellees.

DE GRAFFENRIED, J.

In this case Drewry, Hughes & Co., a corporation, sold to a large number of people separate lots of cotton cloth. Each purchase was independent of, and had no connection whatever with, any other purchase. Indeed, the several purchasers lived in different states, and had no connection with each other. Drewry, Hughes & Co. bought the cloth which it sold to these purchasers from a cotton mill at Cottondale, and the cotton mill, acting under the orders of Drewry, Hughes & Co. shipped the goods, in separate, distinct lots, to such purchasers. Each purchaser's goods were put in a separate package, his name was marked upon the package, and a bill of lading was taken from the railroad, in his name, for his goods. The goods were all put in one car by the Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company, and before the car containing the goods left Cottondale the car containing the goods, and the goods, were destroyed by fire.

1. When the goods were delivered by the cotton mill to the railroad company, and were by the railroad company accepted for transportation, they were not the goods of Drewry, Hughes &amp Co., but were the goods of the several, distinct consignees. Each purchaser, upon the delivery of his goods to the railroad company for shipment to him and the issuance, by the railroad company, of the bill of lading in his name for his goods, became the owner of such goods. The title to the goods was in him, and for their loss or destruction while in transit he alone had the right to sue. The casualties incident to the transportation of the goods from Cottondale to the point of their destination were matters with which the consignee alone was concerned. Jones v. Sims. 6 Port. 138; Southern Express Co. v. Armstead, 50 Ala. 350; M. & G.R.R. Co. v. Williams, 54 Ala. 168; S. & N.A.R.R. Co. v. Woods, 72 Ala. 451; 2 Mayf.Dig. p. 621, and the authorities cited on that page.

2. When, therefore, the goods were destroyed, each separate consignee had a separate, independent cause of action against the railroad company for the destruction of his goods, provided, of course, their loss is to be attributed to the actionable fault of the railroad company. The separate consignees had, of course, no joint right of action against the railroad company, because the purchases were separate, and the shipments were separate. It is therefore plain that the consignees, as they had no joint right of action against the railroad company, had no right to join in one suit, in a law court, against the railroad company, for their separate losses.

For his particular loss each consignee had only his independent, separate right of action.

In the case of Childress v. McCullough, 5 Port. 54, 30 Am.Dec. 549, this court, through Goldthwaite, J., said:

"It is a well-recognized rule that courts of law will not take cognizance of distinct and separate claims, or liabilities of several persons in one suit, though standing in the same relative situations."

The above rule has not, in this state, been changed by statute or decision.

3. In so far as the rights of the parties to this litigation are concerned, we may as well say, at this point, that, as a matter of law, Drewry, Hughes & Co. under the amended complaint are shown to be clothed with no more rights than they would have possessed if they had not sold the goods to the various consignees. The consignees had ordered the goods of Drewry, Hughes & Co., and, when that company delivered the goods to the railroad company, and the railroad company issued to the various consignees bills of lading in their respective names for the goods, Drewry, Hughes & Co. had performed all of the duties which they owed the consignees, and the consignees were the absolute owners of the goods.

Of course, there may have resided in Drewry, Hughes & Co., under certain conditions which are of no value here, the right of stoppage in transitu, but, in so far as this case is concerned, Drewry, Hughes & Co. occupy the same relation to the railroad company as if they had not sold the goods, and, after their destruction, had bought the separate rights of action which existed in favor of each consignee--if the goods were destroyed under such circumstances as rendered the railroad company liable for their loss--against the railroad company.

4. This court has not departed from the common-law rule that, except in certain well-recognized exceptions to the general rule, an assignee of a chose in action must ordinarily, at law, sue in the name of the assignor. There is not, as was pointed out in Birmingham Railway, Light & Power Co. v. AEtna Accident &amp Liability Co., 64 So. 44, under the terms of sections 2490 and 3667 of the Code of 1907, much reason left for the enforcement of the above rule; but the rule, never having been expressly changed by statute, still obtains in this state. It has not been changed by decision. B.R., L. & P. Co., v. AEtna Accident & L. Co., supra; Ex parte Bromberg, 121 Ala....