Alabama Great Southern Railway Company v. Thompson

Decision Date02 January 1906
Docket NumberNo. 58,58
Citation50 L.Ed. 441,26 S.Ct. 161,200 U.S. 206
PartiesALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. H. C. THOMPSON, Administrator of Florence James, Deceased
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Messrs. Edward Colston, Judson Harmon, Edmund F. Trabue, A. W. Goldsmith, and George Hoadly for the railway company.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 206-209 intentionally omitted] Messrs. E. S. Daniels, J. V. Williams, and John O. Benson for Thompson, administrator.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 209-211 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Day delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is here on a certificate from the United States circuit court of appeals for the sixth circuit. The certificate states the facts and propounds the questions as follows:

'This was an action in tort, brought by the administrator of Florence James for the negligent killing of the intestate by the defendant railroad company.

'The suit was started in a circuit court of the state of Tennessee, and a declaration was there filed.

'The plaintiff was a citizen of Tennessee.

'The defendants were the Alabama Great Southern Railway Company, a corporation organized under the laws of Alabama, and William H. Mills and Edgar Fuller, both citizens of the state of Tennessee.

'The case was then removed into the court below upon petition of the railroad company alone, upon the ground that a separable controversy, involving more than $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, existed between the petitioner and the plaintiff, as to whom diversity of citizenship existed, which could be tried out without the presence of either of the individual codefendants of petitioner.

'A motion to remand to the state court because no removable separable controversy appeared was overruled.

'Thereupon an issue was made and the case heard by court and jury, and a judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and against the railroad company alone.

'From this judgment the railroad company sued out this writ of error.

'Upon the hearing in this court, the court raised the question as to whether the court below had rightfully acquired jurisdiction by the removal proceedings referred to, the removal being grounded only upon the question of separable controversy appearing upon the face of the declaration of the plaintiff at the time of the application for removal.

'That declaration substantially averred that the intestate of the plaintiff had been negligently, wrongfully, and carelessly run over while upon the track of the railroad company, in the exercise of due care, by an engine and train of cars owned and operated by the railroad company, which said train was, at the time, under the management and control of the individual defendants, William H. Mills, as conductor, and Edgar Fuller, as engineer.

'Entertaining giave doubt as to whether a joint right of action was stated against the railroad company and the two individual defendants, who were servants of the railroad company, it is ordered that the foregoing statement be certified to the Supreme Court, and that the instruction of that court be requested for the proper decision of the following questions which arise upon the record:

'1. May a railroad corporation be jointly sued with two of its servants, one the conductor and the other the engineer of one of its trains, when it is sought to make the corporation liable only by reason of the negligent act of its said conductor and engineer in the operation of a train under their management and control, and solely upon the ground of the responsibility of a principal for the act of his servant, though not personally present or directing, and not charged with any concurrent act of negligence?

'Is such a suit removable by the corporation, as a separable controversy, when the amount involved exceeds $2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and the requisite diversity of citizenship exists between the said company and the plaintiff, the citizenship of the individual defendants sued with the company as joint tort-feasors being identical with that of the plaintiff?'

A question certified must be one the answer to which is to aid the court in determining a case before it. Columbus Watch Co. v. Robbins, 148 U. S. 266, 37 L. ed. 445, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594. And it is evident that the matter to be determined in the case pending, desiring which the opinion of this court is asked, is the removability of the case brought in the state court against the railroad company and the individual defendants. We shall answer the questions in that view.

The right to remove the controversy is founded upon § 2 of the act of March 3, 1887 [24 Stat. at L. 553, chap. 373], as corrected August 13, 1888 (1 U. S. Rev. Stat. Supp. 611, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 509). It is therein provided, among other things, 'and when, in any suit mentioned in this section, there shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different states, and which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the circuit court of the United States for the proper district.'

The case was removed upon the theory that it contains a separable controversy between the nonresident railroad company and the plaintiff. The removal act of 1875 [18 Stat. at L. 470, chap. 137], as amended in 1887-88, in the part quoted above as to separable controversies, has been the subject of frequent adjudication in this court. Independent of statute, there is much conflict in the authorities as to whether a corporation whose liability does not arise from an act of concurrence or direction on its part, but solely as a result of the relation of master and servant, may be jointly sued with the servant whose negligent conduct directly caused the injury. In a leading case in this court (Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S. 131, 45 L. ed. 121, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 67), many of the cases were reviewed by the chief justice who delivered the opinion, and it was shown that in a number of English and American cases it has been held that, as to third persons, the master is responsible for the negligence of his servant in a joint action against both, to recover damages for an injury. In the case of Warax v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. 72 Fed. 637, a case which has been much cited and sometimes followed in the Federal courts, it was held that a joint action could not be sustained against master and servant for acts done without the master's concurrence or direction, when his responsibility arises wholly from the policy of the law, which requires that he shall be held liable for the acts of those he employs in the prosecution of his business. And it was held that the petition against the engineer and the company presented a case of misjoinder, and could be removed on the application of the nonresident company.

In the case of Powers v. Chesapeake & O. R. Co. 169 U. S. 92, 42 L. ed. 673, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 264, 265, suit was brought against a railroad company and several of its servants for an injury alleged to have been caused by the joint negligence of all. Mr. Justice Gray, delivering the opinion of the court, said:

'It is well settled that an action of tort, which might have been brought against many persons or against any one or more of them, and which is brought in a state court against all jointly, contains no separate controversy which will authorize its removal by some of the defendants into the circuit court of the United States, even if they file separate answers and set up different defenses from the other defendants, and allege that they are not jointly liable with them, and that their own controversy with the plaintiff is a separate one; for, as this court has often said, 'a defendant has no right to say that an action shall be several which the plaintiff seeks to make joint. A separate defense may defeat a joint recovery, but it cannot deprive a plaintiff of his right to prosecute his suit to final decision in his own way. The cause of action is the subject-matter of the controversy, and that is, for all the purposes of the suit, whatever the plaintiff declares it to be in his pleadings.' Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, 43, 29 L. ed. 331, 332, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161; Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 275, 29 L. ed. 899, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Little v. Giles, 118 U. S. 596, 600, 601, 30 L. ed. 269-271, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 33 L. ed. 474, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203; Torrence v. Shedd, 144 U. S. 527, 530, 36 L. ed. 528, 531, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726; Connell v. Smiley, 156 U. S. 335, 340, 39 L. ed. 443, 444, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 353.'

After thus stating the rule, the justice commented on the Warax Case, 72 Fed. 637, as a departure from the former ruling of the circuit court. And while the Powers Case was decided on the ground of the right to remove after the local defendants had been dismissed from the action by the plaintiff, it is patent from the language just quoted from the opinion that, conceding the misjoinder of cause of action appeared on the face of the petition, that fact was not decisive of the right of the nonresident defendant to remove the action to the Federal court.

And in Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wangelin, 132 U. S. 599, 600, 33 L. ed. 474, 475, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 203, the same eminent judge, speaking for the court, said:

'It often has been decided that an action brought in a state court against two jointly for a tort cannot be removed by either of them into the circuit court of the United States, under the act of March 3, 1875, chap. 137, § 2, upon the ground of a separable controversy between the plaintiff and himself, although the defendants have pleaded severally, and the plaintiff might have brought the action against either alone. 18 Stat. at L. 471, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 508; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 U. S. 41, 29 L. ed. 331, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1034, 1161; ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
366 cases
  • George Weston, Ltd. v. N.Y. Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)
    • October 8, 1935
    ...Ed. 355; Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457, 25 L. Ed. 593; Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Pechner, supra; Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U. S. 206, 26 S. Ct. 161, 50 L. Ed. 441, 4 Ann. Cas. 1147; Wilson v. Oswego Township, 151 U. S. 56, 14 S. Ct. 259, 38 L. Ed. 70, 71; Chicago & Alton R. Co. v.......
  • Self v. General Motors Corp., 75-1572
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit)
    • March 30, 1978
    ...in the same fashion that Mottley applies to the federal question requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Alabama Great Southern Ry. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 26 S.Ct. 161, 50 L.Ed. 441 (1906), a diversity case, the Supreme Court read Powers and Whitcomb to mean that "the right to remove depend......
  • Pullman Co v. Jenkins 13 8212 14, 1938, 210
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • January 16, 1939
    ...no question that the Pullman Company would not have been entitled to remove. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co. v. Dixon, supra; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Thompson, supra; Hay v. May Department Stores Company, We think that the fact that the Pullman porter was sued by a fictitious name did not......
  • Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Abernathy
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Alabama
    • June 30, 1916
    ...... 5 Div. 587 Supreme Court of Alabama June 30, 1916 . . On. Rehearing, ... Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company and others, for. damages for personal injury. ...70 [74 P. 1064];. A.G.S. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206 [26 Sup.Ct. 161, 50. L.Ed. 441, 4 ... Wood's conclusion was that:. . . "A great part of the confusion arose from the credit. ... brought against a railway company and its conductor, for the. act of the ... . "I should certainly agree with Southern Ry. Co. v. Arnold, 162 Ala. 570 [[[50 So. 293]. ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Removal Jurisdiction Over Mass Actions
    • United States
    • University of Whashington School of Law University of Washington Law Review No. 90-1, September 2020
    • Invalid date
    ...at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2014). 248. 13F Wright et al., supra note 32, § 3641.1. 249. Id. 250. Id. 251. Ala. Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 128 (1906). 252. In re Avandia, 2014 WL 2011597, at *3 (quoting Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)). 253. 13F W......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT