ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RR CO. v. Johnson
Decision Date | 27 June 2003 |
Citation | 874 So.2d 517 |
Parties | ALABAMA GREAT SOUTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY and Norfolk Southern Railway Company v. Richard JOHNSON. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Crawford S. McGivaren, Jr., and Steve A. Tucker of Cabaniss, Johnston, Gardner, Dumas & O'Neal, Birmingham; and Walter Griess of Griess & Shaw, Eutaw, for appellants.
W. Lee Pittman of Pittman, Hooks, Dutton, Kirby & Hellums, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.
Richard Johnson and his wife, Winnie Johnson, sued Norfolk Southern Corporation; 1 Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("NSR"); Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company ("AGS"), a wholly owned subsidiary of NSR; Maurice Weldon, a conductor for AGS; and Thomas J. Archer, an engineer for AGS. Richard Johnson sought damages on claims of negligence and wantonness arising from injuries he sustained when his vehicle was struck at a railroad crossing by a train owned and operated by NSR and AGS and subsequently identified as "train W96." Johnson's wife asserted a derivative loss-of-consortium claim.2
In their respective answers, NSR, AGS, Weldon, and Archer denied "each and every material averment of [the Johnsons' complaint]" and asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; that Richard Johnson was "guilty of negligence in and about the manner in which he was operating his vehicle and that such negligence on his part proximately contributed to cause his damages"; and that Richard Johnson was "guilty of negligence in and about the manner in which he was operating his vehicle and that such negligence on his part was the sole proximate cause of his injuries." The defendants filed a motion for a summary judgment seeking a summary judgment as to all claims, but, in the alternative, a partial summary judgment as to the Johnsons' claims that the defendants were negligent and wanton (1) in that train W96 should have been traveling at a slower speed, because, they say, this claim was preempted by federal law; (2) in that NSR or AGS should have installed additional warning signs, signals, or devices at the railroad crossing where the accident occurred, because, they say, this claim was also preempted by federal law; and (3) in NSR's and AGS's training of the crews of either train W96 or another train present at the crossing, "train A56." The Johnsons filed a response to the summary-judgment motion and stipulated to the dismissal of the following claims: any claim that train W96 should have been traveling at a slower speed; any claim that NSR and AGS should have installed any additional warnings, signs, signals, or devices at the crossing where the accident occurred; and any claim that NSR and AGS were negligent or wanton in training the crews of train W96 and train A56. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order; that order stated, in pertinent part:
The Johnsons dismissed Weldon and Archer without prejudice immediately before trial, and the case proceeded to trial against NSR and AGS on the remaining claims of negligence and wantonness. At the close of the Johnsons' evidence, NSR and AGS filed a joint motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML"), which asserted, among other things, that Richard Johnson's own negligence proximately caused the accident, that the Johnsons' claims were preempted by federal law, and that there was insufficient evidence that NSR and AGS were guilty of negligence or wantonness. The trial court granted the motion "as to the count of wantonness." At the close of all evidence, NSR and AGS renewed their motion for a JML, on the same grounds previously asserted. The renewed motion was denied, and the case was submitted to the jury on the remaining claim of negligence.
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Richard Johnson. The trial court entered a judgment on the jury's verdict; that judgment stated in pertinent part, (Capitalization in original; emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, NSR and AGS jointly filed a renewed motion for a JML, or, in the alternative, a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment and for a stay of the judgment. The renewed motion for a JML asserted the same grounds as the two previous JML motions. The motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment sought only to amend the judgment to substitute NSR for Norfolk Southern Corporation, against which the judgment had been erroneously entered. The trial court denied the renewed JML motion, but granted the motion to amend the judgment and ordered the judgment stayed upon the posting of appropriate security.
NSR and AGS appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to grant their motions for a JML because, they say, (1) there was no substantial evidence of any negligence on their part; (2) Johnson was violating a traffic law when the accident occurred and was, therefore, unquestionably negligent, and his negligence was a proximate cause, if not the sole proximate cause, of the collision made the basis of this action; and (3) federal law preempted any duty on the part of NSR and AGS to provide additional warning, such as, for example, a flagman, of an approaching train at a crossing where the mechanical signal devices were working properly and the approaching train's horn was being properly sounded.
Our standard of review of a motion for a JML is well-settled:
I.C.U. Investigations, Inc. v. Jones, 780 So.2d 685, 688 (Ala.2000).
On February 27, 1999, a through-freight train3 owned by AGS, designated as train W96, collided with a truck driven by Richard Johnson at the intersection of AGS's mainline railroad track and Constantine Road in Boligee. There were four sets of tracks at this intersection, running north and south, but only three sets intersected Constantine Road, which ran east and west. A motorist traveling west on Constantine Road, as Johnson was doing on February 27, would come first to the "siding track." In succession, the motorist would encounter, and pass over if a safe traverse of the crossing was accomplished, the "mainline track" and then the "house track." The "siding track" was used by local-freight trains in the "switching" process; the "mainline track" was used by trains traveling between Meridian, Mississippi, and Birmingham, Alabama; and the "house track" was used as a storage track. The "proper track," another storage track, branched off the siding track to the east of the crossing and did not intersect Constantine Road. The crossing was equipped with crossbucks,4 automatically activated flashing lights and an automatically activated bell, pavement markings, and "no passing zone" signs. As they did in the trial court, NSR and AGS assert in their brief to this Court that federal moneys had been used to install the passive warning devices, i.e., the crossbucks, the pavement markings, and the "no passing zone" signs and that, therefore, Johnson's state-law claims are preempted by federal law. Specifically, in their brief they state:
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