Alabama Mineral R. Co. v. Jones

• Decision Date: 04 February 1897
• Citation: 114 Ala. 519,21 So. 507
• Parties: ALABAMA MINERAL R. CO. v. JONES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

21 So. 507

114 Ala. 519

ALABAMA MINERAL R. CO. v. JONES.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 4, 1897

Appeal from circuit court, Shelby county; George E. Brewer, Judge.

Action by Mary A. Jones, administratrix, against the Alabama Mineral Railroad Company, for the death of her husband and intestate. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

For prior report, see 18 So. 30.

Plaintiff's intestate was a section hand on the defendant's railroad and W. A. Scott was the section foreman or boss for the defendant at the section at which the plaintiff's intestate was at work. The defendant's evidence tended to show that as the two hand cars were going over the trestle abutting the railroad bridge crossing the Coosa river, where the accident occurred, Scott, the section boss, who was riding on the first car, instructed the men on his car to stop the car, and also signaled the car upon which the plaintiff's intestate was riding, and which was following immediately upon the car upon which the section boss was that thereupon John Woods, who was on the first car, put on the brakes, and stopped the car instantly, and one Guy, who was on the car with the defendant, applied the brakes on said car, and tried to stop it, but was unable to do so before the collision.

Upon the introduction of all the evidence, the court, at the request of the plaintiff, gave to the jury the following written charges: (1) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Scott, the section boss of the defendant ordered the section hands to run the two hand cars across the bridge, and that said section hands, in compliance with said order, started across the bridge with said hand cars, one following fifteen or twenty feet behind the other, and that while on the trestle, after crossing the bridge, said Scott was on the front car and made a sign for the hands on said hand car to stop or check up, without first ordering the rear car to check up or giving those on said rear car sufficient notice of his intention to check up the front car, and that immediately, as soon as those on the rear car discovered the checking of the front car, one of the hands on the rear car suddenly put on the brake of said car, and that this was the best thing to do under the circumstances in order to avoid a collision between the two cars, and that plaintiff's intestate, John Jones, was on said rear car at the time, and that he was at his post in discharge of his duty beside one of the handles of the lever, with his hands upon the same working it in order to propel the car, and that said putting on of the brake snatched the handle out of his hands, and that, before he was enabled to recover it, the rear car ran into the front car, and thereby threw the said John Jones to the ground and killed him, then they must find for the plaintiff." (2) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Scott, the section boss of defendant, ordered the section hands to run the hand cars across the bridge, and that said section hands, in compliance with said order started across the bridge with said hand cars, one following the other 15 to 25 feet behind the other, and that while on the trestle, after crossing the bridge, the said Scott, who was on the front car, made a sign to the hands on that car to put on the brake and check up without first ordering the rear car to check up, or giving those on said rear car sufficient notice of his intentions to check the front car, and that immediately, as soon as those on the rear car discovered the checking of the front car, one of the hands on the rear car suddenly put on the brake of said car, and that that was the best thing to do under the circumstances, in order to avoid a collision of the front car, and that plaintiff's intestate, John Jones, was on said rear car at the time, and that he was at his post of duty, beside one of the handles of the lever, with his hands upon the same, working it in order to propel the car, and that said putting on of the brakes snatched the handles out of his hands, and that before he was able to recover it the rear car ran into the front car, and thereby threw said John Jones to the ground and killed him then they must find for the plaintiff." (3) "If the jury believe from the evidence that John Jones came to his death by reason of section foreman Scott's negligently and carelessly causing his car to be checked up without sufficient notice to those on the rear car, and that by reason of this the rear car collided with the front car, and that said John Jones was thrown out of said rear car and killed, and that he did nothing that contributed proximately to his death, then the jury must find for the plaintiff; which said charge the court gave, and to the giving of which said charge the defendant then and there duly, separately, and legally excepted." (4) "The court charges the jury that, if they believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in this cause, she is entitled to recover an amount equal to the present cash value, or pecuniary value, of John Jones' life to his family dependent on him during his expectancy of life." (5) "The court charges the jury that if they believe from the evidence that John Jones, at the time of his death, was in good health and of sober habits, and was 48 years of age, that his expectancy of life was as much as eighteen years." (6) "If the jury believe from the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, she is entitled to recover an amount equal to John Jones' pecuniary worth to his family who were dependent upon him from the time of his death to this time, added to the present cash value of his pecuniary worth to his said family during the balance of his expectancy of life." (7) "If there is a conflict in the evidence, then the jury may look to the opportunities and means of knowledge of the various witnesses in determining which of them they will believe." (8) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Bill Scott was section boss, and that John Jones was one of the hands in the employ of said Bill Scott, and that said Bill Scott had control of the running of the two hand cars spoken of by witness, and that while crossing the bridge over the Coosa river, in accordance with his orders, at a great rate of speed, and that said hand cars were running in about 15 or 20 feet apart, and that, just after the two cars had crossed the iron part of the bridge, he gave a signal to the hands on the front car to check up, without first giving warning to those on the rear car, and if they further believe from the evidence that, at the time said Bill Scott gave a signal to those on the front car, Woods put his foot on the brake and checked it up, and if they further believe from the evidence that the checking of the front car caused Guy to put his foot on the brakes of the second car, and that the handles of the lever was jerked out of John Jones' hands by the putting the brake by Guy, and that said rear car ran into the front car and threw John Jones to the ground and killed him, then the jury must find for the plaintiff." (9) "If the jury believe from the evidence that at the time John Jones was killed he was in the employ of the Alabama Mineral R. R. Company, and that said Bill Scott was the foreman or section boss, and that deceased was on a hand car at the time of the accident, and if they further believe that said hand cars were operated under the directions of said Bill Scott, and that said Bill Scott told the deceased and the other hands to go over the Coosa river bridge as fast as they could, and that in compliance with said orders the hands started across the bridge at a great rate of speed, and that they were running about 15 or 20 feet apart, and that just after they passed the iron part of the bridge the said Bill Scott waved his hand to those on the front car to slow up, and that John Woods at once placed his foot on the brake of the front car and checked it up, and if they further believe that Lee Benson, as soon as John Woods put his foot on the brake, waved to the hindmost car to check up, and that Guy at once placed his foot on the brake, and if they further believe that the placing of Guy's foot on the brake suddenly checked the speed of the car, jerked the handle of the lever out of John Jones' hand, and if they further believe that before he could recover and get hold of the handle the hindmost car ran into the front car, and threw John Jones off and he was killed, then the plaintiff is entitled to damages." (11) "The jury may look to the opportunities of the witnesses for observing and knowing the facts which they may testify about in determining which witnesses they will believe."

To the giving of each of these charges the defendant separately excepted, and also separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of the following charges requested by it: (1) "If the jury believe the evidence, they will find for the defendant." (2) "If the jury believe from the evidence that said front car upon which said W. A Scott was riding was not stopped, or its speed checked suddenly, while crossing the Coosa river bridge, without notifying those on the car behind of its intention to stop, then they must find for the defendant." (3) "If the jury believe from the evidence that said cars were not run over said river at same time and at a great rate of speed, and that said front car was not stopped suddenly or its speed checked while both cars were going at a high rate of speed, and without first ordering the hindmost car to stop, and without notifying those on the hindmost car of the intention to stop, then they must find for the defendant." (4) "If the jury believe from the evidence that Scott, before or at the time of checking the speed of...