Alabama Pipe Co. v. Wofford

• Decision Date: 11 May 1950
• Docket Number: 7 Div. 40
• Citation: Alabama Pipe Co. v. Wofford, 253 Ala. 610, 46 So.2d 404 (Ala. 1950)
• Parties: ALABMA PIPE CO. v. WOFFORD et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 404

46 So.2d 404

253 Ala. 610

ALABMA PIPE CO. v. WOFFORD et al.

7 Div. 40.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 11, 1950.

Lusk, Swann & Burns, Gadsden, for appellant.

Hawkins & Copeland, Gadsden, for appellees.

SIMPSON, Justice.

Suit under the Workmen's Compensation Law, Code 1940, Tit. 26, § 253 et seq., by appellee for the death of her husband, as an employee of appellant company, allegedly caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.

The trial court found that the deceased's death was due to 'an accident * * * which arose out of, from, and in the course of his employment * * * by then and there becoming overheated while engaged in the performance of his duties for defendant,' resulting in a heart attack, which was brought on 'by the condition of overheating, combined with the strenuous and fast labor performed by the deceased.'

Compensation is not limited in such cases to those in perfect health, the test within the meaning of the Compensation Act being, was the accident a proximate contributing cause acting upon the particular individual to produce death, whether directly or through disease. New River Coal Co. v. Files, 215 Ala. 64, 109 So. 360; Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, 249 Ala. 115, 30 So.2d 10.

It is not controverted that death resulted while deceased was in the employ of defendant, the inquiry being whether or not the conditions of employment and the death resulting were such as to make it an accident arising out of employment within the meaning of the law. If the hazard of accident 'was peculiar to the employment as a contributing cause' and flowed from that as a rational consequence, it was within the protective scope of the statute. American Fuel & Clay Products Co. v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 44, 127 So. 540, 541.

The following statement of principle is regarded as settled law and governing in this jurisdiction in such cases: '* * * the harmful condition does arise out of the employment, if, in the performance of the duties for which he was engaged, in the manner required or contemplated by the employer, it is necessary for the employee to expose himself to a danger, materially in excess of that to which people commonly in that locality are exposed, when not situated as he is when thus performing his service, and that such excessive exposure may be found to have been the direct cause of the injury, though operating upon other conditions of common exposure. American Fuel & Clay Products Co. v. Gilbert, 221 Ala. 44, 127 So. 540; Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 44 S.Ct. 153, 68 L.Ed. 366, 30 A.L.R. 532.' Gulf States Steel Co. v. Christison, 228 Ala. 622, 628, 154 So. 565, 569; Gadsden Iron Works v. Beasley, supra.

As stated, the deceased's death did occur in the course of his employment and we think there is some support in the evidence that by reason of the conditions in the pipe plant, where he worked, he was exposed to a danger materially in excess of that to which people commonly in the locality were exposed. But the critical question is whether or not this excessive exposure was the direct cause of his death, even though operating on other conditions of common exposure. We are forced to the conclusion that there is a total lack of evidence to support this last essential for a recovery.

The proof showed: The deceased, of the age of fifty-three years and weighing about 190 pounds, who had never suffered any sickness before and who had never been attended by a doctor, was acting as one of the 'shake-out men' in the pipe manufacturing plant, which work required considerable physical labor under conditions of overheating in the plant; that the work being accomplished was that normally performed by the other employees, and, after a rest period of some forty-five minutes, on resumption of work, in about fifteen or twenty minutes without warning deceased collapsed and died almost instantly; the coroner, of six years' experience, who was also an undertaker of twenty-five years' experience, thought the defendant died of a heart attack. Boiled down, this was all the proof showed. There was no autopsy or medical testimony. Conceding for the present purpose and without deciding that the coroner was shown to be sufficiently qualified to testify as regards this pathological proposition, viz., that deceased died of a heart attack, there is no evidence to prove that the deceased's work under these circumstances produced the heart attack which resulted in his death. Or, otherwise stated, from aught appearing his death might have been due to natural causes, as was stated in the undertaker's certificate of death, apart from any conditions of hazard in his employment.

The burden rested on the claimant to prove by...