Alabama Power Co. v. Maddox, 7 Div. 203.

Citation151 So. 575,227 Ala. 628
Decision Date12 October 1933
Docket Number7 Div. 203.
PartiesALABAMA POWER CO. v. MADDOX.
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama

Rehearing Granted Dec. 21, 1933.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Etowah County; Woodson J. Martin, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injury by M. A. Maddox against the Alabama Power Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals.

Reversed and remanded on rehearing.

Roger C. Suttle and O. R. Hood, both of Gadsden, for appellant.

McCord & McCord, of Gadsden, for appellee.

BROWN Justice.

This is an action on the case by a passenger against the appellant, a common carrier of passengers, to recover damages for personal injuries, alleged to have been inflicted on the plaintiff as a proximate consequence of the negligence of defendant, or its agents or servants.

The first count, after alleging matters of inducement and the character and extent of plaintiff's injuries, avers "all of which injuries and damages he avers were proximately caused by this negligence of the defendant corporation, to wit: Defendant negligently failed to use reasonable care and diligence to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe means of egress from said car, to his full damages as aforesaid, for which he now sues." (Italics supplied.)

The second count adopts the averments of the first as to matters of inducement and the character and extent of the injuries and avers: "All of which injuries and damages he avers were proximately caused by this negligence of the agents and servants of the defendant who were in charge of the operation of said car and while acting within the scope and line of their duties of service to defendant in this: Said servants and agents of the defendant then and there acting for the defendant as aforesaid negligently caused or allowed the doors of said car to come together upon plaintiff's hand and he sustained the injuries and damages complained of, and for which he now sues," etc.

The averments of the two counts are materially different. While the first count charges negligence in general terms, it sets up a standard of duty on the part of the defendant to use only "reasonable care and diligence to provide plaintiff with" a reasonably safe means of exit.

The charge of negligence in the second count is specific "Said servants and agents of the defendant then and there acting for the defendant as aforesaid negligently caused or allowed the doors of said car to come together upon plaintiff's hand." The second count does not set up any standard of duty, but left the court free to apply the standard fixed by law, i. e., "the highest degree of care and diligence which is known to careful, diligent, and skillful persons engaged in such business." Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Robertson, 203 Ala. 358, 359, 83 So. 102, 103; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Bowen, 212 Ala. 690, 103 So. 872; Southern Railway Co. v. Burgess, 143 Ala. 364, 42 So. 35; Montgomery & Eufaula Railway Co. v. Mallette, 92 Ala. 209, 9 So. 363; Gadsden & Attalla Union Railway Co. v. Causler, 97 Ala. 235, 12 So. 439; Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Robinson, 183 Ala. 265, 62 So. 813; Southern Railway Co. v. Cunningham, 152 Ala. 147, 44 So. 658; B'ham Ry., L. & P. Co. v. Barrett, 179 Ala. 274, 60 So. 262, 263.

This condition of the pleadings made it difficult for the court to charge the jury, without treating ...

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