Alabama Power Co. v. Owens

• Decision Date: 12 May 1938
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 26.
• Citation: 236 Ala. 96,181 So. 283
• Parties: ALABAMA POWER CO. v. OWENS.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

181 So. 283

236 Ala. 96

ALABAMA POWER CO. v. OWENS.

4 Div. 26.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 12, 1938

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; D. C. Halstead, Judge.

Action for wrongful death by Agnes Owens, as administratrix of the estate of Robert Owens, deceased, against the Alabama Power Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Reversed and remanded.

E. C Glover, of Abbeville, J. N. Mullins, of Dothan, and Martin Turner & McWhorter and J. C. Blakey, all of Birmingham, for appellant.

Halstead & Smith, of Headland, and Martin & Jackson, of Dothan, for appellee.

BOULDIN Justice.

Count A of the complaint, on which the trial was had, charged that defendant, a public utility, was engaged in furnishing electrical energy for domestic purposes to residences in Abbeville, that plaintiff's intestate was a customer that it was the duty of defendant to furnish the home of the deceased for lighting purposes electrical current of approximately 110 volts, and that defendant breached said duty in that, through its servants or employees, acting within the scope of employment, defendant negligently furnished to plaintiff's intestate for lighting his home a current of electricity far in excess of 110 volts and greatly dangerous to human life, and as a proximate result of said negligence plaintiff's intestate was killed.

This count meets all the requirements of the well settled rule that the duty of care being shown a general averment of negligence is sufficient. Where the duty of care depends on the place where the injury was received, as in American Ry. Express Co. et al. v. Reid, 216 Ala. 479, 113 So. 507, the averment of place is one of the elements disclosing such duty. Here, the averments sufficiently disclose that the deceased came in contact with this dangerous current furnished to his home.

The specific location in his home, and the details of the fatal contact, were matters of evidence. Moreover, the fact that this contact was in his home, and this was known to the local management at the time is without dispute in the evidence.

There was no error to reverse in overruling demurrers to count A.

The evidence disclosed that plaintiff's intestate came to his death by electrocution. About one o'clock P.M. on December 24th, he carried home a radio, and proceeded to connect the extension cord attached to the radio with another extension cord which he attached to the drop-light fixture in the room. When he took in his right hand the connecting fixture at the end of the extension cord from the radio, and in his left hand the connecting fixture on the extension cord from the drop-light, in order to connect the two, he received the fatal electric shock.

The plaintiff introduced evidence along the usual lines in such cases tending to show a current of 110 to 120 volts for lighting purposes will not kill an adult person, at least under ordinary conditions, as well as evidence of burns said by expert witnesses to indicate a higher voltage. Other evidence from witnesses and textwriters tended to show that under some conditions fatalities from such current do sometimes occur.

There was evidence tending to show no shock from attaching the fixture to the drop-light, the turning on of the light bulb just before the accident, the use of current soon after in heating pads for use in the attempt to resuscitate the deceased, and for lighting purposes, with other evidence of the effect of high voltage on such appliances; and still further evidence of the passing of the current through the body, closing a circuit through the two wires. In this connection evidence tended to show the wire was grounded at the radio through a short-circuit resulting from defective wiring of the radio.

Under the whole evidence, to be weighed and considered in all its tendencies, it was for the jury to find whether death resulted, under the special conditions, from the ordinary lighting current of 110 to 120 volts, or from a high voltage, more dangerous current, as charged in the complaint.

Any legal evidence, therefore, tending to show no such high voltage was passing over this light wire at the time, was relevant.

The evidence disclosed that the transformer of defendant, used to step down the current for this and neighboring residences was designed to reduce and send out over the wires to residences the usual lighting current, and over other wires a current of 220 to 240 volts for cooking and water heating purposes.

Whether this transformer was performing its proper functions stepping down the current going over the lighting wires to this residence was a material inquiry.

Touching the rulings on evidence offered by defendant on this line, we quote at length the statement of the trial Judge in passing upon the motion for new trial, as follows:

"In the trial of this case, Mr. Blakey, attorney for the defendant made the following statement to the court:

" 'We offer to show by this evidence (not by the witness then on the stand, who was defendant's witness, J. H. Carroll, see page 84 of transcript) that at seven P. M. of the day that Robert Owens met his death the transformer which was located across the street from the Robert Owens residence was performing its function which was to reduce the voltage of electricity from the primary voltage of approximately 23 or 2400 volts to approximately 120 volts, and that such transformer was in the same condition at

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