Alachua County v. Adams

• Decision Date: 25 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 96-257,96-257
• Citation: 677 So.2d 396
• Parties: 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1690 ALACHUA COUNTY, Florida, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, and the City of Gainesville, an Incorporated Municipality Within Alachua County, Florida, Appellants, v. Dwight ADAMS, Individually, as a Citizen and Taxpayer of Alachua County, Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 396

677 So.2d 396

21 Fla. L. Weekly D1690

ALACHUA COUNTY, Florida, a Political Subdivision of the State of Florida, and the City of Gainesville, an IncorporatedMunicipalityWithin Alachua County, Florida, Appellants, v.Dwight ADAMS, Individually, as a Citizen and Taxpayer of Alachua County, Florida, Appellee.

No. 96-257.

District Court of Appeal of Florida First District.

July 25, 1996.

Robert L. Nabors and Harry F. Chiles of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee, Special Counsel, for Appellants.

Marion J. Radson, Gainesville, for Appellant City of Gainesville.

Mary A. Marshall, Gainesville, for Appellant Alachua County.

Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, for Appellee.

BOOTH, Judge.

This cause is before us on appeal from a declaratory judgment holding chapter 94-487, Laws of Florida, to be an unconstitutional special act.We affirm.

The issue here is the validity of a special act permitting Alachua County to use tax revenues raised under a general law for a purpose not enumerated in (and, indeed, prohibited by) that general law.

Florida Statute section 212.055(2), a general law, authorizes Florida counties to levy an infrastructure surtax and use the proceeds therefrom for certain enumerated purposes.The statute expressly provides, however, that "[n]either the proceeds [of the surtax] nor any interest accrued thereto shall be used for operational expenses of any infrastructure...."

Chapter 94-487, Laws of Florida, a subsequently enacted special act, purported to expand section 212.055(2) to allow Alachua County and its municipalities to use the surtax revenues "for operation and maintenance of parks and recreation programs and facilities established with the proceeds of the surtax."

Under the authority of section 212.055(2) and chapter 94-487, Alachua County and its municipalities entered into an interlocal agreement to, inter alia, "provide for the dedication of the use of Surtax proceeds by the County and all municipalities within the County to the ... maintenance of recreation facilities and the provision and operation of recreation programs in the implementation of a countywide recreation partnership."

Taxpayer Adams disputed the constitutionality of chapter 94-487 and the interlocal agreement, and threatened to seek to enjoin Alachua County and the City of Gainesville from pursuing referendum approval of the surtax.¹Alachua County and the City of Gainesville consequently sought a declaratory judgment on the matter and, after briefing by the parties, the trial court held in pertinent part:

Defendant ADAMS has demonstrated that Chapter 94-487, Laws of Florida, is an unconstitutional special law that purports to authorize Alachua County to levy a sales surtax that has not been authorized by general law.Defendant ADAMS is thus entitled to a judgment on the pleadings.It is therefore ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that ... Chapter 94-487, Laws of Florida, is declared to be an unlawful special act of the Legislature which purports to amend Alachua County's power to levy the local government infrastructure surtax prescribed in Section 212.055(2), Florida Statutes, in violation of Article VIISection 1(a) Florida Constitution.

On appeal, Alachua County and the City of Gainesville draw a distinction between the power to tax and the power to spend, and argue that only the former must be authorized by general law under the Florida Constitution.²

Adams asserts that the power to spend is inextricably inherent in the power to tax under section 212.055(2); that any expansion of a county's power to spend is therefore a de facto expansion of its power to tax under the statute; and that under the Florida Constitution, any such expansion must therefore be by general law.

Appellants rely on Rowe v. Pinellas Sports Authority, 461 So.2d 72(Fla.1984), wherein a general law allowed Florida counties to levy a tourist development tax to "be pledged to secure and liquidate revenue bonds issued by the county for the purposes" of, inter alia, building stadiums.§ 125.0104, Fla. Stat.(1983)(emphasis added).A subsequent special act chartered the Pinellas Sports Authority ("PSA") and empowered Pinellas County to pledge non-ad valorem moneys (including revenues from the tourist development tax) to the payment of revenue bonds issued by the PSA.Rowe, 461 So.2d at 77.Pinellas County thereafter passed ordinances imposing the tourist development tax and, under a subsequent interlocal agreement to build a stadium with the City of St. Petersburg and the PSA, proceeds of the tax were committed to pay a portion of the debt service on bonds issued by the PSA.Certain taxpayers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, but the trial court entered a final judgment validating issuance of the bonds.

On direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the taxpayers argued, inter alia, that under the general law the county's tourist development tax revenues could not be pledged to pay off bonds issued by a governmental entity other than the county.The Florida Supreme Court in Rowe rejected this argument, holding (Rowe, 461 So.2d at 77):

When a special act (such as the PSA charter) and a general law conflict, the special act will prevail.Because ... the PSA charter was enacted by...