Alachua County v. Scharps, 1D02-3240.

• Decision Date: 12 September 2003
• Docket Number: No. 1D02-3240.,1D02-3240.
• Citation: 855 So.2d 195
• Parties: ALACHUA COUNTY, Florida and the Labor Party Just Health Care Committee, through its Chairman Mark Piotrowski and the Alachua County Labor Party, through its Co-chairs, Jennifer Brown and Mark Piotrowski, and Beverly Hill, the Supervisor of Elections, for Alachua County, Florida, Appellants, v. Howard J. SCHARPS, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

855 So.2d 195

ALACHUA COUNTY, Florida and the Labor Party Just Health Care Committee, through its Chairman Mark Piotrowski and the Alachua County Labor Party, through its Co-chairs, Jennifer Brown and Mark Piotrowski, and Beverly Hill, the Supervisor of Elections, for Alachua County, Florida, Appellants, v. Howard J. SCHARPS, Appellee.

No. 1D02-3240.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

September 12, 2003.

David Wagner, County Attorney, Gainesville; Robert L. Nabors, of Nabors, Giblin & Nickerson, P.A., Tallahassee; Andrea Costello and Alice K. Nelson, of Southern Legal Counsel, Inc., Gainesville, for Appellants.

Joseph W. Little, Gainesville, for Appellee.

WOLF, C.J.

Appellant, Alachua County Board of County Commissioners (the County), was the defendant in an injunctive and declaratory action brought by appellee, Howard J. Scharps. The County challenges a final judgment invalidating a resolution passed by the County which directed that a referendum be placed on the general election ballot. Appellant raises a number of issues, including whether appellee had taxpayer standing to challenge the County's authorization of the referendum. We find that appellee lacks standing; therefore, we reverse the decision of the trial court on this basis and decline to address the other issues raised by the County.

On July 11, 2000, the County adopted Resolution 00-55 (the resolution), and directed that the following non-binding question be placed on the November 8, 2000, Alachua County general election ballot:

UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE AND HEALTH INSURANCE TRUST FUND

Do you favor legislation to create a system of universal health care in Florida that provides all residents with comprehensive health care coverage (including the freedom to choose doctors and other health care professionals, facilities and services) and eliminates the role of health insurance companies in health care by creating a publicly administered health insurance trust fund? The trust fund would receive the funds presently going to the numerous health insurance companies throughout the state.

__________ Yes __________ No

On September 29, 2000, Scharps filed a second amended complaint (the complaint) for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief pursuant to Article V, Section 4 of the Florida Constitution and chapters 26 and 86 of the Florida Statutes. Regarding his standing, Scharps alleged the following:

3. Howard Scharps is resident, citizen and taxpayers [sic] of Alachua County, Florida and has been all times material hereto.

....

46. Plaintiff Scharps opposes the substance of the matter stated in the nonbinding referendum and objects on First Amendment and Florida Declaration of Rights grounds to Board's employment of the power and resources [sic] to the County and the State of Florida to promote one political point of view in the guise of a nonbinding referendum that does not pertain to the functions and powers of county government[.]

In count I of the complaint, Scharps sought a declaratory judgment that the resolution was invalid because the County had no power under section 125.01, Florida Statutes (2000), or Article III of the Florida Constitution, to conduct a referendum to determine elector sentiment on the issue of universal health care. In count II of the complaint, Scharps alleged violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Rights in Article I of the Florida Constitution. Scharps sought injunctive relief to either keep the referendum off the November 2000 ballot or, alternatively, to seal the results of such a ballot.

The County asserted numerous defenses, including that Scharps did not have standing to bring the declaratory action against the County. On November 7, 2000, the eve of the election, the trial court rendered an order denying injunctive relief and reserving judgment on declaratory relief, finding that Scharps failed to meet the burden of persuasion that his own injury would outweigh the complications necessary to comply with any injunctive relief.¹ Specifically, the court held,

Plaintiff does not allege personal or financial injury as a result of the tabulating and releasing the votes on the non-binding referendum. Rather, Plaintiff alleges an inability on the part of the Board of County Commissioners to exercise any discretion as to potential future proposed referenda....

Apparently the referendum was held on November 8, 2000.² On March 12, 2002, the trial court entered the final judgment declaring the resolution invalid, finding that the County improperly placed a non-binding referendum regarding universal health care on the November 2000 election ballot. The judgment did not address or explicitly rule on the standing issue. The County filed a timely motion for rehearing, arguing in part that the issue of Scharps' standing was not addressed by the court. The trial court denied the motion for rehearing, and this appeal ensued.

Standard of Review

Determining whether a party has standing is a pure question of law to be reviewed de novo. See Edgewater Beach Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Walton County, 833 So.2d 215, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002)

. The trial court failed to explicitly address the arguments as to Scharps' standing to bring this action. The trial court, however, implicitly found there was standing by addressing the merits of appellee's complaint. When standing is raised as an issue, the trial court must determine whether the plaintiff has a sufficient interest at stake in the controversy which will be affected by the outcome of the litigation. See Fox v. Prof'l Wrecker Operators of Fla., Inc., 801 So.2d 175, 178 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001). The trial court should have addressed the standing issue. See Jones v. Dep't of Revenue, 523 So.2d 1211, 1214 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ("Before reaching the merits of appellant's challenge, however, it is first necessary to determine whether appellant had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute.").

Appellant admits he suffered no special injury, but he alleged in his complaint, asserted at the trial level, and argues on appeal that he is exempt from the special injury rule because he has "taxpayer standing" and constitutional standing. We find he has neither.

Taxpayer Standing

Generally, in order to have standing to bring an action the plaintiff must allege that he has suffered or will suffer a special injury. See Rickman v. Whitehurst, 73 Fla. 152, 157, 74 So. 205, 207 (1917); Godheim v. City of Tampa, 426 So.2d 1084, 1086-88 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). The special injury requirement, or the "Rickman rule," has an exception "[w]here there is an attack upon constitutional grounds based directly upon the Legislature's taxing and spending power." N. Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Fornes, 476 So.2d 154, 155 (Fla.1985) (emphasis in original) (quoting Dep't of Admin. v. Horne, 269 So.2d 659, 663 (Fla.1972)). When such constitutional grounds exist "there is standing to sue without the Rickman requirement of special injury." Id. (quoting Horne, 269 So.2d at 663). The supreme court refused to depart from this special injury rule or expand this exception. Fornes, 476 So.2d at 155; see also Sch. Bd. of Volusia County v. Clayton, 691 So.2d 1066 (Fla.1997)

(reaffirming long-established precedent that taxpayer standing requires special injury on constitutional challenge); Dep't of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981) (noting that absent a constitutional challenge, a taxpayer can only have standing upon a showing of special injury which is distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers in the taxing district). Thus, taxpayer standing is available if the taxpayer can show that a government taxing measure or expenditure violates specific constitutional limitations on the taxing and spending power. See Martin v. City of Gainesville, 800 So.2d 687, 688-689 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Paul v. Blake, 376 So.2d 256, 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) ("A taxpayer may institute such a suit without a showing of special injury if he attacks ... taxing or spending authority on the ground that it exceeds specific limitations imposed on the... taxing or spending power by the ... Florida Constitution.").³ Here, appellee generally asserts that the County employed the "powers and resources of the State of Florida or of Alachua County" outside the scope of section 125.01(1)(y), but he does not assert that the County violated a specific taxing and spending power under the state or federal constitution.⁴

The case of Martin v. Gainesville, 800 So.2d at 687, is instructive on this issue. The plaintiff in Martin filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief as did Scharps in the instant case. There the plaintiff sought to prevent expenditures for a policy with which he disagreed, claiming that these expenditures were in violation of Article VIII, Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, which gives municipalities governmental, corporate, and proprietary powers for municipal purposes "except otherwise provided by law." Id. at 688. In Martin this court affirmed the trial court's dismissal for lack of standing, finding that the plaintiff had failed to show that the defendant "violated the specific limitations imposed upon a city in taxing or spending by the Florida Constitution.... [M]ere statutory violations did not constitute `violations of specific provisions of the Florida Constitution.'" Id. at 688 (quoting Fredericks v. Blake, 382 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)). Similarly in City of Atlantic Beach v. Bull, 476 So.2d 158 (Fla.1985), the plaintiff relied on the same theory of standing which appellee argues here: he is a citizen, resident and taxpayer, and the local government's action was outside the general powers granted under the Florida Constitution. In Bull, however, the supreme court rejected that standing theory. See also City of Sarasota v. Windom, 736 So.2d 741, 742 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)

(finding no standing where the...