Alack v. Vic Tanny Intern. of Missouri, Inc.

Citation923 S.W.2d 330
Decision Date28 May 1996
Docket NumberNo. 78423,78423
PartiesCharles ALACK, Respondent/Cross-Appellant, v. VIC TANNY INTERNATIONAL OF MISSOURI, INC., et al., Appellants/Cross-Respondents.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Missouri

Anthony J. Sestric, St. Louis, for Appellants/Cross Respondents.

James D. Ross, St. Louis, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant.

PRICE, Justice.

Plaintiff was injured while using health club facilities. He had signed a two-page, seventeen-paragraph "Retail Installment Contract" containing a general exculpatory clause. The clause, however, did not expressly release the health club from injuries resulting from its own negligence. The trial court ruled that the exculpatory clause did not bar plaintiff's negligence action as a matter of law, but the trial court allowed the contract as evidence and submitted the issue to the jury as a matter of fact. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $17,000.

We hold that the exculpatory clause was ambiguous and that defendant health club did not insulate itself from liability for future negligence because the exculpatory clause did not use the word "negligence" or "fault" or their equivalents so that a clear and unmistakable waiver occurred. We further hold that the trial court correctly denied the plaintiff's motion for a new trial on damages and plaintiff's request for an instruction on punitive damages. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

I.

In 1982, Charles Alack became a member of Vic Tanny International of Missouri, Inc., a health club facility. Alack was encouraged to engage in a specific cardiovascular workout routine known as the "Super Circuit". During this routine, a member was instructed to exercise on ten different weight machines while running a lap between each exercise. The weight machines used during a "Super Circuit" were specifically chosen because they required only a selection of weight amount prior to their use and would not interrupt the cardiovascular nature of the routine.

While using an upright row machine during a "Super Circuit", the machine's handle disengaged from the weight cable and smashed into Alack's mouth and jaw. Alack suffered injuries to his mouth and lips, including several loose and broken teeth. As of the trial, Alack had seen his dentist over 20 times, had undergone two surgeries, and was scheduled for a third surgery. While the surgeries relieved some of Alack's pain, his temporomandibular joint remained displaced. Alack testified that he will be subject to additional jaw problems, including arthritic changes, and might require additional surgery in the future. Alack had already incurred, or was committed to incur, $17,000.00 in medical expenses for these surgical and dental procedures.

The handle of the machine was connected without the necessary clevis pin placed between the cable and the pigtail hook. The manufacturer originally designed, manufactured, and shipped the machine with the clevis pin in place. The manufacturer also provided a user manual warning that keeping the equipment correctly assembled was "critically important to user safety." 1 At trial, maintenance employees of Vic Tanny acknowledged that the work-out machine could be dangerous if used without the clevis pin. It was also acknowledged that Vic Tanny did not require periodic inspections by any specifically designated employee to make certain that the clevis pin was in place.

On cross-examination, Alack was questioned about his Vic Tanny "Retail Installment Contract", including a paragraph purporting to release Vic Tanny from "any and all claims" against it. 2 At no place in the membership contract does Alack expressly agree to release Vic Tanny from its own future negligence or fault. All seventeen of the paragraphs on the form-contract were printed with the same-sized lettering. Nothing made Paragraph G, or any of the language contained therein, conspicuously stand out. Alack signed the contract near the bottom of the first page. Paragraph G was on the back side of the contract.

During trial, Vic Tanny initially used the exculpatory paragraph to demonstrate that Alack was aware that injuries could occur during a workout session. Then Alack used the paragraph to explain that he believed he was only releasing Vic Tanny from any injuries caused if he attempted to lift too much weight or workout for too long of a period. Alack explained what the clause meant to him during direct examination:

Q. (By Alack's attorney) And having read that language what was your understanding as to what that language meant?

A. (By Alack) That language to me meant that if--It's somewhat of a limitation of liability intended. And to me it meant that if I did something, sprained my back, which I have done, sprained ankle or whatever in working out with the weights that they're not liable.

* * * * * *

Q. Did you understand that language to mean that if Vic Tanny was negligent and that negligence resulted in injury to you that you could not bring a claim against Vic Tanny for negligence?

A. No, that was not my understanding.

Finally, Vic Tanny argued that the exculpatory clause entitled it to a directed verdict because Paragraph G bars any negligence claim by Alack as a matter of law. The trial judge decided to submit the issue to the jury. The jury was instructed that it could find in favor of Vic Tanny only if it believed that, when Alack signed the membership agreement, he had agreed to release Vic Tanny from the type of claim involved in this case. The jury returned a verdict against Vic Tanny on Alack's negligence count, and awarded Alack $17,000.00 in damages. Vic Tanny filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Alack filed a motion for a new trial on the issue of damages or, in the alternative, to increase the jury award. Both motions were overruled by the trial court.

Vic Tanny appeals, alleging: 1) that the trial court erred in denying Vic Tanny a directed verdict as a matter of law on Alack's negligence claim because of the exculpatory membership contract; 2) that the trial court erred in allowing Alack to testify to his understanding of the membership agreement because the agreement contained clear and unambiguous language not to be contradicted by parol evidence; and 3) that the trial court erred in refusing Vic Tanny's proffered instruction that provided an affirmative defense based on the release contained in the membership contract.

Alack cross-appeals, alleging: 1) that the trial court erred in allowing the exculpatory language of the membership contract into evidence because it was irrelevant and prejudicial, and, therefore, he is entitled to a new trial on damages; and 2) that the trial court erred in refusing to submit an instruction on the issue of punitive damages because the jurors could have found that Vic Tanny demonstrated complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety of others.

II.
A. Release From Future Negligence
1.

Although exculpatory clauses in contracts releasing an individual from his or her own future negligence are disfavored, they are not prohibited as against public policy. Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Mo.1965). However, contracts exonerating a party from acts of future negligence are to be "strictly construed against the party claiming the benefit of the contract, and clear and explicit language in the contract is required to absolve a person from such liability." Hornbeck v. All American Indoor Sports, Inc., 898 S.W.2d 717, 721 (Mo.App.1995). It is a "well-established rule of construction that a contract provision exempting one from liability for his or her negligence will never be implied but must be clearly and explicitly stated." Poslosky v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 349 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Mo.1961).

2.

Most states have enforced exculpatory clauses when they include specific references to the negligence or fault of the drafter. In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 508-509 (Tex.1993), the Texas Supreme Court applied an "express negligence doctrine" that requires a release to specifically express the intent of a party to be relieved from his or her own negligence. The court explained that indemnity agreements, releases, exculpatory agreements, or waivers are extraordinary methods of shifting the risk of negligent conduct. Id. at 508. Therefore, individuals wishing to protect themselves from their own negligence "must express that intent in specific terms within the four corners of the contract." Id.

In Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 424 N.Y.S.2d 365, 367-368, 400 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1979), the New York Court of Appeals first noted the following principles of law regarding the construction of exculpatory language:

As the cases make clear, the law's reluctance to enforce exculpatory provisions of this nature has resulted in the development of an exacting standard by which courts measure their validity. So, it has been repeatedly emphasized that unless the intention of the parties is expressed in unmistakable language, an exculpatory clause will not be deemed to insulate a party from liability for his own negligent acts [citations omitted]. Put another way, it must appear plainly and precisely that the "limitation of liability extends to negligence or other fault of the party attempting to shed his ordinary responsibility" [citations omitted].

Not only does this stringent standard require that the drafter of such an agreement make its terms unambiguous, but it mandates that the terms be understandable as well. Thus, a provision that would exempt its drafter from any liability occasioned by his fault should not compel resort to a magnifying glass and lexicon. [citations omitted].

The court then held that a release providing that "I ... waive any and all claims", language remarkably similar to that used in the present case, was insufficient to bar a personal injury action for negligence because the release...

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