Alameda County Land Use Assn. v. City of Hayward

Decision Date12 October 1995
Docket NumberNo. A067490,A067490
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 8072, 95 Daily Journal D.A.R. 13,823 ALAMEDA COUNTY LAND USE ASSOCIATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF HAYWARD et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Meyers, Nave, Riback, Silver & Wilson Michael R. Nave, Rick W. Jarvis, San Leandro, Frederik A. Jacobsen, San Mateo, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Pacific Legal Foundation, Robin L. Rivett and Gregory W. McCracken, Sacramento, for Amicus Curiae.

Michael J. O'Toole, City Attorney for the City of Hayward, Hayward, Michael H. Roush, City Attorney for the City of Pleasanton, Pleasanton, for Defendants and Respondents.

HANING, Associate Justice.

Plaintiffs and appellants Alameda County Land Use Association et al. 1 appeal the dismissal of their action for injunctive and declaratory relief after the demurrer of defendants and respondents City of Hayward et al. 2 was sustained without leave to amend. They contend the trial court erred in ruling their action was not ripe because they had not been injured by adoption of a memorandum of understanding (MOU) entered into between respondents concerning approximately 13,000 acres of open space.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

When reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, we assume the truth of all properly pled material facts and consider those matters which may be judicially noticed (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58), and we report them accordingly.

On or about November 16, 1993, respondents entered into an MOU with each other concerning a parcel of approximately 13,000 acres known as the Ridgelands Area and consisting primarily of open pasture space. Portions of the Ridgelands Area lie within the city limits of Pleasanton and Hayward; the majority lies within the unincorporated area of Alameda County. Part of this unincorporated area lies within Pleasanton's "sphere of influence." 3

Paragraph one of the MOU states that respondents shall use their "best efforts" to adopt into their respective general plans, certain specified goals and policies concerning the Ridgelands Area. Paragraph three provides that if each respondent's general plan is so amended, any further amendments to "that portion of each [respondent's] General Plan applicable to the Ridgelands Area shall provide that said amendment shall not be effective unless there are parallel amendments adopted by the other [respondents]."

The goals and policies specified in the MOU were substantially adopted into Hayward's general plan by resolution of its City Council on July 27, 1993, and into Pleasanton's general plan by a voter initiative entitled "The Pleasanton Ridgelands Area Plan Initiative" on November 2, 1993, prior to execution of the MOU. The Hayward general plan now provides that "Any subsequent amendments to the Ridgelands Area planning policies of this general plan shall not be effective unless and until parallel amendments are made to the general plans of Alameda County and the City of Pleasanton." The Pleasanton initiative states that the initiative "shall not be amended as to the land use designations nor repealed except by a vote of the people of Pleasanton. Any such amendments or repeal of this initiative shall not be effective unless there are parallel amendments (or a parallel repeal) adopted by the City of Hayward and the County of Alameda." Alameda County has not yet adopted all specified MOU goals and policies into its general plan.

Appellants are two individuals owning property within the unincorporated portion of the Ridgelands Area, and four non-profit organizations representing residents or property owners in all three jurisdictions of the Ridgelands Area. They filed the instant action to obtain a declaration that the MOU was invalid on its face and as applied to their property within the Ridgelands Area, and unenforceable because paragraphs one and three constitute an unlawful attempt by each respondent (1) contractually and legislatively to divest itself of, surrender and impair its discretion and power to enact legislation within its authority, and (2) to delegate to other agencies legislative land use authority exclusively delegated to it by law, including Government Code sections 65350 et seq. and 65588. Therefore, they contend, the MOU unlawfully prohibits and restrains each respondent from amending its general plan to include certain goals and policies applicable to property in the Ridgelands Area, regardless of whether that respondent, now or in the future, finds such goals and policies best promote the public interest or welfare of the respondent's residents.

Appellants also sought an injunction against implementation of the MOU on the grounds implementation would irreparably harm them and the general public because (1) adoption would occur without adequate independent consideration by each respondent of whether the specified goals and policies are in the public interest; (2) once the specified goals and policies are adopted, each respondent will deem future amendments to its general plan inapplicable to the Ridgelands Area unless parallel general plan amendments are made by all respondents, regardless of whether it deems such future amendments to be in the public interest; and (3) the rights of individual landowners to ask the local government wherein their property lies to amend its general plan's goals and policies applicable to their property and act independently upon that request in light of the public interest are violated.

Respondents demurred on the grounds that appellants' complaint failed to state a cause of action, that certain claims were not ripe for review, and that others were not subject to facial challenge.

The trial court first concluded that appellants did not allege they were parties to or had enforceable rights under the MOU. Second, it ruled the complaint lacked allegations that an actual controversy admitting of definitive and conclusive relief existed, or that appellants were actually injured or deprived of any rights by the adoption of the MOU. Third, it concluded the complaint lacked allegations that (1) the MOU had been enforced to appellants' detriment, (2) that appellants attempted to file the necessary land use applications to perfect their "as applied" claims, or (3) that the MOU would not substantially

advance a legitimate state interest. The court sustained respondents' demurrer without leave to amend because it felt appellants did not show they could amend their complaint to allege such controversy, rights or lack of purpose with respect to the MOU, as opposed to "future land use decisions."

DISCUSSION
I

The principal issue in this appeal is whether appellants' complaint presents a justiciable controversy. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1060, "Any person interested under a written instrument, ... or under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, ... may, in cases of actual controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action ... for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument or contract."

Respondents' demurrer admits the truth of all material factual allegations of appellants' complaint. (Perdue v. Crocker National Bank (1985) 38 Cal.3d 913, 922, 216 Cal.Rptr. 345, 702 P.2d 503.) If those facts reveal an actual controversy exists between the parties, the complaint is legally sufficient for declaratory relief. (Zeitlin v. Arnebergh (1963) 59 Cal.2d 901, 908, 31 Cal.Rptr. 800, 383 P.2d 152.) Sustaining a demurrer when the complaint reveals such a controversy constitutes error. (Maguire v. Hibernia S. & L. Soc. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 719, 728, 737, 146 P.2d 673; Browning v. Aymard (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 277, 281, 36 Cal.Rptr. 604.)

Before a controversy is ripe for adjudication it "must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. [Citation.] It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." (Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 171, 188 Cal.Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306 quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth (1937) 300 U.S. 227, 240-241, 57 S.Ct. 461, 464, 81 L.Ed. 617.) "The 'actual controversy' referred to in [Code of Civil Procedure section 1060] is one which admits of definitive and conclusive relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state of facts. The judgment must decree, not suggest, what the parties may or may not do. [Citations.]" (Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d 110, 117, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111.) "The principle that courts will not entertain an action which is not founded on an actual controversy is a tenet of common law jurisprudence, the precise content of which is difficult to define and hard to apply.... A controversy is 'ripe' when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made." (California Water & Telephone Co. v. County of Los Angeles (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 16, 22, 61 Cal.Rptr. 618.)

In the context of a declaratory relief action seeking review of the propriety of an administrative act before any application of the act to the parties challenging it, the United States Supreme Court observed: "The problem is best seen in a twofold...

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